Truthlords

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Preface

This book is a collection of papers presented at seminars, conferences and congresses. It is divided into two parts: one in Arabic and the other in English.

In 1984 the International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP) issued volume two of a series under the title: "Philosophes critiques d'eux mêmes".(*)which included a synopsis of my ideas. I think that it is oppropriate to quote this synopsis as a preface to this Book:

Man, by his very nature, is a creative animal. Thus, to understand what it is to be human is to give centrality to our power of creativity. But, up to the present moment, formal logic has failed to shed light on the process of creativity for two reasons: first, it has played a great role in annihilating the creative function of reason through the non-contradiction principle that has been transformed into an absolute formal criterion of truth. In this sense, if a scientific theory is claimed to be true, thinking of its contradictory as a possible truth is inadmissible. Second, it has put reason into the context of argument, and the argument presupposes that we already know what we would like others to accept. Thus, the argument confines reason to man's relation with other men rather than the relation of man to nature.

(*) André Mercier (ed), Philosophes Critiques d'Eux - Mêmes., Peter Lang, 1984.

The origin of civilization reveals the essential characteristic of reason, that is "creativity" of the techniques of agriculture. In essence, this creativity has transformed man's relation to nature from being horizontal, during the hunting age, into being vertical. In other words, reason transcends the world, and this transcendence means humanizing the world by transforming it. This meaning of reason excludes mechanistic objectivism which claims that science is merely a description of objective reality, and excludes also solipsism which reduces the world to the creation of reason.

The first exclusion is due to the inability of reason to transcend reality; and the second is due to the presupposition that reason is *a priori* to reality. In either exclusion man is not engaged in transforming reality. That would be impossible in mechanistic objectivism because, for this kind of objectivism, reason is the object of reality, and reality would then be transformed by itself. The solipsistic view is equally incompatible with the concept of transforming reality, since the transformation of an imaginary reality is an absurdity. Thus in both concepts of reason there can be no true transformation of reality. Transformation is only possible where the objective-subjective is maintained. In this sense, we have to claim that science is not a 'description' of reality but an 'interpretation ' of reality.But this interpretation is related to praxis in the Marxian sense. Thus, reason can be defined as the faculty of practico-transcendental interpretation. And this definition involves a substantial relation between reason and revolution if we mean by revolution radical transformation of reality. Thus, reason, being creative, is revolutionary.

But, this was not always the case. In ancient times, mythos was the central organizing principle, and accordingly it gained an absolute authority in matters of science as well as in those of morals. On the other hand, history of civilization shows us how human reason has

managed to emancipate man from the mythology of the agricultural civilization. The Greeks were the first to transform this Mythos into something more rational, into Logos. From that time to the present day that thread of rationalism has been lost at times, but it has been possible to find it again. It has been lost in the feudal civilization in the Middle Ages where man was imprisoned in a religious closed system. By the French Revolution this closed system has been transformed into a secular open system. But gradually this open system was transformed into a closed one due to the emergence of monopoly and imperialism. Consequently, the uprising of an open socialist system was a must.

Anyhow, this human evolution proves that man is in search of an 'ism' which has to be negated by a 'de-ism'. 'De' means negation of an absolutized ism, losing its absoluteness into relativeness for the sake of an absolutised 're-ism'. So, re-ism is implied in de-ism. This triad implies a dialectical relation between the absolute and the relative. But a dialectical relation should not be tackled on an idealist level, as if it were a struggle of isms regardless of the socio-economic factors.

But man evades this triad if he is considered as an end in himself. And this cannot be realized unless he becomes cosmic, conquering the cosmos and achieving what may be called the cosmic consciousness.

Yet, as a prelude to this cosmic consciousness, three substantial achievements should be realized: Sovereignty of Logos, which is up to the scientific and technological revolution. Abolishment of social classes as a cause of the dichotomy principle that is prevailing over the class divided societies beginning from the agricultural civilization. Unity of knowledge as an incarnation of the unity of the cosmos if we take this unity to mean unity of nature and man. But this unity of knowledge can be achieved through what may be called "Three P's Science", that is, Physics, Politics, and Philosophy.

It is now acknowledged that the findings of natural sciences and mathematics can be reduced to the principles of physics. As for politics, man's rationality is due to being social and being social means at the same time being political. Physics is joined to political power in a radically new way, that caused the emergence of what could be called the political physicist. This conjuncture could be an exercise of unification, but it is insufficient for formulating a weltanschauung It is the task of philosophy being considered as cosmogony and the philosopher as cosmogonist.

That is precisely what I have undertaken to articulate in my philosophical perspective, namely to trace the rise and fall of isms, or to pursue the history of philosophy as the struggle of absolutes, or strictly speaking the dialectical relation of the absolute and the relative, or the closed and the open systems which is a synthesis of the history of philosophy as it has been portrayed in my two books: *Thc concept of system in Bergson's philosophy.* (1960) and *the story of philosophy* (1968). This led to a new reconstruction of philosophy as the science of the cosmos, not in the traditional Greek sense but in a new perspective in which I envisage philosophy to be moving, that is, the establishment of a new science, namely that of the *Three P's Science,* which I intend to develop.

The pivotal concept in my philosophy, taken as a whole, can be seen as a battle against the spirit of dogmatization. This distrust in dogmatization explains the fascination which the Bergsonian system exercised on me for such a long time, that is, during the fifties when I started to be preoccupied with the problem of building systems. For BERGSoN did make a very splendid effort to preserve the primacy of de-dogmatization through the open system.


Since that time I began to relate the system to the social regime. In short, I discovered that throughout the history of human thought

system builders sought either to justify the status quo through a closed system, or to pave the way for a pro quo by adopting an open system. The open system, in this case, is then transformed into a closed one with the establishment and reinforcement of the social system. It then appeared to me that the system is equivalent to ideology, or an ism.

From the beginning of the seventies and up till now I have been involved in tackling Afro-Asian problems in a philosophic perspective. I organized the first Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference which was held in Cairo in 1978 on the theme "Philosophy and Civilization". The idea of organizing this conference came as a result of my conviction that the Afro-Asian civilization lacks two essential movements: Reformation, that is, critical thinking in religious issues, and Enlightenment which means liberation of reason from any other authority save that of reason itself. These two movements are the fundamentals of the modern society whether it adopts capitalism or socialism. And that is why the Afro-Asian societies are in search of an 'ism'.

Out of the Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference evolved another idea, namely, that of the First Islamic Philosophy Conference which I organized and which was held in Cairo in 1979 under the topic 'Islam and Civilization', and which concentrated upon the interrelationship of the modern Western industrialized secular societies and the Islamic non-industrialized, non-secular ones, through the issue of secularization as an outcome of religious reformation.

As to the question whether I am a pessimist or an optimist, my answer is that as an Afro-Asian thinker. I am a pessimist, but as a militant I am optimistic.



Dogmatism

THE FUNDAMENT ALIST ABSOLUTE
and
SECULARIZATION in the MIDDLE EAST(*)

The title of this paper necessitates at the outset, the clarification of three terms: "absolute", "fundamentalist", "and "secularization".

Kant was the first to introduce the concept of the absolute into the field of philosophy, at the beginning of his preface to the first edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason". He says that reason has this peculiar destiny, within a part of its knowledge, of being forced to face questions we cannot avoid. These questions are imposed on reason by its very nature, but it is unable to give answers. These unanswerable questions are about the concept of absolute, whether you call it God or State. And the history of philosophy, according to Kant, is nothing but the story of this inability. However, Kant differentiates between two cases: to seek to grapple the absolute and to grapple the absolute. A possibility for grappling the absolute has alwayas existed and will always exist, but to conceive that you have grasped the absolute, in an absoulte way, is an illusion. For insofar as one grasps the absolute he or she limits it, and then it is no longer the all comprehending reality.

This Kantian notion of the absolute which flourished, in late nineteenth century Germany, in a mystical form and emigrated to England with the specific purpose of counteracting the antireligious

absolute was Berkeleyian solipsism. But it was done to death in the early years of this century; people ceased to believe in the manufacture of the universe by human reason.

In recent times a new absolute has emerged, that is, the fundamentalist absolute. Thus we have to clarity what is meant by fundamentalism. It is described in the Oxford Dictionary as a religious movement that became active among various Protestant bodies in the United States after World War I, based on strict adherence to the literal inerrancy of Scripture, held to be fundamental to the Christian faith.

The word came into use in the United States by 1920, and was probably coined by the editor of the New York Watchman-Examiner, who described "fundamentalists" as those "who mean to do battle royal for the fundamentals". The term "the fundamentals" was familiar to Watchman readers thanks to a series of free booklets that had been issued between 1909 and 1915, which dealt with the fundamentals of faith, such as the reality of hell and the second advent of Christ, a series of attacks on the biblical criticism that treated the Bible chiefly as the record of a remarkable religious development' and criticism of scientific theories, especially Darwinism, in view of the threat that it seemed to present to the doctrine of creation.

From our understanding of the meaning of "the absolute" and "fundamentalism", we can define the meaning of the "fundamentalist absolute" as not being abstract and isolated from the historical process, but as being immanent, with the purpose of controlling the historical process by confining it to the past. In this sense, the fundamentalist absolute is a rupturous agent that is also definitive and interdictory, and therefore considers war as sacred and essential.

There remains "secularization", it is derived from the Latin word

saeculum, which means "the world in time and in history". Hence the definition to be adopted is that secularization is the process by which human existence is determined by the dimension of time and history. In this sense secularization as a movement emerged in 1543, when a new mentality was born with Copernicus' "De Revolutionibus orbium coelestium. "Its pivotal idea is that humanity is not the center of the universe.

Hence, fundamentalism differs from conservatism. Conservatism accepts the modern reduction of the role of religion and accepts the modern arena in which the theological task is to be done whereas fundamentalists are uncomfortable with the modern logos and are critical of it. Their main purpose is not to translate religion into the mental categories of modernity but to change these categories so that religion can be grasped. It stems from the belief that the whole world, not just some religious segment, should reflect its sacred source.

The underlying cause of the severe attack of fundamentalists on modernity is the emergence of a new trend in the West, that is, secular humanism. "A Secular Humanist Declaration",(1) drafted by Paul Kurtz and endorsed by fifty-eight prominent scholars.

This new trend is based on the following principles:

1. Free inquiry; the right to differ not only in science and everyday life but also in politics, economics, ethics, and religion.

2. Separation of church and state: the foundation of an open democratic society where the clerical authorities are not permitted to legislate their own parochial views - whether moral, philosophical, or political.

3. The ideal of freedom: to defend freedom of conscience and belief not only from ecclesiastical control, but also from government control.

4. Ethics: based on critical intelligence, ethics independent of revealed religion, formulated by critical thinking and in contradiction with absolute ethics.

5. Moral education: no particular sect can claim its values as its exclusive property; accordingly, moral education should be designed to encourage the capacity of free choice.

6. Religious skepticism of the supernatural, doubt about traditional views of God and divinity, and denial of literal interpretation of sacred texts; universe is controlled by natural forces that can be understood by scientific research.

7. Reason: concern over the current attack by nonsecularists on reason and science, and commitment to rational methods of inquiry and testing claims to truth.

8. Science and technology: belief in the scientific method for understanding the world; looking to the natural biological, social, and behavioral sciences, to astronomy and physics for learning the dimensions of the universe.

9. Evolution: defending the theory of evolution against the fundamentalist's attacks, which are a serious threat to academic freedom.

10. Education: the essential method of building humane, free, and democratic societies and of developing the capacity for critical thinking in both the individual and the community.

Consequently, one may conclude that there are two main trends in the second half of the twentieth century, that is, religious fundamentalism and secular humanism. In this paper I will tackle the religious fundamentalism in its Islamic form and expound the ideas of the most in-

fluential militant thinkers: Maulana Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, Ruhollah Khomeini, and Ali Shariati.

Islamic fundamentalism can be seen in motion throughout the Moslem world from North Africa to Southeast Asia, and it affects a total of six hundred million Moslems. It professes to offer a political, economic and social system that provides an alternative to both the capitalist and socialist systems, and that could recreate the conditions that existed in the days of the Prophet Mohammed.

Maulana Maududi (1903-1979) was born in South Central India. Many of his ancestors were leading members of sufi orders, although he did not seem to have sufi connections. His writings, mostly on Islamic subjects, attracted the attention of Iqbal, who invited him in 1937 to carry on his literary work on the premises of a charitable foundation at Pathankot in the Punjab. In 1941 he founded the Islamic group Jamaat-i-Islam. Failing to come to terms with the new state, he was jailed by the Pakistani authorities from 1948 to 1956. Maududi's Jamaat was an open supporter of the late General Zia al-Haq's military dictatorship, and colluded in the hanging of ex-Prime Minister Bhutto in 1969.

In Maududi's(1) views "Islam is not a mere collection of dogmas and rituals. It is a complete way of life. It is the embodiment of Divine Guidance for all fields of human life."(2) The logical consequence of this approach is that the state must be moulded on Islamic patterns."(3) Thus, "the western concept of the separation of religion from politics, is foreign to Islam and the adoption of it would be the very negation of the Islamic concept of polity."(4)

Moreover, "the experience of the Western countries with secularism is no way encouraging. Separation of politics from morality

and religion has created more problems than it has solved. The result is that there is scepticism in thought, confusion in values, expediency in standards."[5] Sovereignty of God is the essence of monotheism (Tawheed) against polytheism (Shirk). "All authority and all powers rest in His hands."[6] The modern secular states regard themselves sovereign.[7] It is a logical consequence of this concept of sovereignty that the political organisation of the Islamic state has been called viceregency (Khalifat). "Man is God's viceregent on earth and as a viceregent his mission in life is to carry out and establish the command of the sovereign.".[8]

Maududi's mistake was that he considered secularization as being essentially a way of dealing with human matters through the relative and not through the absolute, that is, a refusal to absolutize the relative. And religious fundamentalism in general is nothing but an attempt to absolutize the relative. This error is also the result of considering secularization as being exclusively limited to Western civilization. This has created, in turn, an artificial dichotomy by splitting civilization into Western and Islamic, whereas human civilization is one with diverse levels, the diversity being marked by the civilization's process from mythical thinking (mythos) to rationality (logos) through the passage of secularization.

The major agent of transmitting Maududi's ideas was his disciple Hasan Ali Nadavi. The book he wrote in Arabic, "What Did the World Lose Due to the Decline of Islam? expounded Maududi's modern jahiliyya doctrine. When the author visited the Middle East in 1951 and met Sayyid Qutb in Cairo, they found their ideas to be in close affinity, expecially the concept of modern jahiliyya (barbarism), which became the pivotal concept in Qutb's writings.

The negation of God's sovereignty denotes that human beings are under the domination of other humans rather than of God, and this means applying laws laid down by humans, whereas Islam observes the Law of God. Consequently, Qutb has conceived the societies of today as barbaric inluding the Communist, the Jewish, the Christian, and even those who claim to be Islamic societies insofar as some of them explicitly adopt secularization and others declare that they adopt religion but exclude religion from the social system. From the concept of jahiliyya Qutb concludes that Islam liberates people from being slaves to other human beings because it declares that God is the only giver of Law. But this declaration is not mere speculation, it necessitates being incarnated into reality by force, or, strictly speaking, by the sword.

In this way, the fundamentalist absolute is antagonistic to secularization, and this antagonism is bloody on the ground that secularization is a negation of God's sovereignty in all areas of human life.

At last comes Khomeini, who incarnated the bloody fundamentalist absolute in Iran in 1979 through the establishment of the Islamic Republic. His perception of this Republic rotates round three issues: the need to subordinate political power to Islamic goals; the duty of the religious scholars (the fuqaha) to bring about an Islamic state of "the governance of the Faqih". a program of action for the establishment of the Islamic state.

These three issues rotate around the idea that the divine command has an absolute authority over all individuals and the government, the "Fuqaha" themselves are the real rulers,(9) and this is the duty of the Faqih to use the governamental institutions to execute the divine Law to establish the just Islamic order. The Law is actually the ruler.(10)

Thus, the Islamic Republic differs from the secular republic in that the people do not assemble to pass laws or to make laws. Such power in Islam is in the hands of the Almighty. The Almighty is the sole legislative power,[11] through the Koran and the Sunna. Consequently, the separation of religion from government is completely alien to the spirit and the teachings of Islam.

What are the qualifications of an Islamic ruler who can undertake these responsibilities of government? First, the leader must rule according to the Divine Law and not to his own will. Second, this Divine Law is conceived as being an interpretation of the just Faqih, and the people have to obey in accordance with the Koranic verse: "Obelievers obey God and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you". Up to this point one can see that Khomeini's concept of the fundamentalist absolute is not theorized and elaborated. The one who did it was Ali Shariati. In his book "The Sociology of Islam" he tries to interpret history in religious terms. He says that the story of Cain and Abel is the story of history, the beginning of the war that still has not concluded. The weapon of each is religion. It is for this reason that the war of religion against religion has been constant in human history. On the one hand, is the religion of Shirk, of assigning partners to God, a religion that furnishes the justification of Shirk in society and class discrimination. On the other hand is the religion of Tawheed, of the oneness of God that furnishes the justification for the unity of all classes and races[12]. But this does not mean that Shariati is for communism. He is against both capitalism and communism because Islam excels both.

Now the question is:

What are the fundamentals of the Tawheed, that is, Islam?

They are three: preservation (Taqiya), submission to the Imam, and ability to offer one's life as a testimony. The most important is the third principle because it is this principle that pushes the Moslem into war without hesitation. In this respect it is not death that chooses the martyr, but the martyr who chooses death consciously and according to his or her own will. It is not a matter of tragedy but of an ideal because testimony by blood is the supreme degree of perfection. This means that the real Moslem is the militant martyr.

To conclude, Islamic fundamentalism confuses the absolute with the relative, the eternal truth with a temporal expression of the truth. Thus the theological truth of yesterday is defended as an unchangeable message against the theological truth of today and tomorrow. Islamic fundamentalism fails to make contact with the present situation, not because it speaks from beyond every situation but because it speaks from a situation of the past. It elevates something finite and transitory to infinite and eternal validity. In this context, fundamentalism paves the way for what I call "absolute struggle".

Notes

* Paper presented at the XVIII World Congress of Philosophy, Brighton, August 1988.
(1) P.Kurtz, A Secular Humanist Declaration, U.S.A., 1980.
(2) Maududi, **The Islamic Law and Constitution,** p.7.
(3) **Ibid.,** p. 1.
(4) **Ibid.,** p. 5.
(5) **Ibid.,** p. 5-6.
(6) **Ibid.,** p. 162.
(7) **Ibid.,** p. 172.
(8) **Ibid.**
(9) Khomeini, **Islam and Revolution,** trans. Hamid Algar, Mizan Press, Berkeley, 1981, p.56.
(10) **Ibid.,** p. 79.
(11) **Ibid.,** p. 53.
(12) Ali Shariati, **On the Sociology of Islam.**

TOLERANCE and DOGMATISM (*)

In the Encyclopedia Britannica tolerance is defined as "the allowance of freedom of action or judgment to other people". This understanding of tolerance does capture one of its essential features, that is, freedom. But freedom cannot be absolute, otherwise it breeds intolerance. From the outset of human civilization it is observed that freedom has been regulated. The primitive man invented the idea of "taboo"[1]. To him the taboo meant that certain persons or inanimate objects had been "set apart" from the rest of the world, and had become "sacred", that is, not to be discussed or touched on pain of instant death or torture. From this viewpoint, the taboo always involves the categorical imperative in the negative sense "Thou shalt-not". Thus, the basis of taboo is a prohibited action. Translate this into terms of human history and you get this: intolerance is an inevitable outcome of the concept of taboo.

Let me elaborate this statement by a few observations.

The Greek mind was free to think about the world, as it pleased, to reject all traditional explanations, to search unhampered by any outside authority for the truth. Yet, Protagoras was told to submit his doctrines to the court. Socrates was condemned to death. Aristotle's life was in peril.

Through the Christian era religious intolerance was prevailing. There were all sorts of Inquisitions. The best known of these were the Royal Inquisition of Spain and the Holy Inquisition of Rome. The former was a local affair which watched over the heretics in the Iberian peninsula in the American colonies. The latter had its ramifications all over Europe and burned Joan of Arc in the northern part of the Continent as it burned Giordano Bruno in the south.

In the Islamic civilization al-Ghazali had condemned al-Farabi and Ibn Sina as atheists. Ibn Rushd defended philosophy on the grounds that the demonstrative reasoning is the only reasoning to understand the inner meaning of the Quran. Due to this statement Ibn Rushd was accused of being atheist and was banned.

Now the question is:

What are the causes of intolerance?

Epistemologically, intolerance is an outcome of dogmatism. Sociologically, it is an outcome of the contradiction between the status quo and the pro quo. But this does not mean that there is separation between epistemology and sociology, for they are correlative and inseparable.

How?

Any dogma is a concrete absolute that could be taken as the basis of the society. In this sense, the social system is raised to the level of the absolute and, consequently, it intolerates any tendency towards changing the status quo, on the grounds that the dogma is in crisis the moment it is touched by criticism.

Look at the Reformation of the sixteenth century and you will grasp the organic relation between the dogma and the stagnation of the status quo. The Reformation was the rupture of the tradition of the

Church, of which the dogmatics of the great councils was the framework and the centre. In breaking the dogma of the Church the Reformers broke up the basis of the society. Instead of a feudal society a bourgeois society was emerging, and that is why it is said that due to Reformation the spirit of capitalism emerged before the capitalistic order. But capitalism, through its development, went along the same process. It was transformed into a dogma. Read the "Conservative Mind" by Russell Kirk and you will grasp what is considered nowadays, in America, to be the manifesto of the new right. In this book Kirk says that the "essence of social conservatism is preservation of ancient moral traditions of humanity. Conservatives respect the wisdom of their ancestors; they are dubious of wholescale alteration". Then he goes on to state six canons of conservative thought headed by the belief that a divine intent rules society and that the political problems, at bottom, are religious problems(2). In this sense, conservatism equals dogmatism for conservatism is in itself absolutism and absolutism, in its turn, is a theory of exclusion leading inevitably to unlimited intolerance.

Now comes the following question:

What is to be done to abolish or reduce unlimited intolerance?

There are attempts to overcome this unlimited intolerance by attacking it on the conscious level by showing it to be an erroneous closed system of belief. Such attempt is likely to be wholly unsuccessful because this is not the real ground for the unlimited intolerance. The real cause lies in the irrational forces behind, that is, the "taboo", the untouched, the uncriticized, deeply rooted in the "collective unconscious". Needless to say, the taboo and the collective conscious are widely recognized as a result of the works of Freud.

Now the question is:

Where does tolerance lie?

It is in the transition period from one absolute to another, from one ism to another, but the ism changes through class conflict into de-ism, that is, the negation of ism for the sake of searching for new ism or re-ism. Tolerance has no chance in ism or re-ism, but in the de-ism period.

Notes

(*) Paper submitted to the First EASRG Regional Conference, November, 1981.

(1) "The taboo of the savage Polynesians are after all not so remote from us as we were inclined to think at first, the moral and conventional prohibitions by which ourseves are governed may have some essential relationship with these primitilve taboos and an explanation of taboo might throw a light upon the obscure origin of our categorical imperative". S. Freud, **Totem and Taboo,** Routledge, 1960, p. 22.

(2) Russell Kirk, the Conservative Mind, chicago, 1953.

THE CAVE and the DOGMA (*)

The pinnacle of Plato's philosophy in his doctrine of Forms is presented in the parable of the cave where the prisoners are symbols of human beings. They are captured by an optical illusion that convinces them that the shadow of truth is truth itself; and they are dogmatic in their conviction.

Now the question is:

Why did Plato choose the parable of the cave and not any other parable?

Most probably, the parable is referring to the primitive man who used to live in the cave hiding from the terrific forces of an environment to which he was hardly equal and engaging himself in decorating the walls of his cave with drawings and paintings. But most probably the primitive man was little concerned with beautifying his abode. He had drawn the figures of fierce animals having their heads cut off imagining that, in this way, he had got rid of them. It was not only fierce animals that put terror into his heart, but also nature itself. There was lighting followed by thunder. There was ominous night with its searching sounds coming out of the bush. There was the sudden transition from life to death.

An old legend runs as follows:

"King Saurid, son of Salahoc, reigned in Egypt three hundred years before the Flood and dreamt one night that the earth was convulsed: all houses fell down upon men and the stars collided in the heavens such that their pieces covered the sun. The king awoke in terror, rushed into the sun-temple and consulted the priests and diviners. Akliman, the wisest of them said he too had a similar dream. It was then that the king had the pyramids built in that angular way suitable for withstanding even the blows from stars, with enormous stone blocks held together with iron hooks and cut with a precision such that neither the fire of heaven nor the Flood could harm them. There, the king and the leaders would find refuge".(1)

Then, even the pyramids played the same role of that of the cave with a slight difference. That is, the cave emerged from the insecurity, during life span whereas the pyramids emerged from insecurity after death. But both concepts, the cave and the pyramid, pushed the primitive man to fill in the gaps emerging from the inability of understanging, in a rational and scieutific way, the relation of man to nature. The gaps were filled with spirits. And once man entered into a relationship with the supernatural, the affinity was bound to the creation of gods, or strictly speaking with the absolutes. But the absolutes cannot live in peaceful coexistence, otherwise they lack being absolutes, for the absolute, by its very nature, cannot be but one, And that is why, using the Darwinian terminology, the absolutes struggle for existence, and the survival is for the fittest. But this struggle is performed by man, the relative, and not by the absolute. Thus, man, adopting an absolute, struggle for it to the extent that he kills the other absolutes, and this what I call "theological murder".

Put the Socratic case and you will grasp this act of murder. Socrates was charged with corrupting young men and not believing in

the city's gods. His accusers demanded the death-penalty.

Other cases could be mentioned, but I like to limit myself to one more, which is more significant, that is, the religious war waged by the Empcror Charles V against the Lutheran princes who adopted a new absolute and were subject, at the same time, to the authority held by a representative of the old absoulte. The war lasted for twenty five years.

In both cases, the believers think that when they presever their absolutes, these, in return could cure them from the plague of insecurity.

Still, in contemporary society, man is beset by the plague of insecurity which emerges not from the primitive cave, but from a new cave, that is, the techno-cave.

Clearly, this techno-cave contains a presumption towards totality, towards technicism. It encompasses all dimensions of human relations. In this context, technology is a threat to the very essence of man by transforming him into a man-machine. As a counter-attack, a fundamentalist ethics is built upon "heuristic fear" designed to awaken humanity to the threat posed by technology, which results in alienating man from his essential relation to nature, or strictly speaking, to cosmos. This techno-cave sounds, amazingly, like the primitive cave in which the magic of technology resembles that of the magic of words and drawings in the sense that modern man has fallen into an optical illustion covincing him that technology could solve human problems. In this sense, the techno-cave man absolutizes the technique imagining that this absolutization, or strictly speaking, this dogmatization could cure him from the feeling of insecurity.

Now the question is:

Is this tendency towards dogmatization in born, that is, genetically conditioned?

As far as I know. it seems to me that Popper is the only twentieth century philosopher who tried to approach this question. In his book "Unended Quest", Popper says that "the inductive method of science had to the replaced by the metho of (dogmatic) trial and (critical) erroration which was the mode of discovery of all organisms from the a to Enstein". Concerning the relation between the dog and the critical, Popper asumes that there can by no critical phase a preceding dogmatic phase, a phase in which something - as tion, a regularty of behaviour - is formed" (p.51) This means, to Popper, that the human propensity to look out for regularis to dogmatism. But, in my opinion, this is a psychological inter and consequently, the real interpretation should be a cosmolo surpassing not only the psychological level but also the socioe, for both levels limit themselves to the relation of man to man, on the cosmological level the relation of man to nature comes.

could we breed on the cosmological level?

main task of psychoanalysis is to free man from the psychoonsicous, and that of sociology to breed social consciousness, cosmology is to breed cosmic consciousness. But this new need of the technological and scientific revolution that the creation of a new species of man, that is, the space man man equipped with cosmic consciousness that will revoluattern of human thinking. Up till now, the human mind is against being creative to the extent that being genius is case, whereas, through the cosmic consciousness, creastop will be the essence of man. And creativity, And creativity,by its very inst any dogma, or strictly speaking, against any absolute.

Notes:

(*) Paper submitted to the fourth international philosophy conference on "Roots of Dogmatisn", October 1982, Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, Cairo, 1984.

(1) P. Kolosimo, Not of this World, (London: shere Books, 1975), p. 236.

(2) K. Popper, Unended Quest, London, p. 52.

END OF DOGMA (*)

The origin of this paper lies in a series of papers that were presented at different conferences. The titles of these papers are: "The cave and dogma", "Ideology and dogma", "Tolerance and dogma", "Education without dogma", and "Human Rights and Dogmatism".

In addition to these papers I organized an International Conference in Cairo in 1982 under the theme "Roots of dogmatism".

In these papers I argued that, in modern times, religious fundamentalisms emerged throughout the world beginning from the 1970's, and that is why it is our responsibility, as philosophers, scientists and religious leaders, to investigate this new phenomenon to see its repercussions on world peace. But before proceeding let me define the term "dogma". This term was used in Greek, the language from which it came. In this language, the meaning of the noun "dogma" means a thought that can easily change since it is not based on logical or scientific arguments. The plural "dogmas" serves to indicate the fundamental ideas that structure the thinking and thereby guide the action of a person or a group. And these dogmas are derived more from the external authority than from any reasoning proper to the person. Hence, dogmatism emerges and pushes human reason from the assertion of opinion to a method of thinking based upon principles which have not been tested by reflection, so that to

dogmatize can mean to speak authoritatively without reference to argument or evidence. In this sense, dogma means a decree or a comment. And this meaning can be found in the Old Testament and the New Testament. In the First, Daniel the Prophet says "And the decree (dogma) went forth that the wise men should be slained" (II, 13). And in the Second, Luke the evangelist says "And it came to pass, in those days, that there went out a decree (dogma) from Ceasar Augustus that all the world should be taxed". (II, 2). Then the word dogma began to be used to denote the doctrinal decisions of the Fathers, the Councils, and the Pope. These, afterwards, were called a dogma. Within this historical course, the dogma could be defined as a set of doctrines formulated according to the decisions of religious authorities and becomes obligatory for a certain religious community. In this sense, the term dogma was used in the fourth century to denote the doctrinal decisions of the Fathers, the Councils and the Pope. Hence, theology emerged.

Now the question is:

How Theology works?

It works through the fusion of faith and human reason on one condition that reason presupposes faith as its environment and this means that the essence of faith is to seek its own reason. Thus, reason limits itself. Nevertheless, the new development of reality pushes reason to trespass its limits and try to cope with the new situation and this puts theology into crisis. And if any crisis implies contradiction then what is the contradiction implied in the crisis of theology? It is as follows: if dogma develops it is no more dogma. And if it does not develop then reality surpasses it and is no more relevant. Facing the challenge of this cotradiction the theologians argue that what seems to be developed in dogma, in the course of time, is an illustion on the

pretense that the new developments are contained in the dogma. Thus, the dogma itself does not change though its articulations become more complex. But, the development of social reality discards this theory due to four major movements.

1. The religious Reformation created what could be called hermeneutics which is the science of interpreting the sacred text depending on reason alone. Consequently, reason has been liberated from not surpassing the literal meaning of the sacred text and interpretation becomes various and legitimate without accusing the interpreter of being heretic or atheist.

2. The enlightenment and its impact on the liberation of reason from any authority except reason itself. Within this context the theory of the social contract emerged and the society is based on a human covenant and not a divine one.(1)

3. The rise of logical positivism which has stated that all established theological languages, whether of conservative or liberal orientation, were receding into being meaningless, irrelevant or banal and can now be meaningful only when it speaks against its own historical identity,"(2) or strictly speaking when theology negates itself and this means the demise of dogma. Thus, theology has to disappear with its dogmatic face.


4. Universalism as an outcome of the scientific technological revolution due to the space conquest where man is able to travel in the space to explore the solar system and the universe. He landed on the surface of the moon and his instruments reached Venus and Mars revealing more and more of the universe. Consequently, barriers between man and cosmos or between man and man will face their end. And the end of barriers implies the end of dogma.

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(*) Paper submitted to the II Parliament of Science, Religion and Philosophy, Geneva,1998.

(1) M. Wahba, Ideals for the Enlightenment for today, Quoted in "Revolution, Violence and Equality, (ed.), Y. Hudson and C. Peden, Edwin Mellen Press, 1990.

(2) Thomas Altizer, Creative Negation in Theology, quoted from Peerman (ed.), Frontline Theology, SCM Press, London, 1967, p. 77.



New Logic

INTRODUCTING the CONCEPT of CREATIVITY (*)

It is only the last twenty years that the term "creativiy" had become a global concern. But psychologists, up till now, have not agreed on a specific definition. The reason for this disagreement, in my own point of view, is due to the confusion between the concept of "intelligence" and that of "creativity". And the is why one has to dig deeper into the concept of intelligence to see whether it is legitimate to insist on it.

Looking at the history of the concept of intelligence, beginning from its emergence at the beginning of this century, one could easily discover that the current definitions could be applied to the concept of "reason" itself. Whether intelligence is defined as the ability of adjustment to achieve a specific purpose, or as the adility of abstraction, it seems that both definitions are applicable to reason. Therefore, this dichotomy between intelligence and reason is not justified, and thus we could be satisfied with the concept of reason.

There is a futher cause for excluding the concept of intelligence in relation to the concept of creativity. Getzels and Jackson based their research on a distinction between two types of child: the "High IQ" and the "High Creative". They defined this distinction in terms of

scores on two contrasted types of mental tests. The High IQ is especially good at intelligence tests, but relatively weak in tests to which Getzels and Jackson refer as tests of "creativity". The "High Creative" are the reverse; they are especially good at the creativity tests but relatively low in IQ. This paradox between the two tests lead us to the conclusion that intelligence, in case it is high, hinders creativity. In this sense, promoting intelligence means destroying creativity, and such sense goes against the essence of civilization, that is, creativity. It is well known, anthropologically, that civilization was born as a result of man's creation of the agricultural technique which changed the environment, that is to say, changing it from a non - agricultural environment to an agricultural one that produces an amount of food which exceeds the needs of man, This amount can be stored in order to face the food crisis if it occus. And this crisis occurred during the hunting age as a result of man's submission to the environment. But when the food crisis happened as a result of carcity of animals and the inability to tame them, man began to re-think his submission to the environment in order to transcend this food crisis, and man changed his relationship with nature. Instead of having a horizontal relationship with nature, he changed it into a vertical relationship, that is to say, changing nature to satisfy his increasing needs. This change of nature could only be achieved through creativity. Thus, man is defined as a creative animal and consequently, reason is creative by its very nature. This means that suppressing creativity is, in its essence, a dehumanization of the human being.

Now a question has to be raised: What suppresses creativity? Two factors: Cultural taboos and the school system.

Cultural taboos hinder critical thinking and consequently, creative thinking and is not separated from it.

Concering the school system, it is based on what I call the "culture of memory", that is, theories are given to the student as if they were an absolute truth. And thus the student is convinced that there is only one answer. And this has its impact on the exams throgh what is known as "the model answer". Consequently, the student is bred on dogmatic thinking which contradicts the creative thinking which seeks alternatives.

Now, the question is: How can we enhance creativity?

In order to answer this question one has to define creativity. My own definition is based on my concept of the emergence of human civilization, as I have already mentioned. And from this perspective creativity is the ability of human reason to establish new relations for the purpose of changing reality. But these new relations cannot beestablished without criticizing the current relations. But what is the cause that is behind this criticism?

I think the cause is due to disclosing a certain contradiction within an established theory. And in this sense, the theory becomes problematic, the is, it seems to be true but it might not be so if examined in a critical way. From this perspective. I reject what is called the problem solving technique for two reasons:

First, problem solving means there is a problem and there is a solution. But does any problem have a solution? The problem might be pseudo and accrdingly the search for a solution becomes an illusion.

Second, in case it is a real problem solving it is achieved through a certain traditional pattern. As an example, if you face a problem with your you, can go immediately to the expert, that is, the mechanic and he will repair it according to specific rules that he knows well.

Here, there is no creativity. But if he finds out that there is a contradiction between that he knows and wwhat happened to our car then his traditional knowledge does not fit. He finds himself facing a problematic that needs creative thinking to be solved.

Notes:

(*) Creativity Bulletin, No. 14, 1993, CEDLT, Ain Shams Univ., Cairo.

HUMAN MIND
&
ARTISTIC CREATIVITY (*)

This paper is presented to show to what extent human mind is capable of creative activity through an investigation of artistic creativity.

It is usually said that creative activity is limited to artistic creativity. According to Freud the concept of unconscious psychic activity enables us to get the first glimpse into the nature of poetic creativeness. He conceived artistic creativity as a product of a regression to infantile modes of thought or experience, and therefore he had assigned a special role to art as the product of a singular being capable of remaining in touch with his earliest period of life and employing those early experiences in his art. Judging from the model of the study of Leonardo, Freud concludes that the artist produces his major works out of contact between a precipitating experience and a memory of childhood. In this way, the artist creates a new synthesis, and this synthesis, in my own opinion, represents a kind of reality which is reflected in the mind thanks to the categories that are indispensable for our act of creativity, that is to say, the category of relation and the category of transcendence.

what is meant by reflection within the scope of these two cetegories?

Reflection is not receptive or passive but active, in the sense that it enables man to surpass what is conventional. But this surpassing is performed in a humanized way. In this sense, human mind subjectivies what is objective and objectivies what is subjective. And in this sense, I interpret Protagoras' statement, "Man is the measure of everything". Here, Protagoras said it as a philosopher, but what about artists? The same. Tolstoi, in the proofs of 24th March, 1889, confirmed this statement. He says, "What the artist says will deserve the name of art only if he understands and feels something which no one else has ever seen, understood, or felt, but at the same time, it must be something which is necessary for the whole mankind to see, understand and feel".

What about science?

It is needless to say that scientific knowledge is in evolution and this is due to the dialectical relation between the subject and the object. Mere perception of the objects never operates alone; we only formulate scientific knowledge when we add something to perception. And what is added is precisely an ensemble of logico-mathematical framework which surpasses the perceived objects.

Thus reflection is one and the same whether it is practised in philosophy or art or science. It is not a mere reproduction of reality, but a creation of reality. Consequently, creative activity is not only essential to art, but to all fields of human knowledge. And this means that the human mind is, by its very nature, creative.

Now, a question should be raised:

Why do we consider a creative minded person as a rare phenomenon and identify him as being genius?

It is owing to a scientific myth that differentiates between intelligence and mind. My own point of view is that intelligence is a

non scientific term, whether we define it as the ability of adapting behaviour to circumstances, or as the ability of formulating new relations.

The first definition means that human behaviour is passive, and that human being is an adaptive creature, whereas he is not because he surpasses the environment through changing it and that is why we prefer to consider the human being as a non adaptive being.

As for the second definition, intelligence does not differ from mind as long as formulation of new relations is an essential function of mind. And in this case we commit a fatal mistake against human beings when we say that one is more intelligent than the other. Life history of the so-called genius confirms this statement. Take Einstein, for example, nothing in Einstein's early history suggests dormant genius. On the contrary, the one feature of his childhood about which there appears no doubt is the lateness with which he learned to speak. It is said, that a good deal of his genius lay in his courage to challenge accepted axioms and beliefs, that is to say, accepted scientific relations.

Now, one has to ask:

What is the root of this scientific myth which is called intelligence?

It is of socio-economic nature, that is to say, of the nature of class societies. Intelligence tests are an outcome of these class societies. So, to get rid of this scientific myth, social and technological revolutions are a must. Through social revolutions we are convinced more and more of the equality of human beings. And if technological revolutions cope with the social revolutions, incarnation of equality can be realized. In this case, all human beings will be creative. I may

be accused of propagating another scientific myth. But a hasty look about cybernetics is a proof against this accusation. It is, indeed, beyond question, that the future of technology is tied up above all with cybernetics. For several years, scientists, specialising in cybernetics, have been discussing the potentialities of the future technology and the prospects for its interdependence with man. The outcome of these discussions is that human mind is not a calcu lating machine, or a memorizing machine, but is capable of being creative. So, the task of cybernetics is not supposed to duplicate talent genius, but to bring about the best possible conditions for opening up these faculties of man. The task of modelling the brain is called forth by the desire to eliminate exhausting mechanical operations which only waste the brain and bring no creative joy. Thus, cybernetics will create millions of new writers, artists, scientists and philosophers. In one word, we can say cybernetics will reveal what is inherent in the human mind; creativity or "intellectual originality", as Norbert Wiener says in his book "The Human Use of Human Beings".

Notes

* Paper presented at the "Inernational Week of Philosophy of Art", Argostolion, Cephalonia, September, 1976.

Creativity and Children(*)

It is very difficult task to outline a psychology of childhood. Jean Piaget spent more than forty years studying the "thought of the little child". However, Piaget admits that he could not study the whole field comprehensively. The reason, in my opinion, is that childhood had not been studied in a psychologically systematic way except from the beginning of the second half of the 18th century and the reason was to establish new education systems which respect the specific characteristics of childhood. The movement came to a halt in the first half of the 19th century and was continued by Taine in France in 1876, and Darwin in England in 1877. However, the studies which dealt with the psychology of childhood, from its various dimensions, wasn't expanded except in the 20th century. The most prominent founders and representatives of child psychology are Jean Piaget and Henri Wallon. Both have published several studies on children and both are opposed to each other. Wallon discussed Piaget's views about the child in his book "De l'Acte à la Pensée," (1942) and Piaget commented on it in his book "Six Psychological Studies" 1945. In June 1946, the Journal of Psychology, edited by Youssef Mourad, published an article written by Wallon for the Journal entitled "The Effect of the Other in the Formation of the Self". In this article, Wallon outlines his theory of childhood in view of its difference from

Piaget's. He says that Piaget is responsible for spreading the traditional view that the feeling of the self is a purely individual matter. Accordingly, it is assumed that the child, at the beginning of its life, is in a state of autism. After that the child passes through a stage of egocentrism before it can visualise the others in a situation of interpersonal relations.

On the contrary, Wallon thinks that the newly born child is not a closed entity, but is in relation with the other since the moment of its birth which the child communicates through its facial expressions and sounds which express his needs and desires and how these stimulate the responses of others. This interrelation between the child and others continues until the age of three when the child faces an identity crisis and starts forging for itself an independent identity by emphasizing its ownership of objects. Hence, it seems that the child is closed within itself, whereas from the start the other is there, but it appears to be a stranger. However, this assumed stranger remains a partner of the child because it is the social self which the child absorbs within its own self.

We deduce from the controversy between Piaget and Wallon that the relation between the self and the other in the period of childhood, is not an issue of psychology but rather a philosophical issue. If the other is the symbol of the society, and if the society is the result of the relation between the human being and the environment, the question then is:

What is the nature of the relationship between the human being and the environment?

The answer to this question leads us to the origin of civilization. In my opinion, human civilization began with agriculture and not with hunting where man was in a horizontal relation with the environment

which means that he was adapted to the environment, for he lived on hunting, slaughtering and eating the animals. He could not domesticate the animals, therefore, with time they became scarce. With the change in the climate and animal migration, "food crisis" occurred in the hunting age. The way out of this crisis was for man to change his hunting age, that is, to change his relationship with the environment; instead of being in a horizontal relation it became vertical, that is, man adapted the environment to his needs rather than being adapted to it. The result was the invention of the technique of agriculture which changed the environment and this led to the phenomenon of the food surplus which, in turn, gave rise to the system of distribution and control which caused the emergence of private ownership, and the division of humans into owners and non-owners.

Based on this evolution, we can propose two definitions of the human being as a "creative animal" and as a "social animal". However, man is a "creative animal" before being a "social animal". If we give priority to the human being as "social animal", the issue of the relation between the self and the other will emerge. But if we emphasize the notion of man as a "creative animal", the issue of how to discover and make use of man's creative abilities becomes the prominent one.

Now the question is: What is creativity?

Creativity is the ability of the human reason to establish new relations with the purpose of changing reality. Here I would like to mention the experiment of the artist and educator the late Habeeb Gorgy. He gathered a number of children and provided for them the atmosphere and the means of spontaneous self-expression without any kind of formal training and depending on the children's own

imagination and inspiration. The educational principles of Habeeb Gorgy were adopted for the foundation of art education system in Egypt with the purpose of promoting children's creativity through the methods of teaching. Gorgy warned against filling children's minds with information because this, in his opinion, kills creativity. This warning shows the contradiction between the memory which is concerned with storing and retrieving information, and the creative ability which transcends mere memorization to the discovery of the new. In other words, one could say that there is a contradiction between the "culture of memory" and the "culture of creativity". This contradiction is inherent in the relation between both kinds of culture and time. The "culture of memory" revolves round the preservation of the status quo which is the product of the past. Hence, the "culture of memory" revolves round a "past vision". On the other hand, the "culture of creativity" transcends the status quo to a pro quo and, hence, it revolves round a "futuristic vision".(1)

Suppression of creativity occurs when we restrict ourselves to the "culture of memory". Hence, it is pertinent to ask what is the reason behind such restriction" The reason, in my opinion, lies in the "cultural taboos" which are imposed on the child's reason since the beginning of the educational and pedagogical process. Moreover, our justification of the "cultural taboos" is based on the illusion that the child's reason is passive and that it is dependent upon the information, which we feed into its mind and which stops at the sensory level and does not surpass it to the abstract, on the ground that abstraction is a difficult process for the child's intellect to attain at the early stages of childhood. This is Piaget's tradition which is still prevailing.

In order to eliminate this illusion, one should dig deep into how the child acquires and learns a language which it ignores. If the child's

reason is passive and void of any content, how does it understand an expression or a word the meaning of which it ignores? The meaning, by its nature, is abstract and this means that the child's reason is equipped with the category of relation and that of abstraction. Due to these two categories the child is capable of learning and acquiring the language and of being creative in formulating and constructing phrases and sentences in its discourse with the others, as well as in its attempts to change the environment.

Finally, we conclude that learning is not based on imitation, but that it originated in creativity, and that without creativity there could not have been imitation.

Notes

* Paper submitted to the seminar on "Child & Creativity", Goethe Institute, January, 1994.
(1) H. Wallon, De l'Acte à la pensée, P.U.D. Paris, 1942.
(2) J. Piaget, Six Etudes de Psychologie, Gonthier, Genève, 1964.
(3) M. Wahba, Philosophy of Creativity, Dar Al-Thakafa Al-Gadida, 1995.

CREATIVITY
A NEW WAY of THINKING

The greatest challenge facing education at the edge of the 21st century is the fact that the scientific technological revolution has exercised an exceptional impact on the life of modern man in genral and on educators in particular. Aside from revealing new horizons, science and technology have also revealed global problems. This is why the relation of the above mentioned revolution to reason is itself becoming a global problem of our age.

Within this context we have to refer to the Club of Rome's report "No Limits to learning" which was a result of almost two years of work on "Learning Project". The authors of this report arrive at the conclusion that "small signs of a shift are evident". (p.4.). In this connection they insist on the need to put the human being in the centre of the discussion of global problems and to shift the accent from problems of physical nature to human problems. Arguing about the absence of an "accent on man" the authors arrive at the conclusion that the so-called "human gap" was the result of this situation. And in order to bridge this gap the study of learning has come up.

Following from the concept of learning the authors distinguish between two types of learning: "maitntenance learning" or conventional

learning," that is, to maintain an existing system, or an established way of life. And this concept include" the acquisition of fixed outlooks, methods and rules for dealing with known and recurring situations". (p.10) But this maintenance learning does not suit the global problems facing humankind. Here, comes the second type of learning, that is, the innovative learning, or the ability to anticipate events and the participation in taking decisions.

Within this context, the authors oppose the passive role of man which is an outcome of applying the laws of biological evolution to the process of learning which, in their minds, is a wrong application because these laws are based on the concept of adaptation of the organism to environmental conditions. (p.48).

On my own part, I prefer to distinguish between "culture of memory" and "culture of creativity" rather than "maintenance learning" and "innovative learning" for two reasons. First, there is an organic unity between learning and culture. Second, it is only over the last twenty years that the term "creativity" has become a global concern. It has become obvious that if we are to avoid catastrophe we must escape from absolute ideas and develop new ones.

Turning to my own distinction, one could say that memory culture is based on an old fashioned thinking system that rotates round fixed concepts and absolutes which are legalized by the logic of Aristotle that is based on the principle of non-contradiction, that is, two contradictory statements cannot both be true. Hence, a true/false system has been elaborated in the education system which means that once an idea is true it is for ever. But what happened in the history of ideas falsifies this system. For example, Newton's most famous scientific contribution was to unite heaven and earth which seemed to be independent and contradictory. The challenge to find some

relationship between them stirred Newton. There was reason to believe that some unifying principle did exist. From Galileo Newton knew that bodies should continue to move in straight lines unless disturbed by forces. Hence, the planets, set into motion somehow, should move in straight lines, whereas, according to Kepler, they move in ellipses around the sun. Some force must be deflecting the planets from straight line paths and this force was the sun that was acting as an attracting force on the planets.

Another example: in Euclidian geometry, properties of space existed absolutely and independently and were the supreme prototype of properties of the universe which were true, eternal and knowable by certainty. Hence, according to the principle of non contradiction no one dared think of negating or surpassing these properties. But in the 19th century non-Euclidian geometry emerged. Hence, we can conclude that the principle of non contradiction breeds dogmatic thinking. Moreover, paradoxes that were once not accepted, because they were logic according to the Aristotelian logic, came to be accepted.

A third example: Once, we thought that light must be either a particle or a wave. Formal logic would not permit it to be both. Yet, Louis de Broglie has found out that light is both particle and wave.

Within this context a new way of thinking and a new view of the very purpose of education should be called for which, I assume, is the creative thinking.

Hence, the question that has to be raised is the following:

How can we promote creativity in the education system?

First of all, we have to distinguish between creativity as a process and creativity as a product. Concerning creativity as a process, one has

to teach the students how creative scholars in history, such as Socrates, Galileo, Bruno and Kant initialized their predecessors and what kind of cultural taboos they faced in their criticism. These scholars criticized the current ideas as a prelude to creativity. Thus critical thinking is involved in creative thinking and both constitute one organic unity. But this does not mean the elimination of either. In the classroom, whenever students are formulating a question, or analysing a text or defining a term with clarity and accuracy they are developing the skills of critical thinking. Whenever they solve a contradiction or establish new realtions among ideas they are developing creative thinking. Whenever they consider diverse points of view and accurately reconstruct them they are thinking both critically and creatively.

On the other hand, creativity as a product can only be apprectiated as a means of changing the environment. This means that the teacher has to show the student the organic unity between science and technology.

Within this context I would like to differentiate between two senses of creative thinking; the strong sense and the weak sense. The strong one is to test the new idea against the strongest objection and be ready to change it if the objection is based on rational basis (dialogical thinking). The weak one is to defend the new idea as being an absolute.

There is a further issue that must be raised, that is, the problematic embedded in the concept of creativity in the sense that what is problematic implies a contradiction which has to be solved in a creative way.

For clarity's sake, we have an evidence from Darwin's thought. During his Beagle trip (1831-1836) Darwin recorded thousands of

scientific notes which did not include a sign of his conception of Evolution, for he was mainly concerned with geological matters. He was convinced that there is a fixed harmonious natural order in which biological species are in harmony with each other on the one hand, and with nature on the other. But when he accepted the geological theories which are based on the changeable order in nature, he discovered that there is a contradiction: every kind of the living species adapts itself to the environment, yet the environment is always changing, notwithstanding, the kinds are fixed. In July 1837, ten months after his return to England, he began writing his observations on the changing of species. In September 1838 he had formulated a clear idea concerning the role of natural election in the process of evolution. His reading of Malthus' theory of population have contributed to the clarity of his thought. but in 1838, he was preoccupied with philosophical issues concerning the evolution of mankind, intellectually, emotionally and behaviourly. He discovered the connection between psychology and evolution. All this happened before writing his masterpiece The Origin of Spieces, before September 1938, when he was reading "Malthus" theory of populationwhich led him to recognize the importance of natural election. After that, he has nothing more to do except establishing the scientific basis which includes all these issues. This was not an easy job, it took a long time to be fulfilled.

We can come to the conclusion that the interdependence of sciences leads to the establishment of a new approach. This establishment could not be achieved except in relation to revealing the existence of some contradiction. This contradiction requires critical thinking which criticizes the status quo, and accordingly surpasses it. In this respect, we can say that critical thinking is an essential component creative

thinking.

Thus, we can regard creativity as the essence of the educational process which can change the traditional thinking skills. and the methodology of thinking as well as the strategies of evaluation.

CRÉATION: IDÉOLOGIQUE ou CULTURELLE? (*)

A l'origine, en français et en espagnol, le mot "culture" avait un sens religieux, celui de culte. Plus tard, il prit le sens de culture de la terre. Dans son édition de 1762, le Dictionnaire de L' Académie française définit la culture comme "le soin qu'on prend des arts et de l'esprit". Importé en Allemagne, le terme y prit une connotation différente. Dans "Primitive Culture" (1871) E.B. Tylor remarque:

"La culture ou la civilization.. est ce tout complexe qui comprend la connaissance, la croyance, l'art, le droit, la morale, la coutume et toutes les autres aptitudes de I'homme en tant que membre de la société".[1]

Le "tout complexe" de Tylor est le dénominateur commun des définitions générales de la culture.

Mais, qu'est ce que ce "tout complexe"? Est-il statique ou dynamique?

S'il est statique, on ne peut pas expliquer I'évolution et la diversité des cultures. Donc il est, nécessairement, dynamique. Mais, en ce cas, on doit chercher la cause du dynamisme qui ne peut être dans la culture. A mon avis, I'idéologie est la cause. En d'autres termes, la culture est l'objectivisation de l'idéologie, ou plus précisement, le "tout complexe" est cré par l'homme en tant qu'il est par nature un animal

idéologique. Donc, culture, idéologie et création sont interdépendantes.

Mais, qu'est ce que la création?

Création veut dire matérialisation d'un avenir qui n'est pas le simple prolongement du passé par le présent. Donc, le passé ou le présent est le status quo reprise et dépassé par un pro quo, par un acte créatrice. L'objet cré est une apparition entièrement neuve, mais l'apparition ne suffit pas, il faut que la création procède d'une intention. Cependent cette intention ne peut pas être la causalité, puisque l'éffet n'a rien de plus que sa cause. Et s'il n'a rien de plus, il n'est pas neuf.(2)

Donc, la création est dépassement, et ce dépassement se donne comme projet jeté dans l'avenir. Mais, on concoit que beaucoup des penseurs ont manqué le concept de l'avenir, comme les psychanalystes et les penseurs des Lumières.

La pensée de Freud, malgré son caractère génétique, ignore l'avenir et semble évoluer dans une temporalité à deux dimensions: le present et le passé avec une nette prédominance de celui-ci. Le mot avenir ne se trouve qu'une seule fois dans la titre d'un·de ses livres "L'Avenir d'une Illusion", lequel démontre précisement que cette illusion n'a pas d'avenir.

De même, les penseurs des Lumières au XVIIIe siècle ont lutté pour un meilleur avenir, mais ils le concevaient sous une forme atemporelle.

Sans L'avenir il devient manifeste que l'homme ne crée pas, il découvre ou redécouvre. Sur le travail de production Marx a écrit:

"L' ouvrier n'est pas ce qu'il produit par son travail. Donc, plus ce produit est important, moins vaut l'ouvrier. Le dépouillement de l'ouvrier au profit de son produit signifie non seulement que son travail devient un objet et prend une existence mais il signifie également que

son travail existe en dehors de lui, indépendamment de lui et étranger à lui et que le travail devient en face de l'ouvrier une puissance autonome. Cela signifie que la vie pretée par l'ouvrier â l'objet vient se dresser devant son auteur comme une force ennemie et étrangère".

En ce sens l'ouvrier ne retrouve jamais sa part de créateur sur l'objet produit. De même la culture, devient ennemie et étrangère s'elle est considerée comme une entité, comme un absolu. On observe et on constate qu'il ya une tendance, dans l'histoire de la civilization humaine, de faire de la culture un absolu, un mythe, et cette tendance a eu des effets pervers.

Elle a fait de nous des esclaves de la culture. Un autre mythe veut qu'harmonie soit la marque de la culture et que les moments de desintégration, de ce que Durkheim appelle "anomie", soient un mal. Cette conception, aussi, nie la dialectique vitale de la culture pour en faire une chose statique.

Mais, comment peut-on faire de la culture un absolu?

A travers l'absolutisation, ou plus précisement, la dogmatisation de l'idéologie, le caractère créatrice qui est le caractère essentiel de l'idéologie est nié.

La création idéologique est detérminée par la conjonction de deux facteurs:

a) le refus de status quo

b) une vision du pro quo

Le premier facteur implique une malaise, ou plus précisement, un esprit critique de la structure humaine par rapport à une realité qui ne permet pas à l'homme de s'exprimer et de se développer.

Le deuxième facteur implique, un Weltanschauung qui perment aux hommes de changer et même développer des structures psychologiques favorisant la nouvelle situation sociale. C'est pourquoi

le Weltanschauung qui était fonctionnel et avait permis aux hommes d'agir à une certaine époque, devient dogmatique face à une réalité changée à laquelle il n'est plus adapté. Le dogmatisme devient maladif dans la mesure où, dependant des idées et des positions dans une situation qui ne lui correspond plus, il favorise le maintien de priviléges d'institutions anciennes et s'oppose â la création idéologique. Et dans cette mesure la critique de tout dogmatisme est valable pour l'introduction d'une nouvelle idéologie. C'est pourquoi on peur avoir une pathologie de l'esprit critique qui consiste dans le fait d'oublier que la critique doit toujours être fomulée par rapport aux possibilités existantes des exigences de la praxis, et qu'elle ne doit jamais devenir unilatérale en oubliant le nécessité d'un nouveau Weltanschauung. Donc. il y a une unité entre la critique du status quo et le nouveau Weltanschauung et une relation entre ce nouveau Weltanschauung et certaines classes sociales dont il est l'expression.

Par example, l'idéologie bourgeoisie avant d'être réalisée, a été concu comme un système des impératives représentant un nouveau style de la pensée et de la vie, en voulant l'intention de remplacer la culture féodale. Le même est vrai pour l'idéologie socialiste. Elle a proclamé l'abolition des classes et la démocratisation de la culture, c'est-à-dire l'élimination de la distinction entre les cultures et les non cultures, et par conséquent, la propagation de la culture de masse ou la société de masse.

Donc le conflit entre les système bourgeois et le système socialiste est essentiel et non pas accidental. Mais quand on conçoit l'essentiel comme accidental, une illusion optique emerge et nous donne deux faux concepts: "l'identité culturelle" et "la culture industrielle".

L'identité culturelle veut dire une culture ethnique qui a été proclamée par Spengler dans son livre fameux "Der Untergang des

Abendlandes". Le thème central est le séparation et la distinction totale des cultures, et par conséquent, l'assimilation culturelle est secondaire et si une culture, à travers l'invasion a influencé une autre le resultat est, probalement, une "pseudo-morphologie". Donc l'histoire est une succession des cycles culturels, et les cultures sont clos et non pas ouverts.

A mon avis, ce concept des cultures clos obscure l'unité du processus du développment humain, qui est caractarisé par l'évolution du "Mythos" au "Logos",

Quant au concept de la culture industrielle, elle a été élaboré par Herbert Marcuse dans son livre "One-Dimensional Man" où il montre le danger que l'évolution contemporaine du capitalisme et de la société de consommation représente pour la culture.

Mais, cette conception de Marcuse nie la dimension essentielle de l'homme qui est le dépassement du réel et qui va avec la nature de la raison en tant qu'elle est une faculté d'interpretation practico-transcendentale. Cette définition signifie qu'il y a une relation organique entre la raison et la révolution si on accepte la définition de la révolution comme un changement radical de la réalité. Il s'ensuit que la raison est révolutionnaire par nature. Mais la révolution ne signifie pas qu'on peut dispenser de l'évolution. L'évolution est un prélude de la révolution, et c'est le sens de la loi de la transformation de la quantité en qualité.

Le paradoxe de vigntième siècle est que les philosophes et les savants traitent la révolution scientifique - technologique et sociale par une raison non révolutionnaire.

Le concept de la raison a passé à travers deux phases: la phase non critique et la phase critique. La première phase a commencé dequis Aristote jusqu'à Descartes. Dans cette phase, la raison est considérée comme une faculté passive et adaptive. La théorie des formes, chez

Aristote, est une théorie statique et le passage de la potentialité à l'actualité se réalize sans le secours de l'éfficacité de la raison. Descartes a interpreté la correspondance entre les idées et la réalité à travers un concept statique et non dynamique de l'homme. Locke et Hume ont expliqué les origines des idées par l'expérience et les sens seulement.

La seconde phase critique a commencé dequis Kant jusqu'à Marx. Kant a dépassé Descartes, Locke et Hume grâce à son concept de la capacité de la raison de construire des synthèses et par conséquent de transcender la réalité. Mais la transcendence n'est pas complète, et c'est à cause des formes a priori de la sensibilité et l'entendement qui sont utilisées seulement pour organiser seulement la réalité phénoménale. Malgré ce défaut, Kant peut être considéré comme un prélude de l'interpretation practico transcendentale qui est inclue dans la philosophie de Marx. Dans le "Thèses sur Feuerbach" Marx dit que "les philosophes ont interpreté le monde en divers moyens, l'essentiel c'est le changement du monde". Les critiquants de Marx ont mal interpreté cette proposition en disant que Marx a exclu l'interprétation pour ne constater que l'acte révolutionnaire. Mais cette interprétation est fausse car elle nie la relation essentielle, chez Marx, entre théorie et praxis.

En tout cas, pour conclure permettez moi de dire que dans la mesure où la culture n'est pas liée à la dimension du dépassement ou de la transcendence cette culture constitue une ménace considérable pour l'avenir de la création idéologique.

Notes

(*) Communication présentée au xxe Congrès de l'Association des Sociétés de Philosophie de Langue Française, Août 1984, Quèbec, Canada.

(1) Tylor, E.B., The Origins of Culture, Part 1, Primitive Culture, New York, 1958, p.2.

(٢) مراد وهبة، فلسفة الإبداع، دار الثقافة الجديدة، ١٩٩٥.

PHILOSOPHY, LANGUAGE & CREATIVITY (*)

The first involvement of philosophy in language emerged from the fact that philosophy is an investigation into the meaning of words or names. Thus, the philosophers' interest in language is not an interest of recent origin, but is one shown by a distinguished line of investigators running from the pre-Socratic to the most recent followers of Wittgenstein. The Sophists discussed linguistic theory under the headings of correct diction and correctness of names. The topic of the correctness of names was the standard theme in Sophistic discussions. And it was said that Protagoras was the first to divide up discourse (logos), according to one account, into wish, question, answer and command, and according to another, into reported narrative, wish and summons, whereas the Sophist Alcidamus proposed a different, four fold classification, into assertion, negation, question and address. In addition, Protagoras distinguished the three genders of names, as masculine, feminine and those referring to inanimate objects. In drawing these distinctions Protogoras aimed to revise grammatical genders as a part of a process of language correction.

In Plato's "Cratylus" all parts of a sentence, and even a sentence as a whole, is treated as a name. But a name, in order to be a name, must

be a name of something. The something which is named is regarded as the meaning of the name in question. From this it follows that a name which is not the name of anything at all is not a name in any real sense of the term, and is necessarily without any meaning. So in Plato's "Euthydemus" we find it said that what a sentence or logos asserts is what the sentence is about. To each segment of reality there belongs just one logos, and to each logos one distinct segment of reality.

The results of this way of looking at words are as follows": first, it deprives all negative statements of meaning, since what is not cannot be named and this leads to the doctrine that it is not possible to control it. Second, the exclusion of the things that we encounter in our experience, for they always are and are not. This makes them unable to answer to the names that we use in meaningful discourse. Plato's solution of this point was neither that of renouncing language, nor that of abandoning the world of experience, but rather the manufacture of a world of forms. These forms are devised to satisfy the requirement of being satisfactory objects of linguistic meaning and reference. In this sense, Plato solved the problem of correct language by altering reality to fit the needs of language.

From the above mentioned, one can recognize that the real problem is to delimit the relation of language to reality, that is, the search for what in modern trends is termed of as the natural language which inspired Wittgenstein in his attempts to restrict and delimit significant language-use to that which depicts the world and which in its own structure will reflect the structure of reality.

Thus, one can notice that the study of language has been tackled by philosophers and the following questions have ben raised: What is meaning? How does one manage to use words with pre-established meanings to refer to particular things? How does one acquire

language? This last question is clearly part of philosophy of language for historical reasons. Both Locke and Leibniz provided detailed treatments of language acquisition as an integral part of their treatments of other philosophical problems.

Locke's original intention, after presenting his thesis that all knowledge springs from experience and disposing of the doctrine of innate ideas, had been to show what knowledge the understanding had by these ideas and the certainty of it. He says, "there is so close a connection between ideas and words, and our abstract ideas and general words have so constant a relation one to another that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our knowledge which consists in propositions, without considering the nature, use and significance of language"(1). This means that Locke's theory of language is based on empiricism, whereas Leibniz' book entitled "New Essays on Human Understanding" was written in a different spirit. The understanding is not void but contains many notions and doctrines which emerge when they are stimulated by external objects. The general terms are not only means of perfecting the language but they are also necessary for its essential structure. (2) This means that Leibniz' concept of language is based on rationalism.

In the early 1960's, the philosophy of language was radically altered when Davidson redefined what form a semantic theory for a natural language can take, and what conditions of adequacy, both empirical and formal, such theories should meet. Along with Quine he discouraged philosophers from analyzing such individual concepts as meaning. Instead he framed questions about semantics in the context of understanding language.

What distinguishes someone who understands a language from someone who does not? Beliefs and other mental attitudes about the

world and minds of others, that is, mentalistic features and not linguistic or non-linguistic behavioural act are, for Davidson, the mark of understanding. Thus, sentences have meanings and knowledge of these meanings warrants, in part, certain beliefs upon hearing these sentences uttered in various sorts of circumstances. This wisdom is inherited from Plato, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Frege, Russell, Chomsky and others who share dissatisfaction with behaviouristic accounts of linguistic understanding.

Linguistics, in contrast to philosophy of language in general, is explained as the scientific study of language. It is strictly concerned with writing grammars and dictionaries for languages and with describing phonetic and phonemic systems. In this sense it is acknowledged that linguistics is one of the branches of science and such a view has led linguistics to direct their attention to formulating rigorous procedures for testing facts about the technical concepts they employ.

Philosophy of linguistics is a branch of philosophy of science concerned with linguistics. As such it might ask questions such as: What sort of facts are to be included in a linguistic theory? How can these facts be established? What is the relation between facts about particular languages and facts about language in general? In what sense are grammars and dictionaries real? What is the relation between linguistics and psychology?

On occasions, philosophy of linguistics has been identified with philosophy of language because the problems in linguistics and philosophy of language overlap.

Anyhow, all the above fields are generally contrasted with linguistic philosophy.

Linguisitic philosophy represented a breakaway from what had gone before and what had gone before was Logical Positivism; and the main difference is as follows. Logical Positivism thought of the canon of meaningful human discourse and knowledge as being science. It is admitted that these were other forms of discourse as well, but it measured the meaningfulness of other forms of discourse by the standards of science. For Positivism, philosophy is the philosophy of science whereas linguistic philosophy is aware of the variety of different forms of human discourse. There are many different sorts of meaning besides scientific meaning and the task is to try to discover how these different sorts work, not to measure everything by the canons of science and pronounce the other sorts meaningless. Accordingly, linguistic philosophy reinstalled many fields of discourse which had been thrown out by the logical positivists. Within this context, linguistic philosophy attempts to solve philosophical problems. For example, one might attempt to approach the problem of free will and determinism through a study of words like voluntary, accidental and compulsory. This demands a direct attempt to collect facts about the ways in which these words are used.

Linguistic philosophy and philosophy of language are pursued nowadays with more self-consciousness than ever before. Both are in fact as old as philosophy. In spite of historical continuity, stretching back to the Greeks, there are good reasons for dating the beginning of modern philosophy of language in the works of Gottlieb Frege. Frege wanted to show that mathematics was reducible to and founded on logic. To carry out this enterprise he had to invent a new logical system. In the course of his logical investigations he found out that the prevailing nineteenth century views about language represented most influentially by J.S. Mill to be rather superficial and in many cases

false, so he was forced to develop a theory of his own.

After Frege, the next great work in the philosophy of language was by Russell and was carried on by his student Wittgenstein in the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". One of the aims of this book was to separate the realm of meaningful from meaningless discourse, In spite of its obscurity it had a profound influence in the 1920s and 30s especially on the Logical Positivists. They developed partly from the "Tractatus" and partly from other remarks by Wittgenstein, and in particular, the Verification Principle. This principle states that the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification, or put less obscurely: all meaningful statements are true by virtue of the sense of experience which verify them.

From the above mentioned, one can conclude that all these disciplines rotate round language. Thus, the question is: What is language? In 1957 two books were published epitomizing two extreme positions: Skinner's "Verbal Behaviorism" was culmination of the tradition of stimulus -response learning theory, while Chomsky's "Syntactic Structures" launched a new linguistic theory known as generative grammar which has revolutionized psycholinguist's aims and ideas about language. And since I have adopted the philosophy of creativity, the question is" How do these two thinkers think of creativity.

Chomsky tells us that he paid little attention to Skinner's teaching until he himself came to MIT in 1955 and saw himself compelled to take a strong position in regard to the claims of behaviorism, in general, and in particular Skinner's Verbal Behaviorism (1957). What Skinner had sought to do was to extrapolate from his famous work on stimulus and response behavior in animals to human linguistic behavior. He seemed to argue that human beings acquired and made

use of language in a more sophisticated but not essentially different from that in which rats could be taught. The child would learn language skills by some process of stimulus and response within a Pavlovian model.

Thus, thinking is behavior and behavior is based on the stimulus-response mechanism which is based on memory. Skinner says "To seek help is to act in ways which have in the past led to help. If past consequences have not been explicit we are likely to look in vague and unproductive ways[3]. Then he says: "The probability of behavior depends upon the kind of frequency of reinforcement in similar situations in the past".[4] As a consequence, Skinner denied the innateness hypothesis which holds that one of the faculties of mind is the faculty of language and replaced instead contingencies of survival and contingencies of reinforcement And these are an outcome of the environment and that is why abstract thinking is the product of a particular kind of environment, not of a cognitive faculty, and even consciousness is a social product. The philosophy behind Skinner's theory of language is empiricism which is based on Locke's assumption that there is nothing in reason which was not first in the senses and that is why Skinner is against pure mentalism that invented the concept of mind and which has dominated Western thinking for more than two thousand years starting from Plato.

Following from the above mentioned, Skinner has formulated his opinion about creativity. In his own point of view, novelty is explained only by contingencies of survival and contingencies of reinforcement without appealling to a creative mood. "In the field of human behavior, the possibility arises that contingencies of reinforcement may explain a work of art or the solution of a problem in mathematics or science without appealing to a different kind of

creative mind or to a trait of creativity".[5] Contingencies here explain the behavior quite apart from any innate act by autonomous man. This means that the explanation shifts from a trait of character to an environmental history of reinforcement. And thanks to memory people have made copies of the world around us, as well as records, about what has happened in that world and have stored them for future use. On a future occasion such a store can evoke behavior and permit a person to respond more effectively. Thus, creativity is limited to the environment and not to man, to stimuli and not to responses. New combinations of stimuli appear in new settings and the responses describe them.[6]

As for Chomsky creativity is implied in the creative aspect of language use. But in what sense is the term "Creativity" used by Chomsky? According to him, human language is free from control of the external stimuli and the internal physiological states. In this sense, the human language serves as an instrument for the free expressions and for appropriate response to new situations, rather than merely as a communicative device of report. Accordingly, Chomsky states that a valid model of linguistic behaviour must account for the fact that human beings use combinations of words which do not arise in conditioned response to any stimulus in our environment. This indicates that the human mind, according to Chomsky, had the ability to produce and interpret new sentences independent from stimulus control. These sentences are not "familiar sentences" or "generalizations of familiar sentences".

Thus, Chomsky refuses the behaviorist's idea that sentences are formulated by stimulus-response mechanism. On the contrary, they are formed by what he calls generative grammar, that is, the rules generate an infinite number of grammatical sentences and this is

called "the creativity of language", that is, the speaker's ability to produce new sentences that are immediately understood by other speakers although they bear no physical resemblance to sentences which are familiar. Proceeding in this way, Chomsky seeks a hypothesis concerning language acquisition that is based on elucidating prerequisites for such acquisition, that is, the a priori principles that determine how and in what form such knowledge is acquired. But what interests me here is not to elucidate these a priori principles but to deduce from the concept "a priori" the active role of reason in language acquisition. And if this is the case one had to claim first: that the empiricist learning theory cannot account for this kind of acquistion. Second, that since reason is active then it is capable of being creative, but not in the Chomskian sense, that is, not in merely fomulating new sentences derived or generated from a small number of basic sentences plus a set of rules. My reasons are as follows:

1. Formulating new sentences independently of the outside world would be a symptom of a mental disease, that is, mania.

2. The child understands the sentence before understanding the words. This means that the child's mind is equipped with the category of relation and the process of abstraction. And this means that the child learns not by images but by concepts. Consequently the sensory principle cannot account for the transformation of images into concepts.

3. Human reason is related essentially to nature as a part of it, and yet this part is conscious of the whole and not vice versa. Consequently, any theory about reason cannot be isolated from the theory of being-in-the-world. So, the unity between reason and the world is from the start. But this unity is of a dialectical nature for it implies the unity of opposites (the part and the whole), and due to this

dialectical nature reason transcends nature and this transcendence means humanization of the world by transforming it. Within this context, the creative use of language cannot be confined to mere formulation of new sentences but should be confined to the articulation of sentences that could help in changing reality.

In this sense, language is less an instrument of communication with others than a means of reassuring oneself of one's existence as a transcending being, or in other words, as a creative being.

Notes

* Creativity Bulletin, No. 17, 1998 CEDLT, Cairo.

(1) Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, The Fontana Library, London, 1975, p.19.

(2) Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais sur L'Entendement Humain, Flammarion, Paris, 1966, p.236.

(3. Skinner, About Behaviourism, Vintage Books, New York: 1976, p. 77.

(4) Ibid, 246-7

(5) Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Penguin Books, London: 1971, p.182.

(6) Skinner, About Behaviorism, 1957, p. 112.

CREATIVITY: INTRODUCTION to EDUCATION(*)

There is an integral relationship between the historical phases of human civilization and the methodology of thinking. A powerful illustration of this particular point is to be found in Greek philosophy and particularly in Aristotelian logic. Logic is the science of studying the laws of thinking with disregard to the subject of thinking, and accordingly it is a prerequisite to the study of logic before getting involved in any other kind of science. The ultimate purpose of using logic is to determine which cases require justification and which justification is required for each case. From this point of view logic is regarded as the god of sciences, and within the framework of this assumption Euclid established his theory of mathematics in his book "The Principles". The establishment of logic and mathematics as sciences was not based on mythical thinking, for the subject of logic is limited to the three actions of reason: imagination, judgment, and syllogism. Therefore, Aristotle's books on logic are as follows: The book of "Categories" which deals with concepts, the book of "De Interpretatione" which is preoccupied with judgmens, and the book of "Prior Analytics" which is concerned with syllogism.

Euclid's mathematics is based on the premises of syllogism as stated by Aristotle, and is divided into three main sections: The first is the axioms, such as the principle of non-contradiction and the

principle of causality. The second is the definitions and the third is the postulate.

As a result of the principle of non-contradiction, which is the basis of Aristotle's logic, no scientist tried to contradict Euclid's geometry, for this principle implies that if (A) is true, its contradiction is false.

With the beginning of modern philosophy two trends appeared. One of them is related to Bacon, while the other is related to Descartes, Bacon published a book entitled "The New Organon" (1626), which can be regarded as the basis of scientific discovery. The negative aspect of the book deals with the source of natural illusions that are imposed on reason: "The illusions of the Tribe", are the natural outcome of the weakness of human nature, since reason is a false mirror in the sense that it disfigures the nature of things by mixing it with its own nature. "The illusions of the cave" mean that every individual is imprisoned in a cave as a result of his submission to the educational system and to the authority of those of whom he is proud, and accordingly, disfigures the light of nature. "The illusions of The market" result from the mis-selection of words which leads to false discussions.. "The illusions of the theatre" impose themselves on the human reason through the impact of the philosophical beliefs.

On the other hand, Descartes published a book entitled: "Discours de la mèthode" (1637). His method has four basic rules. The most important is the first one: "Do not accept anything as the truth till you make sure that it is so". Of course this is a revolutionary rule because it glorifies freedom of thinking, and rejects any authority that imposes itself on reason.

During the 20th century, a new term has been widespread which is the "New Thinking" in the field of actual life. The question now is:

What is this new thinking? or to be more specific, what is this new logic? In order to define this new logic, we have to consider the reasons behind coining this new term, and identify these reasons in accordance with the spirit of the age. Specifying the spirit of the age requires determining the characteristics of that age. These characteristics are countless. The outstanding characteristic is a scientific trend which calls for the elimination of boundaries between sciences. This approach was adopted in the 30's by a group of scientists at Cambridge under the supervision of the Mexican scientist Arturo Rosenblueth. Later, the American mathematician Norbert Wiener joined this committee. Both Rosenblueth and Wiener found out that the machines work in the same manner as the nervous system works, and that the theory of communication in the field of mathematics contributes to the study of the human brain. Through the interdependence between biology and mathematics we have a new kind of sciences which is called interdisplinarity of sciences. In 1442, Wiener published a book entitled "Cybernetics: Control and Communication in Machines and Animals. The term cybernetics is derived from the Greek word kubernetes which means the captain of the ship and the word Governor is derived from the same Greek origin. Wiener coined this term for two reasons. The first reason is related to a research by the physicist Maxwell (1831-1879) entitled "The Theory of Governing", which deals with feedback mechanism. The second reason is deeply rooted in the idea that the mechanism of the ship is the best kind of mechanism. As a result of this particular trend, computer industry has been established. In 1982, Time Magazine announced "The Man of 1982" as its title, it was not a man, but a machine called computer, which prophesies the computer revolution which is based upon knowledge is power. This idea was

expressed by Bacon, but has not been illustrated till the computer revolution. Thus, knowledge becomes a productive force which is capable of changing the concept of the forces of production which Adam Smith has mentioned in his book: "The Wealth of Nations". According to him, we have three kinds of powers of production: land, labor, and capital. In my own point of view, work will be rational and accordingly the workers of the future will be intellectual individuals. We can say that "Knowledge is control" Daniel Bell put this phrase on the cover of his book "The Coming of The Post industrial Society".

Interdisciplinary sciences, the computer revolution and the power of knowledge, are all new phenomena that are based on the new logic that can be called the logic of creativity. It seems that there is a contradiction in terms between logic and creativity in the sense that logic is mainly concerned with the rules whereas creativity implies breaking the rules. This contradiction diminishes with the disappearance of the illusion that creativity is a rare phenomenon confined to the genius, or creativity is obscure, or that creativity could lead to neurosis. Freud says; "There are four major characteristics which distinguish the genius character of Destoyvisky: he is a creative artist, mad, moralist and loose". He assumes that there is an integral relationship between madness and creativity, particularly Schizophrenia. In my own point of view, these illusions are reflections of the past when the scientists related all aspects of abnormal behaviour to the impact of some supernatural powers which excel the natural ones. They could not distinguish between the mad and the wise. The word "mania" in ancient Greek expressed the enthusiasm of the creative as well as the infatuation of the mad. Nevertheless, there is an essential distinction between normal and abnormal creativity. Normal creativity influences reality, while abnormal creativity is

incapable of changing reality. In addition without creativity man could have been primitive leading a life of animals. But, he is not so, because he possesses the power of transcending the environment for the ultimate purpose of changing it.

This transcendence cannot be achieved without the ability of the human mind to establish new relations which can surpass the current relations and change the environment. This is how man was able to surpass the food crisis which threatened his life during the hunting age through inventing agricultural techniques in order to adapt the environment to his needs instead of being submissive to it. Thus, we can say that creativity is an entrance to civilization and time has come to adopt it as an entrance to education.

The question now is: How can creativity be an entrance to education?

First, we have to draw a distinction between creativity as an educational skill at the very bottom of the educational skills and creativity as the central skill. Supporting either point of view requires a definition of creativity:

From what has been mentioned above, there is a sharp tension between scientific creativity and the existing culture, or between creativity and the dogma which is supported by authority. In Galiloe's time, doubting the opinions that had no basis but the authority was enough for excuting the person. Thus, what is important is: how can the creative person deal with the dogmatic system? In his book "The Dialogue", Galileo tries to avoid controversial issues which allow for the interference of the Inquisition through pretending that he accepts the current theory, despite the fact that he rejects it. Nevertheless, the Inquisition was not convinced and he was judged by the court. This

example illustrates the importance of revealing the cultural dimension of scientific creativity in order to help students understand the relationship between creativity and changing the established culture. From this prespective, we can assume that creativity is capable of influencing the culture and changing it. Creativity is the basis of all the thinking skills and these skills will not be exposed in the same manner as it is in the literature of psychology and education. To explain my point of view, I will select three skills: problem-solving, establishing relations, and critical thinking.

It is relevant to begin with "problem-solving". We recognize that there is a distinction between this particular skill and creative thinking. Cognitive psychology is not specifically concerned with creative thinking. Moreover, researches in experimental psychology are not preoccupied with the issue of critical thinking. This is due to the very basic assumption that there is a relation between creativity and genius and this relation was assumed by Plato and is still assumed till our present time. Most thinkers suggest that creative thinking is confined to the genius and some of these thinkers exaggerated this assumption to the extent that they tried to investigate the brains of the genius in order to determine the area of creativity in the human brain.

Nevertheless, I have to raise the following question: Can we say that problem-solving is the essence of the creativity process? The skill of problem-solving implies that there is a problem, and there is a solution. But, does any problem have a solution? The problem can be artificial and accordingly the search for a solution becomes an illusion. But the search for the artificiality of the problem is in itself creativity. The creativity of logical positivism lies in its ability to reveal the artificiality of metaphysical problems. There is a furthur question that must be raised: Does the solution lie in the problem

itself? To answer this question, we have to raise the emergence of the non-euclidian geometries as a result of the inability to solve the contradiction of euclidian geometry which lies in the fifth postulate which the scientists were incapable of solving and therefore created a new kind of geometry.


In this context, it is better to say solving the problematic instead of saying solving the problem, for the term problematic means that the issue can be true and false. So, it seems as if it were a contradictory issue, and solving this contradiction is an entrance to creativity. For clarity's sake, we have an evidence from Darwin's doctrine. During his Beagle trip (1831-1836) Darwin recorded thousands of scientific notes which did not include a sign of his concept of evolution. For he was mainly concerned with geological theories. He was convinced that there is a fixed system where the living species are in harmony with each other and with nature. But when he accepted the geological theories which are based on the changeable system within nature, he discovered the following contradiction: Every kind of the living species adapted itself to the environment, yet the environment is always changing, though the kinds are fixed. In July 1837, ten months after his return to England, he began writing his observations on the changing species. In September 1838 he had formulated a clear idea concerning the role of natural election in the process of evolution. His reading of Malthus' book on "Population" has contributed to the clarity of his thought. But in 1838, he was engaged in philosophical issues concerning the evolution of mankind, intellectually, emotionally and behaviourly. He discovered the relation between psychology and evolution. All this happened before writing his masterpiece the "Origin of species" After that, he has nothing to do except establishing the scientific basis which included all these issues. This was not an easy task, it took a long time to be fulfilled.

We can conclude that the interdependence of sciences leads to the establishment of a new system. This establishement could not be achieved except in relation to revealing a certain contradiction. This contradiction requires critical thinking which rejects the status quo, and accordingly surpasses it. In this respect, we can say that critical thinking is in the creative thinking.

Thus, we can regard creativity as the essence of the educational process, which can change the traditional thinking skills. Moreover, it can change the methodology of thinking as well as the strategies of evaluation. But putting creativity at the bottom of the skills underestimates its substantial function and makes of it an appendix.

Notes:

(*) Creativity Journal, April, 1992, Cairo.



New Logic

LOGIC of CREATIVITY (*)

It is curious that until the close of the nineteenth century no systematic attempts were made to investigate the phenomenon of creativity on a scientific basis. But the anomaly can be explained if we go back to the most influential philosopher of the first half of the eighteenth century, David Hume, for his system could be considered as the antithesis of mental creativity. In his view man's power of knowing is a very simple affair, first come the impressions made by the sensory stimuli, then follow the reproductions of impressions by memory or by imagination, and with the two processes - impressions and reproductions - the whole business of perceiving and thinking is described and analysed(1).

By the beginning of the twentieth century professional psychologists were starting to study the process of creativity. But this study was limited to artistic creativity. According to Freud, the concept of unconscious psychic activity enabled us to get the first glimpse into the nature of poetic creativeness. He conceived of artistic creativity as the product of a regression to infantile modes of thought or experience, and therefore he had assigned a special role to art as the product of a singular being capable of remaining in touch with his earliest period of life and embodying those early experiences in his art. Judging from the model of Leonardo Da Vinci, Freud concluded that the artist produces his major works of art out of contact between

precipitating experience and memory of childhood[2].

Jung, too, made a significant contribution to the study of the process of creativity especially with reference to the aesthetic process.

However, Spearman's book entitled "The Creative Mind" could be considered the first book that tried to establish the principles of creativity in general and not with reference to art. These principles are three in number:

The first principle is that of apprehension of experience, that is, knowing one's own experience which converts the feelings into consciousness of feelings. But the defect of this principle is that it prevents the self from transcending itself; it affirms nothing more than the subjective experience.

The second is the principle of relations. When two or more items are given, a person may perceive them as related in various ways. Spearman himself is doubtful about regarding this principle as creative, for it only copies what had already existed.

The third is the principle of correlates. When any item and a relation to it are present in the mind, then the mind can generate in itself another item so related. Spearman says that this principle is the most inherently creative, and he mentions the famous test of opposites. Words are read aloud, and to each of them the subject has to respond with its opposite. Thus, "good, tall, clumsy," will be answered with "bad, short, and dexterous". Here, the word read out, provides the given idea, whilst the opposite indicates the given relation. The correlate idea is the response. But, in my own view, this principle is nothing more than mere remembering of past experience.

Anyhow, these are the three principles of creativity and their defects. In addition to these defects one can notice that Spearman's

explanation of creativity had rested on the general principles of psychology. And that is why the closing words in his book "Creative Mind" run as follows: "The study of creativity and that of general psychology are at the bottom the same. Likely enough then, he who had not mastered the one will hardly go far aright in the other".

But in my own opinion, these three principles of creativity can be reduced to the principle of sense data which is the fundamental principle of Logical Positivism and which does not however justify creativity, for creativity cannot be limited to sense data. History of science confirms my own point of view. As a result of successive revolutions in physics, scientific theories are considered to be an outcome of the interference of the subject with the physical object under investigation.

However, in 1950 Guilford, in his presidential address to the American psychological Association, recommended the initiation of research into the possibility of developing tests of creativity. Since then, creativity testing had been developed, but the interesting thing is that this development had come as a reaction against intelligence testing. The users of creative testing have taken, as their starting point, the view that the concept of intelligence had been overvalued, that it may have blinded psychologists to the potential ability of the individual, whose gifts do not lie in his I.Q. Getzel and Jackson's book, "Creativity and Intelligence" is based on the distinction between creativity and intelligence. But this distinction complicates things. For intelligence itself is a doubtful concept, or strictly speaking, a myth for two reasons: first, no one knows precisely what intelligence is. Second, any definition of the concept of intelligence is, at the same time, a definition of the concept of reason. For example, Binet defines intelligence as the capacity to make adaptation for the purpose of

attaining a desired goal. Terman defines intelligence as the capacity to carry on abstract thinking. But these definitions both Binet's and Terman's - could be seen as definitions of reason. So why the doubling? Consequently, we should limit ourselves to reason and try to explore the relation between reason and creativity, rather than between intelligence and creativity. Put in this way, the issue of creativity is not an issue of psychology but of logic. Yet study of logic had so far failed to reveal the essence of creativity for three reasons:

First, it is noted that creativity is considered to be a rare phenomenon related to the genius. And the creative genius is a mystery. Alex F. Osborn, in his book "Applied Imagination" (1953) adopted by M.I.T., believes creativity will never be a science. Much of it will always remain a mystery.

Second, logic puts reason into the context of argument, and an argument is an attempt to persuade or convince, and so presupposes that we already know what we would like others to accept.

Third, formal logic plays a role in annihilating the creative function of reason through the non-contradiction principle which had been transformed into an absolute formal criterion of truth, and accepted as the supreme principle of reason. In this sense, if a scientific theory is claimed as true, then thinking based on its contradiction (as a possible truth) is inadmissible. And the reason for this inadmissibility derives from the ontological form of Aristotle's logic, being based on the essence, or strictly speaking, on what is permanent and unchangeable.

Consequently, if formal logic fails to reveal the essence of creativity, then we have to find a basis for establishing a logic of creativity which would be, in fact, the logic of reason.

In the preface to the "Philosophy of Right" Hegel says: "To comprehend what is - this is the task of philosophy, because what is, is reason... to recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present, and thereby to enjoy the present, this is the rational insight which reconciles us with the actual." [3]Thus, according to Hegel, reason is applied within the horizontal relation of man to reality, whereas the real relation is the vertical, that is, man's capability of transcending reality. Thus, reason is endowed with two categories: the category of relation and that of transcendence. In order to clarify these two categories Marx's statement is significant.. He says "At the end of every labour process we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer in its commencement". Thus, human labour involves transcending actual reality for the purpose of transforming it. And transformation, in this case, means creating new relations. In "The German Ideology" Marx refers to the development of speech from the needs of human intercourse, and says of animals: "Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me. The animal does not relate itself to anything, it does not relate at all. For the animal, its relation to others does not exist as a relation".

Consequently, reason operates not on facts per se but on facts in relation to other facts and in relation to itself. In this sense, knowledge is not a description of facts but an interpretation of facts. But this interpretation is not confined to speculation, but is rather linked to praxis, assuming that the essence of man lies in transforming reality. Thus, we can define reason as the faculty of practico-transcendental interpretation. And this definition involves a substantial relation between reason and creativity, to the extent that we could say that reason is creative by its very nature. And this means that the moment reason does not create it is no more reason.

Now, the crucial question is:

What prevents reason from being creative? There are two major obstacles: cultural taboos and the education system. Cultural taboos prevent man from practising critical thinking, which is a prelude to transcending the status quo. And that is why creative people are those who have attempted to change belief and behavior patterns to fit new experiences, independent of ancestral or authoritarian dictates.

In tackling the education system, I would like to differentiate between two cultures: the culture of memory and the culture of creativity. Our education on system is based on the culture of memory. Most tests depend on memory, on closed books, and on the certainty principle. However, in the culture of creativity, what matters is not what Euclid's theories are (for example), but rather how Euclid created his theories. The future of human civilization is related to the culture of creativity and not to the culture of memory, if only because of Cybernetics. The task of Cybernetics is to eliminate exhaustive mechanical operations which only waste the brain and bring no creative joy. Thus, Cybernetics will indirectly create millions of new writers, artists, scientists and philosophers. In a word, we can say that Cybernetics will liberate what is inherent in human reason - creativity - or what Norbert Wiener calls, in his book "The Human Use of Human Beings", "intellectual originality".

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POLITICS of LOGIC

At the Third International Philosophy Conference held in Cairo in 1980 on the theme "Unity of Knowledge", I presented a paper entitled "Three P's Science", that is, three sciences in one, each beginning with "p": physics, politics, philosophy. This "Summa" does not mean the elimination of other sciences, but it means the reduction of natural sciences to physics in general and to nuclear physics in particular. The reduction of social and human sciences to politics is not meant in the sense of a theory of governance but of international relations. As for philosophy, it is looked at as a cosmic vision based on physics and politics.

In this context comes the title of my paper "The Politics of Logic", which could refer to a certain kind of reducing logic to politics which is justified by Averroes. But this justification does not mean adopting Averroes as a model of this reduction. It means that his philosophy is considered the crowning of previous endeavors beginning with the Sophists. Logic, according to the Sophists, originated from "contradictory arguments", that is, approving an agrument and its contradictory at the same time, which was in line with the contemporary climate, that is, the second half of the fifth century before the Christian era, where political dialogue had as its target conviction and rhetorical influence. A dictum was said to be attributed

to Protagoras, namely, what the Sophists had to offer, teaching a man about matters of state so that he might become a real power in the affairs of the city both as a speaker and as a man of action[1]. This kind of instruction was the reason why the Sophists were powerful in Athens.

Then came Aristotle, who defined man as a political animal. But he divided men in "Politics" into free and unfree. He then formulated this dichotomy into universal and necessary propositions: all Athenians are free by nature, and all foreigners are not free. Accordingly, logic had nothing to do except teach us how to formulate these propositions depending on the concept of essence which is the subject matter of science. And what the particular adds to the essence comes from the sensible matter and this is excluded from the field of science.

Averroes is in agreement with Aristotle on relating logic to politics, not within the context of the division between Athenians and foreigners, but within the division between the multitude and men of science. However, this dichotomy, though it is traditional in Islamic thought, is the pivotal idea in Averroes' logic. It could be stated that Averroes has two logics: the logic of multitude and the logic of men of science. The first is the logic of induction and the second is the logic of syllogism. He says: "Induction is more convincing than syllogism for it is based on the sensible, consequently it is beneficial to the multitude and easier in argumentation[2]. On the contrary, syllogism is less beneficial to the multitude and easier in argumentation. Therefore, its use is more beneficial to those who are expert in this art; By "those" he means men of science.

However, Averroes illustrates his favorable appreciation of syllogism and not induction due to its superiority[3]. He means the demon-

strative syllogism, or demonstration, which is based on true apriori premises. On the contrary, dialectical syllogism is based on premises that are considered to be accepted premises while in fact they are not, or are thought to be true but in fact are not.(4)

Despite this dichotomy between induction and syllogism, Averroes does not consider it a dichotomy that is based on the discontinuity of both ends but rather on the continuity between both. He gives five proofs.

First: The universal premises that are the basis of syllogism cannot be known without induction; consequently, if there is no way to know these premises, there is no way to demonstrate them (certain syllogism).(5)

Second: This is the result of Averroes' concept of accepted opinions. He says men of science and philosophers believe in certain accepted opinions without being opposed by the multitude(6). He says there are reasons for doubt about the accepted opinions: one of these is due to the contradictory views among philosophers such as the undivided particulars; another is due to the contradictory views among the multitude. For example, some think that wealth is more favorable than poverty, while others think that poverty is more favorable than wealth.(7)

Third: This proof concerns the contradictory views between the philosophers and the multitude, such as the view that virtue with poverty is preferable to the good life without virtue; the multitude thinks the opposite. From this it seems that if contradiction is possible among philosophers and among the multitude, it is possible between philosophers and the multitude. Therefore, contradiction is a human phenomenon and is not confined to certain classes of human beings.

Fourth: Philosophical concepts come from the multitude,. Philosophers think that the concept of substance comes from the multitude when they sell and exaggerate the price of certain stones. The similarity between the two terms (substance and stone) is due to the fact that these stones are substances because of their superiority and because substance is the most dignified if it is named substance.(8)

Fifth and last: The multitude appreciates the philosopher's thought, though they attack him for it. And this means that the philosophers start from accepted opinions.(9)

Now the question is: If there is continuity between the multitude and the philosophers, why does Averroes speak about the discontinuity between them? The answer to this question is possible on condition that we should differentiate between the status quo and the pro quo. To elaborate: historically, this discontinuity between philosophers and the multitude goes back to Euthyphro. Euthyphro says that after the condemnation of Socrates his distinguished disciples dispersed. Among them was Plato, who left Athens, and when he returned after thirteen years, he established the Academy and on its entrance he inscribed, "Entrance is fordidden except fot those who are competent in geometry". Thus Plato was separated from the multitude. As for Averroes, he claimed that the Prophet used to translate the symbols into sensible images so that the multitude could understand the religious text. Concerning the philosophers, Averroes thought that they are competent to interpret. Thus, the question of the problematic of truth, according to Averroes, is as follows:

If contradiction is embedded in the problematic, the question is: where is the contradiction in the concept of truth? I think that the contradiction is in Averroes' definition of interpretation, which is "extension of the significance of an expression from real to

metaphorical significance, without forsaking therein the standard metaphorical pratices of Arabic, such as calling a thing by the name of something resembling it or a cause of consequence or accompaniment of it, or other things such as are enumerated in accounts of the kinds of metaphorical speech".[10]

Thus we can understand Averroes' warning against the explicit declaration of the contradiction between what is real (sensible) and what is allegorical. The importance of this warning is due to the fact the philosophers, in his age, were ignored in comparison to jurists and politicians. Therefore, as a reaction, Averroes gives priority to the philosophers, although they are equal to theologians. This priority of philosophy over theology leads to the negation of the illusion of the possession of absolute truth by the theologian (jurist), that is, by religious authority in its organic unity with political authority. And if the illusion of possessing absoulte truth is negated, truth is turned into mere knowedge, which is liable to evolution. In this case, no one will have the right to charge the other of unbelief on the gound that he negates a certain absolute truth, and hence is deviating from "ijma" "or consensus, and its concomitant certainty, or dogmatism.

If certainty is the essence of "ijma" "and if certainty negates demonstration, that is, refuses to be accepted by demonstration, certainty then prevents demonstration. Consequently, (takfir), the charge of unbelief is a charge that will continue to be directed against any one who violates dogmatism. In this sense, Averroes is distinguished from Aristotle due to his introduction of the category of takfir into the field of logic and demonstrating that it contradicts interpretation. Therefore, I disagree with Gauthier and Gilson in their claim that Averroes did not contribute anything new in the field of logic. For logic, according to Aristotle, does not include the two

categories of takfir and interpretation because it does not imply the dichotomy between al-Rasikhoun fililm (well-grounded in science) and the multitude. This dichotomy, in its turn, implies a problematic or, strictly, a contradiction between continuity and discontinuity.

The question now is:

Is it possible to eliminate the problematic which is implied in the dichotomy, and hence, eliminate the category of takfir?

Within the context of a pro quo, the elimination is possible. Averroes had envisaged such a possibility in his discussion of Plato's Republic. In the ideal city of Averroes the multitude practices the logic of syllogism.

The question is: How? Averroes answers by saying that if man's sole purpose is sensual pleasure, delight of the senses, in this case, man is closer to the field of unexamined opinions, or in contemporary terms, of taboos. Due to the liberation from the taboos the multitude will be equal to the philosophers. The evidence is that Averroes, in his ideal city, evades the class divisions. Consequently, one could say that he wishes to involve the multitude in the field of philosophy, provided that the multitude is not involved in sensual pleasures, for such pleasures prevent men from controlling themselves(11). This means that this kind of control leads man to surpass what is sensual to what is reasonable, or to surpass what is rhetorical or poetic to what is demonstrative. This opens the door for the multitude to practice rational demonstration. And if the multitude enters that door it becomes possible for them to be governors in Averroes' ideal city, and, in this way, the discontinuity between the multitude and the governors is negated.

Therefore, Averroes attacks the Arab poets who call for sensual

pleasures through their poetry. In this sense, the poets perform a role in bringing about the discontinuity between the multitude and the governors. He also attacks the theologians (mutakallimun), particularly the Asharites, describing them as having sick minds which influence the multitude; hence true harm comes from them and not from the philosophers.

Hence, according to Averroes, if we seek continuity between sharia (religion) and philosophy, it is imperative that we eliminate false problems which emanate from kalam (theology). It is also essential that the fakih (jurist) stop using fikh (jurisprudence) as a tool for either pleasure or authority. This means that if we succeed in eliminating theology, the opposition between religion and philosophy will consequently be eliminated. As a result, takfir will also be eliminated.

Now the question is: Was Averroes able to achieve this task? In other words: Was he able to convince the multitude?

My answer is that he failed, and the reason for this failure is his being unaware of the necessity of writing a sequel to "Fasl al-maqal fima bayn al-hikma wal sharria min al-ittisal", "to be entitled Fas al-maqal wa taqrir mabayn al-gomhour wal hukamaa min al-ittisal" (Decisive Treatise on the Continuity between the Multitude and the Governors). The importance of such a book, in my opinion, is due to the fact that takfir, the charge of unbelief, will always be practiced by theologians against the multitude as long as the multitude continues to be under the control of the theologians. Therefore, writing such a book would have made the multitude conscious that this control is false and illusory. Accordingly, due to the absence of such a book, the charge of unbelief still prevails in the present age.

Notes

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LOGIC of VIOLENCE

"What is not yet, is true".

This statement of mine says the opposite of Hegel's. In the preface to the "Philosophy of Right" Hegel states:

...to comprehend what is-this is the task of philosophy, because what is, is reason... To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present, and thereby to enjoy the present, this is the rational insight which reconciles us with the actual.[1]

Thus, according to Hegel, reason is used within the horizontal level of reality, that is, the actual reality. Certainly, reason has to perceive the actual reality, but this perception does not come from the status quo, but from the pro quo, and this is due to the fundamental distinction betwen man's relationship with reality and the animal's contact with it. A horse, for example, lacks what is proper to man, what Marx refers to in his "Capital": "At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement"[2]. Thus, human activity, within this dimension, implies the concept of purpose, and this concept means transcending the actual reality for the sake of tranforming it.

In this sense, our statement mentioned at the beginning of this paper, reveals a paradox, namely, truth is related, organically, to the

potential and not to the actual. And the conflict between what is potential and what is actual or real, dates back to the origin of philosophic thought. In classical Greek philosophy, reason is the cognitive faculty to distinguish what is true from what is false, in sofar as truth is primarily a condition of being, of reality. And by virtue of this equivalence being is better than non-being. The latter is a threat to the first- a destruction.

But, in my opinion, the threat is the other way round, that is, the being, the actual, the status quo, is the real threat to the non-being, the potential, the pro quo. Consequently, reason is led to measure the truth of the being in terms of the non-being, of the potential. And if this measure is true, then the "would be" replaces the "is".

Thus, reason transcends the actual in the sense that it moves from the potential to the actual and this movement violates reality through praxis. Consequently, reason is violent, and, therefore, violence is a rational act. This statement goes against Popper's concept of violence in his paper entitled "Utopia and Violence" in which he states that violence is against reason, and that the attitude of reasonableness is the only alternative to violence. In this sense Popper is, also, against utopia on the pretence that any utopia assumes the realization of the potential, the pro quo, and such realization is beyond the power of scientific argument. Consequently, the utopian method, which chooses an ideal state of society as the aim which all our potential actions should serve, is likely to produce violence and not human happiness. He counterposes, against this, a reformism which takes as its procedural rationale:

Work for the elimination of concrete evils rather than for the realization of abstract goods. Do not aim at establishing happiness by political means, rather aim at the elimination of concrete miseries. Do

not try to construct systematic normative blue prints for human liberation, but engage, instead, without articulating ultimate social and political ideals, in practical piecemeal social engineering. Choose what you consider the most urgent evil of the society in which you live, and try patiently to convince people that we can get rid of it.

This means that we should fight for the elimination of hunger, disease, racism and the like by direct means, e.g. by improving distribution of farm produce, by establishing non discriminating practices in housing and employment. We can reach agreement on:

> ... What are the most intolerable evils of our society and what are the most urgent social reforms, but we cannot reach agreement about utopian ideals for the radical transformation of our society.

Thus reason, according to Popper, is, by its very nature, unable to transcend reality for the sake of transforming it radically on rational and scientific basis. As a result, reason's function is confined to mere negation, and not to negation of negation. In this sense, reason is not dialectical, and this conclusion is affirmed in his paper entitled "What is dialectic" in which he refuses the "dialectic triad" and replaces the method of trial and error which deals with:

> ....an idea and its criticism, or with the struggle between a thesis and its antithesis; originally we made no suggestion about a further development, and we did not imply that the struggle between the thesis and an antithesis would lead to a synthesis. Rather we suggested that the struggle between an idea and its criticism or between a thesis and its antithesis would lead to the elimination of the thesis (or, perhaps, of the anti-thesis) if it is not satisfactory.

Anyhow, in my own opinion, the method of trial and error is the method used by animals on the grounds that they are unable to adopt a

purpose, or strictly speaking, a futuristic vision. They live only in the present. Man is the unique animal who acts according to a purpose put in the future to be realized in the present. This means that man moves from the future to the present.

But opposing Popper's concept of violence does not mean that we justify any violent act. Not every violent act is reasonable. Only the one that could change the social reality in a radical way, and this is nothing but the revolutionary violence and not pure violence.

At the beginning of the 1890s Plechanov wrote in his article "Power and Violence" directed against the anarchists' absolutisation of violent action:

"If we take as an example any revolution of the 18th century, such as that of 1830 or 1848, on each occasion we come across a long bloody series of violent acts, revolts, barricades, armed confrontation and butchery. These instances of violence mislead the anarchists and their delusions can be summed up as follows" Since violence is perpetrated in every revolution it is sufficient to resort to violent means to unleash or accelerate revolution.

The error, here, is to be found in the fact that violence as a factor that promotes the destruction of the old order is absolutised and presented as a factor leading up to revolution. Since revolutions, the anarchists say, have proved victorious thanks to violence it is, thus, essential to encourage violence and then revolution will inevitably triumph.

This logic is put forward by the present day radical left who see violence as the creative force of history. In their absolutisation of violence, the ideologists of the radical left associate revolutionary method for the transformation of society above all with revoultionary

war that takes the form of guerilla war. Revolutionary war is presented as the supreme form of class struggle. In his book "Revolutionary in the Revolutionary" Riges Debray declares that any party which does not place its main stake on armed struggle is non-revolutionary.

This appeal of Debray's call for the elevation of guerilla war to a law of revolutionary struggle met with enthusiastic support from the leaders of the European New Left (Rudi Dutschke and others) who called for the unleashing of guerilla warfare in the jungles of the cities.

In this sense violence has become almost endemic to many high school and college campuses since the rebellion at Berkeley in 1964. All of the essential elements were laid down there: student radicalism, seizure of buildings, confrontation with police. This pattern has since repeated itself elsewhere but with slight variation. At Chicago, a two week occupation of the administration building. In Paris, in May 1968 a seemingly harmless student protest aroused against the nation's education system. But this protest escalated into bloody street battles of incredible violence between police and students. In many Moslem countries students belonging to the militant Moslem brothers wage against sin and evils imported from western civilization which is considered by these militants as equivalent to pre-Islamic society.

Now. a question has to be raised:

Is the violence conceived by the New Left and most of the student movements, rational?

The answer is in the negative as long as violence is practised by the adherents of these movements without a revolutionary theory that involves a futuristic vision of a new society based on scientific law of the development of the society. Thus the futuristic vision and scientific

law are essential characteristics of rational violence, or strictly speaking, of revolutionary violence. Otherwise, violence is equivalent to terrorism and anarchism. In this sense, the violence adopted by the New Left is irrational for they reject both capitalism and socialism, and at the same time, they have no alternative and this goes hand in hand and in response to a new trend that has prevailed since the sixties and could by summed up in the following concepts: de-ideologisation, de-dogmatisation, de-sacralisation and de-systematisation. In a nutshell, one could say "de-ism", that is, the negation of any "ism". What the New Left need to be rational in using violence is to negate the negation by transcending the de-ism to "re-ism".

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(*) Paper presented at the Fourth EASRG Coference, on Youth, Violence and Religion, April, 1981.

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LOGIC of PAX MUNDI

At a press conference in London on 9 July, 1955 B. Russell presented an appeal for defence of humanity's right to exist, subsequently known as the Einstein-Russell manifesto. The manifesto was signed by the greatest scientists of the world. The manifesto reads:

In the tragic situation which confronts humanity we feel that scientists should assemble in a conference to appraise the perils that have arisen as a result of the development of mass destruction and to discuss a resolution in the spirit of the appended draft.

We are speaking on this occasion not as members of this or that nation, continent or creed, but as human beings, members of the species man, whose continued existence is in doubt".

From the above mentioned manifesto there are two problematics that need to be tackled. The first problematic is involved in science being responsible for the would be mass destruction and the necessity of a revolution to avoid this mass destruction.

Now the question is: Is a revolution a solution?

The second problematic is implied in the scientist as being committed to a creed or to a nation and as being a member of the species man.

Now the question is:

If the scientist is not related to a creed or to a nation to what is he related as a species man?

At the opening of the first World Peace Congress in Paris in 1945, Frederic Joliot-Curie said: We are met here not to demand but to impose peace on the war mongers".

Now the question is: Could peace be imposed?

Let me now extract the notions implied in these three questions: revolution, species man and peace.

Let me now paraphrase these notions as follows:

A revolution is practiced by the species man for the sake of imposing peace.

Then the question is:

How can the species man carries out a revolution to realize peace?

But answering this question one has to ask three more questions?

Who is the species man?

What is a revolution?

What kind of peace?

To my own viewpoint a revolution is a radical change replacing a pro quo instead of the status quo. The pro quo is a futuristic vision that has been created by reason. Consequently, reason is creative. And if reason is creative then its logic shuld adopt creativity as its pivotal concept and in this sense we could establish a new logic that is, logic of creativity and then it is our task to identify its categories which are four in number: abstraction, relation, purpose, and time.

Who is the species man?

He is distinguished by reason..

But how does reason function?

Reason does not perceive facts because there are no facts per se, but facts as perceived. Thus reason, from the beginning interprets facts. But his interpretation is not confined only to the theoretical level but it is related also to practice due to our definition of creativity as the ability of reason to establish new relations for the purpose of changing reality. Therefore, reason, in the light of interpretation and creativity, is the faculty of practico transcendental interpretation as opposed to the passive speculative feature immanent in both the Cartesian on one hand and Lockean and Humean systems on the other hand. Descartes interpreted the correspondence between innate ideas and reality in the static and non evolutionary concept of man. Locke and Hume observed in the factors constitutive of the origin of the ideas the maximum part played by experience, with, in addition, minimum part played by the organizing factor Locke referred to by the phrase "operations of our mind" known by reflection, and Hume reduced it to the association of ideas. Kant could have completely surpassed Descartes, Locke and Hume if he had developed the constitutive characteristic of reason. He was satisfied with this characteristic at the start and not through the whole system. And this defect is due to the a priori form of the sensibility and understanding which is limited to organizing the phenomenal reality.

Thus the species man is a self reliant master of his life against any kind of despotism or dogmatism. Consequently, his position in the world is no longer to depend on external authority. Thus, his struggle in the nature and with social systems was to be governed by his reason as being the faculty of the practico transcendental interpretation.

Within this context one could ask: What kind of peace could be realized?

Could it be stated that peace is the negation of war?

If this is so one has to ask: What is war?

War is based completety on the concept of the "enemy". Thus, if this cocept is negated war will be negated too.

But what is the origin of this concept? It is related to the concept of the sacred taboo, and if this sacred is touched enmity emerges.

Now, the question is:

What is the origin of the sacred taboo?

It is relativized absolute. But in his relativity the absolute becomes limited whereas he is, by his very nature, limitless and this leads to new creation, that is, the creation of another absolute and this, in his turn, leads to an enmity between the two absolutes, and so the absolute struggle emerges and this is the origin of war.

Thus, if we want to eliminate war we have to eliminate the absolute struggle, or strictly speaking, to eliminate the relativization of the absolute.

How?

The concept of the absolute is related to the concept of the absolute truth. Thus, the question is:

Can the species man grasp the absolute truth?

Here Kant could be our guide in his distinction between grasping the absolute truth and seeking to grasp it.

Grasping the absolute truth leads to dogmatism, whereas seeking to grasp it prevents us from falling into dogmatism.

Now the question is:

Who is responsible for the creation of dogmatism?

The religious authority backed by a certain kind of theology. And the real function of theology is to prevent the believers from any

deviation concerning its dogma, and if this deviation happens the believer is accused of being heretic. Then, any new interpretation is forbidden and if this newness is the core of the logic of creativity, then theology refutes this logic.

Now the question is:

What is the logic of creativity?

Spearman's book entitled "Creative Mind" (1930) could be considered the first book that tried to establish the logic of creativity based on three principles. The first principle is that of apprehension of experience, that is, knowing one's own experience which converts the feelings into consciousness of feelings. But the defect of this principle is that it prevents the self from transcending itself; it affirms nothing more than the subjective experience.

The second is the principle of relations. When two ro more items are given, a person may perceive them as related in various ways. Spearman is doubtful about regarding this principle as creative, for it only copies what had already existed.

The third is the principle of correlates. When any item and a relation to it are present in the mind, then the mind can generate in itself another item so related. Spearman says that this principle is the most inherently creative, and he mentions the famous test of opposites. Words are read aloud and to each of them the subject has to respond with its opposite. But, in my opinion, this principle is nothing more than mere remembering of past experience.

In my own opinion, these three principles of creativity can be reduced to the principle of sense data which is the fundamental principle of Logical Positivism and which does not however justify creativity, for creativity cannot be limited to sense data. History of

science confirms my own point of view. As an example, consider the development of the theory of relativity. Before Einstein, the Newtonian concepts of absolute space and time had pervaded both the theory and the practice of physics for serveral centuries. Then came Einstein, the Newtonian concepts of absolute space and time had pervaded both the theory and the practice of physics for several centuries. Then came Einstein and questioned the fundamental nature of Newtonian ideas. In this way, a confusion was introduced into the infrastructure. To be free of this confusion Einstein was able to tackle this underlying infrastructure in a radically new light. And this is one form of creativity that is based on doubt against dogmatism or the absolute truth that prevailed within the Newtonian physics.

Another form of creativity is that which comes out of a concealed contradiction that is embedded in the existing theories. As an example, the postulate of parallels. This postulate states that through a given point there is one and only one parallel to a given straight line. At first glance, this postulate appears to be self-evident. There is, however, a contradiction within it because it contains a statement about infinity; the assertion that the two lines do not intersect within a finite distance transcends Euclid's definition of the straight line as the shortest distance between two of its points, and this means that the straight line should have a finite length.

The history of mathematics tells us that excellent mathematicians from Proclus to Gauss have tried, in vain, to solve this problematic and a new turn was given, then it was stated that this axiom could be disposed through the creation of non-Euclidean geometry.

From the above mentioned contradictions one can conclude consequently that revealing a contradiction leads to the creation of a new theory. Thus, formal logic is unfit for generating creativity

because it is based on the non-contradiction principle which has been transformed into an absolute truth. In this sense, if a scientific theory is claimed as true, then thinking based on the possibility of its contradiction is inadmissible. And the reason for this inadmissibility derives from the ontological form of Aristotole's logic, being based on the "essence" or strictly speaking on what is permanent and unchangeable.

As a remedy for the defect of formal logic, dialectical logic, formulated by Hegel is based on the principle of contradiction. But this principle was used within the concept of the Absolute. Thus its end is similar to formal logic, though the two logics are different in principle. In this sense, both formal and dialectical are related to the absolute truth, whereas the history of science proves that it is inadmissible to proclaim any absolute truth.

Thus, the question is:

Is it legitimate to establish a substantial relation between reason and truth?

My answer is in the negative for the following two reasons:

1. If it is illegitimate to state that reason can grasp the absolute truth, we have no right to deduce from this that reason can grasp the relative truth, because truth by its very nature should be absolute and not relative. And as the absolute truth is a dogmatic truth the ancient Greek sceptics, in order to eliminate the dogmatic truth, adopted the following principle: "To every argument an equal argument is opposed and it is in consequence of this principle that we are brought to a point where we cease to dogmatize". In this sense dogmatism is related organically to the concept of truth. So, if we decide to eliminate dogmatism we have to discard the concept of truth.

Now, the question is:

What is the alternative?

In the preface to the "Philosophy of Right" Hegel syas "To comprehend what is - this is the task of philosophy - To recognize reason is the rose in the cross of the present, and thereby to enjoy the present, this is the rational insight which reconciles us with the actual".1

Thus, according to Hegel reason is applied within the horizontal relation of man to reality, whereas the real relation of man to reality is the vertical, that is, man's capability of transcending reality for the purpose of transforming it, and transformation, in this case, means creating new relations. Thus reason is related to creativity to the extend that we could say that reason is creative by its very nature.

Now, what is the logic of creativity?

Its definition is based on the definition of creativity which is the ability of reason to establish new relations for the prupose of changing reality or strictly speaking, changing the status quo through the pro quo. The pro quo is futuristic vision. Thus the future is embedded in creativity and it has its priority over the other two moments, namely, the present and the past. This means that we move from the future and not from the past. And the future is related to the purpose. Thus, the act is purposive and its end is presented in the future. Consequently the act is futuristic. And because it is so, then it is a symbol of negation since it refuses the status quo, and it is also a symbol of affirmation since it incarnates the pro quo, which is the cause of changing the existing reality. This means that the cause is presented in the future. Thus, it cannot be realized but it is, on its way to be realized. Consequently, freedom is embedded in the furure, and

immanent in creativity. Therefore, what limits freedom limits creativity. And cultural taboos limit freedom because they are the cause of the absolutization of culture. In this case, there is a contradiction between the absolutized culture (dogma) and creativity.

Now the question is:

What is the relation btween the logic of creativity and Pax Mundi?

But why Pax Mundi in particular? Because the world is threatened by what came to be known as "Star Wars" (The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) which has been launched in the eighties during the Reagan administration and supported by the Christian fundamentalism headed by the moral majority to master space superiority.

Here we face a new problematic from within the scientific technological revolution. In fact, this revolution emerged as an outcome of the enlightenment, whereas this same revolution is being used to annihilate the world. Consequently Pax Mundi is a must.

But how could we tackle Pax Mundi?

My answer is as follows:

Not through the definition of man as social or political animal but as creative animal, because the first definition limits the scope of creativity due to the social and political control that is mixed up with cultural taboos that generate the concept of the enemy. Consequently from the first definition we can deduce that war is a must whereas from the second one we can deduce that war is negated.

Notes:

(*) Paper presented at the second special conference on "Creativity and Pax Mundi", Cairo, 1998.

(1) Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Know, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1942.

History of Philosophy



A CASE OF RUPTURE
in
HISTORY (*)

The phrasing of the title of this paper is intended to draw the attention to a philosophical event, that is, the breakdown of the organic unity of philosophy and the masses. This event happened in the year 399 B.C. on the occasion of Socrates' condemnation to death owing to "impiety, corrupting young men and denying the gods. This was the apparent cause of his death. But what was behind it? It was Socrates' endeavour to unmask the roots of the illusions of the pseudo-absolutes, blazing the trail for the passage to the total development of man. Socrates was trying to achieve this task within the mass-man and that is why he was dangerous.

In "Euthyphro", it is written that Socrates is a theologian (maker of gods, inventing new gods) and that he is going to be charged before the court, for such a charge is readily received by the world. Thus, the main point here is that the charge should be approved by the world, that is, by the masses. The following two texts illustrate this idea.

"For a man may be thought wise, but Athenians, I suspect, do not much trouble themselves about him until he begins to import the wisdom to others".

"They (the accusers) repeat ready made charges which are used against philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods".

From these two texts it seems to me that there is an organic relation between what may be called official reason, that is, the reason of the state, or of the social system and the mass-reason; or in other words, between the politics of the rulers and the culture of the masses.

Anyhow, consequently after Socrates' death Plato left Athens and travelled in Greece and elsewhere until 387, and, when he returned to Athens, in that year, he refused to philosophize in the market-place and confined himself to teaching at the Academy, where one has no righ to enter unless he knows geometry. Thus, the mass-man was eliminated from philosophy.

In the later parts of "The Republic" the model of justice in the state and consequently the just state is outlined. The interlocutors ask the essential question: Can this model come into being in this world? The answer is in the affirmative if a philosopher can become a king or a king philosopher. (437D.) But Plato did not know how the conjunction of the philosopher king and his people could be accomplished. Most probably, this is because the philosopher king is above the mass-man, and philosophy is alien to the mass-man.

Thus, beginning from Plato an undermining of the mass-man began to spread to which tyrannism could respond and cope. You can update it to Nietzsche's appeal to the superman: "You, higher men, learn this from me: In the market-place no one believes in higher men. And if you want to speak there, very well, do so! But the mob blink and say: "We are all equal". You Higher men. depart from the market-place!"(1) Where the market-place begins there begins the uproar of the great actors and the buzzing of the poisonous flies".(2)

Next to Nietzsche comes Hitler's remark that the masses are a woman waiting to be seduced. This means that the masses are distinguished by feminine characteristics. Thus, so far as their acts are considered, the masses display a singularly inferior mentality. Along with this pejorative concept of the mentality of the masses goes Le Bon's book "The Crowd", where he says:

"Whoever be the individuals that compose it, however like or unlike be their mode of life, their occupation, their character, or their intelligence, the fact that they have been transformed into à crowd puts them in possession of a sort of collective mind which makes them feel, think and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think and act were he in a state of isolation".(3)

Then emerged two philosophical trends, on epistemological and ontological levels, that confirmed the rupture between the philosopher and the masses, that is, Logical Positivism and Existentialism.

As for Logical Positivism, it has developed a scandelous doctrine of the impotence and irrelevance of philosophy. It asumes that philosophy, by its very nature, cannot have any practical consequences and so it can never influence the masses. This idea originated in Wittgenstein's thesis that there are no philosophical problems, that all genuine problems are scientific problems and theories of philosophy are pseudo-problems and pseudo-theories. Then this thesis has become the inspiration of a modern school of language analysts who have inherited Wittgenstein's thesis that there are no philosophical problems, and that all a philosopher can do is to unmask and dissolve the linguistic puzzels which have been proposed by traditional philosophy.

Concerning Existentialism, let us take Heidegger as an example.

He begins his analysis with everyday being-in-the-world, or in other words, the mass-man, the anonymous and faceless crowds in the streets and factories of the industrial world. This mass-man is encountered not as an object of theoretical knowledge but as a being used as a tool. And the tool is determined by its totality as a whole in relation to usability. Thus, to be-in-the-world is to be absorbed in this totality.

When Heidegger sets out to answer the question: Who is, in this way, engaged in the world? he leads us back to the average, to the indifferentiated.

Thus, to be, as far as humans are concerned, is to be with others, but being with others degenerates into the tyranny of the mass - man, into unauthentic being.

In my own opinion, what is represented in Heidegger's philosophy as an ontogical structure of human being is, in reality, derived from the technological world and its mass societies.

It is true that the problem of the mass-man is becoming very acute because of the rapid development of the computer technology which is threatening mass unemployment not only for the factory worker, but for the menal worker. It has become particularly topical in the last few years when electronic machines have begun to be used increasingly widely in economic management.

One hears warnings about the undesirable social consequences of the cybernetisation of society. Thus, emerged a new dichotomy between mechanized decision systems and human systems. And an appeal was raised by Wiener. "Render unto man the things which are man's and unto the computor the things which are the computor's"(4). This means that we will have two realms: The human realm and the

computerized realm. In analogy with the rise of secularization as a separation between the religious and the civil, we have to claim the rise of creativity as the only distinguishing feature of human realm versus the computerized one. In other words, we could say that creativity would be the inevitable outcome of the computerized realm. In this way we eliminate the dichotomy principle replacing instead the unity of the opposed in a dialectical way that leads us, in the end, to solve the problem of man in the mass-man, the singular in the universal, the individual in the community.

And what about the task of the philosopher?

It will be socratic in a modernized way. The philosopher has to unmask the roots of non-creativity, and this is a negative response, but the positive one should be left to the man in the mass-man.

Notes

(*) Paper submitted to the Fifth International Philosophy Conference on Philosophy & Mass-Man, November 1983.

(1) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, U.K. Penguin, 1969, p. 297.

(2) **Ibid.**, p. 78.

(3) Le Bon, The Crowd, Ballantine Books, New York, 1969, p. x.

(4) Wiener, God and Golem, Cambridge, 1964, p. 73.

CHANCE
in
ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY (*)

Aristotle tackles the problem of "chance" in three chapters of book II in "Physics", and in the chapter of "causes" in "Metaphysics". He says that no wise man, before him, tackled this problem on pretence that everything has a determinate cause, while chance is unlimited and indeterminate, and on pretence that any being, either animate or inanimate, has a cause for its being, either soul or nature.

A question is to be raised:

What is Aristotle's point of view concerning this position of the wise men of his age?

But this question itself raises another question:

What is wisdom?

According to Aristotle, wisdom is considered to follow upon universal knowledge. In the opening chapter of Book A "knowing universally" and "knowing through causes" are made to coincide. Thus, the higher and more general the causes known, the wiser a person is considered. And that is why ignorance is the ignorance of the cause. Men wonder when they see an effect but do not perceive its cause.

Now, the question is:

With which kind of cause is philosophy concerned?

As long as universal knowledge is concerned with form, so is knowledge through the cause. Being becomes determinate when it gets a form, that means, an essence. The cause is limited to a certain being, and that is why the cause cannot pertain to Being qua Being. Hence, the causes are physical and not mental abstractions, they are physical principles of material things.

From these premises I proceed to the place of the concept of chance in Aristotle's philosophy. According to Aristotle phenomena are divided into three categories: He says "Some things always come to pass in the same way and others for the most part. It is clearly of neither of these that chance is said to be the cause, nor can the "effect of chance" be identified with any of the things that come to pass by necessity and always or for the most part.

"But as there is a third class of events besides these two events which all say are by chance it is plain that there is such a thing as chance, for we know that things of this kind are due to chance and that things due to chance are of this kind".(1)

In "Metaphysics" Aristotle studies profoundly this third class which he calls accidental and counts it among the two previous classes. Hence chance is an accidental cause, and because it is a cause it involves accidental purpose. Here, Aristotle gives a significant example to illustrate this correlation between chance and purpose:

"A man is engaged in collecting subscriptions for a feast. He would have gone to such and such a place for the purpose of getting the money, if he had known. He actually went there for another purpose, and it was only incidentally that he got his money by going

there, and this was not due to the fact that he went there as a rule or necessarily, nor is the end effected (getting money) a cause present in himself-it belongs to the class of things that are intentional and the result of intelligent deliberation, it is when these conditions are satisfied that the man is said to have gone by chance.(2)

Thus, chance includes purpose, and in this case the inanimate things, the lower animal and the child, cannot do anything by chance because they are incapable of deliberate intention. And that is why Aristotle appropriates the chance to beings that are capable of moral actions.(3) Therefore, chance is in the sphere of moral actions, this means, it is conditioned by human will, and that it is characterized by being good or bad. Chance is good when the result is good, evil when the result is evil. From this point of view the greek word chance is translated into luck or fortune.

Here, a question arises:

To what reality is the chance appropriate?

The answer, to the contingent and not to the necessary. And what is contingent cannot exclude the possibility of its contradictory. But contradiction is refused by reason according to the fundamental law of reason and reality namely, law of non contradiction. Nevertheless, contingency is a real phenomenon according to Aristotle. Consequently human being, being contingent, should be a contradictory being, and being rational implies necessarily being irrational. And this irrationality is confined to the will, which in this case, should be considered as the incidental cause. Moreover, the actions, designated to the will, are related to the future and not to the past. According to Aristotle, propositions, related to the future, are neither true nor false, consequently they are excluded from the field of science which is confined to what is necessary and not to what is contingent, to what is

permanent and not to what is in flux.

To conclude, chance, as an incidental cause, is a contradictory term, because the scientific knowledge is the knowledge through the cause, this means, the concept of chance is in contradiction with the law of non contradiction.

Here, a question arises:

Could Aristotle avoid this contradiction?

The answer is in the negative because Aristotle is satisfied only with formal logic.

Notes:

(*) Presented at the International Philosophy Conference, New York, April, 1976.

(1) 196b -5, 10-15.

(2) 196b 32-37, 196b 38-42.

(3) 196b 2-3.

POLITICS by IDOLATRY or by REASON
THE CASE OF CONSTANTINE (*)

At the outset, one has to clarify two concepts, that is, idolatry and reason.

What is idolarty?

In order to define idolatry we have to define idol. An idol represents the object of man's central passion, namely, the mastery over nature, but in an illusory way. And that is why idolatry is connected with the invention of agriculture, the first phase of man's mastery over nature, in which idolatry evolved to fill in the gaps left by the limitations of the agricultural technique. Thus, it was believed that by worship of the sun and the stars the earth would be fertilized. The idolatrous priests then taught the people that by certain religious acts, rain would come down, and the trees of the fields would yield their fruit.

In this way, man has transferred his own passion of mastery to the idol. The more he impoverishes this passion the greater and stronger becomes the idol. Thus, it could be stated that the idol is the alienated form of man's passion for mastery. Then, he worships and submits to the idol as something from himself. Consequently, every act of submission is an act of idolatry.

Now, we have to define reason to find out the kind of relationship between idolatry and reason.

In the preface to the "Philosophy of Right" Hegel says: "To comprehend what is--this is the task of philosophy, because what is, is reason... to recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present, and thereby to enjoy the present, this is the rational insight which reconciles us with the actual.[(1)] Thus, according to Hegel, reason is used within the horizontal level of reality, that is to say, the actual reality. Certainly, reason has to perceive the actual reality, but from the pro quo and not from the status quo as Hegel thinks. Marx says: "At the end of every labour process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement". Thus, human reason transcends the actual reality. This statement means that reason does not describe reality, but interprets it. But this interpretation is not confined to speculation but to praxis. Consequently, we define reason as the faculty of practico-transcendental interpretation of reality.

According to this definition, reason rules reality, and ruling is politics. Thus, the ruler should not be devoted to justify the status quo but to pave the way for the pro quo.

Now, the question is:

What are the characteristics of the ruler?

According to Plato, the ruler is the wisest, or what he calls the philosopher king whose function is to realize his heavenly vision of the ideal city. And this city, once established, will continue to be stable. In this sense, the philosopher becomes godlike himself, that is to say, an idol and the door is, thus, open to idolatry in politics. This is the Platonic paradox, that is to say, though Plato stated that politics is the object of science, and we have his three books; The Republic, Politics and Laws, to prove it, yet he produced idolatry out of his reflection on politics. Thus, the king was deified on the ground that God grants

particular grace to the sacred kings in order to use them for conducting the lives of other men. Thus, Montesquieu was right when he stated that the ancient Greeks and Romans had raised the knowledge of politics "almost to the level of a cult".

Thus, according to these two definitions, idolatry preserves the status quo by its illusory nature; whereas reason surpasses the status quo and paves the way for the realization of the pro quo.

Within this context, politics can be practised either by idolatry or by reason.

Which one of these two practices was performed by Constantine?

It is well known that Constantine worked two revolutions within the decaying Empire. The first was the transfer of the imperial capital to Byzantium in 330 which bestowed the title of Second or New Rome and which appeared to have been formed by nature for the centre and capital of a great monarchy. It commanded, from her seven hills, the opposite shores of Europe and Asia. The Bosphorus and the Hellespont were considered as the two gates of Byzantium, and the fleets of commerce. In case the two gates were shut, the capital still enjoyed within their spacious enclosure every production which could supply the wants or gratify the luxury of its numerous inbahitants.

The second revolution was the adoption of Christianity as the dominant and official religion of the Empire. This adoption was considered as one of the most important and domestic revolutions which influenced the state of Europe. Accordingly, Constantine gave the church the right to receive, hold and administer property like a corporation under the Roman law. The church was also exempted from taxes. The attitude of the state naturally changed. Constantine's guards were bearing the monogram "Christos" on their shields. The

church, on its turn, taught that the world had been created by God and that the status quo on earth where some were rich and others poor, some ruled and others obeyed had also been ordained by God and he who protested against God's ordinances was not only a rebel but also a sinner. Concerning Constantine as Emperor, the church declared the following statement: "The king, beloved of God, will already be a partaker in the heavenly kingdom; for he is crowned with the virtues which are inherent in God and he had received in his soul the emanations that come from God; he had become rational from the Universal Reason, wise by participation in Wisdom, good by Fellowship with God".(2)

Following from these statements, one could conceive that there was, on the whole, a close and intimate relationship between state and church, a fundamental interdependence of the Orthodox Empire and the Orthodox church which together formed a single political and ecclesiastical entity. It was usual to find both powers with a common aim combining together against any danger which threatened the order of the divinely ordained world. But such kind of relation tended to bring the church under the direct protection of the powerful Emperor, and so the preponderance of the imperial over the ecclesiastical authority always remained.

In this sense, the Emperor was not only the highest military commander, the supreme judge and the only legislator, but also the protector of the church and of orthodoxy. When theologians disagreed he had to settle the dispute and define the truth of Christianity. Accordingly, he prohibited the assemblies of the heretics and confiscated their public property to the use either of the revenue or the the catholic church. And this is no wonder. Constantine was chosen by God and he was, therefore, not only the lord and ruler but the living

symbol of the Christian Empire which God had entrusted to him. He stood in direct relation to God and became the object of a special cult, or strictly speaking, an idol. It was reflected in the portraits of the Christ-loving Emperor, in the dignity surrounding his sacred person, in the words spoken by him or addressed to him in public. His subjects were his servants. Whenever they were allowed to see his countenance they all, even the very highest in rank, greeted him by prostrating themselves to the ground.

Within this context, one could find the real reasons of Contantine's conversion to Christianity. Political reasons alone are sufficient to determine Constantine's conversion. It was clear to all, including even his most powerful supporter, Galerius, that Diocletian had failed in his policy of persecution and that the eastward orientation of the Empire was incompatible with continued hostility to the Christian religion. So in 312 Constantine ranged himself on the side of the Christian God and from then onwards Christianity was assured of the unfailing protection which was strengthened as time went on. And thus the church was under the spell of advocating the status quo where people were divided into two categories, the rich and the poor, the ruler and the ruled and that is why during its eleven hundred years the Byzantine civilization produced only two art forms, Byzantine churches and Byzantine painting. However, it did not produce a single new philosopher of note, for where idolatry in politics prevails, critical thinking which is an essential prelude to philosophy-is aborted.

As a conclusion let me remind you of the riddle of the sphnix, it is that this riddle is an unanswerable question. In the same manner, the riddle implied runs as follows:

How could reason, in politics, rule out idolatry without being ruled out.

Notes:

(*) Paper presented to the 17th International Byzantine Congress, Washington D.C., August 1986.

(1) Hegel, Philosophy of Right, (trans.) T.M. Knox, (Oxford, 1942), pp. 11-12.

(2) Eusebeus, quoted in Barker, From Alexandria to Constantine, Oxford, 1956.

THE PARADOX OF AVERROES

What is a paradox?

The American College Dictionary defines the paradox as a statement or proposition seemingly self-contradictory or absurd, and yet explicable or expressing a truth.

According to this definition the paradox of Averroes lies in the fact that he had been a forerunner of Enlightenment in Europe whereas he had been persecuted among his people.

What is here attempted is the unfolding of this paradox, followed by an explanation.

Averroes' philosophy attracted Emperor Frederick the Second who was trying to wrench from the Holy See its power and influence in the affairs of the Empire. This was due to the fact that Frederick grew up in a society where a new culture was in the making, that is, a secular culture distinct from that of the church. Here Moslem influences, incarnated in Averroes' philosophy, combined to produce a modern civilization which gave the Italian Renaissance its first impulse. There followed a period of reform during which the Kingdom of Sicily was given a modern administration, a new legal code and a new world view. Averroes' theory of the twofold truth, that is the distinction between the theological truth and the philosophical

one had been adopted by the Italian Averroism of the Renaissance which had a great influence on the rise of Enlightenment. The Renaissance emancipated man from the dogmatism of the Church, and thanks to this movement modern science began to grow. But the Renaissance did not save man from all kinds of superstition. That is why Enlightenment was an inevitable outcome. It was essentially a reevalutaion of independent intellectual activity, that is, sovereignty of reason. Averroism played an essential role in the transition from Renaissance to Enlightenment. But it was not an easy task for Averroists. They faced a severe struggle especially in the European universities. Albert the Great published a book entitled "Unity of Intellect against Averroists", and Thomas Aquinas wrote "Contra Averroists", and thus Averroism was condemned in 1265 as a heretic.

In December 1270 the Bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, condemned fifteen theories, thirteen of which were of Averroist inspiration. Here I mention some:

- Unity of active intellect.

- Mortality of the soul.

- Negation of the Divine Providence, whether it concerns individuals or human actions.

Henry the Great mentioned that he took part in the conference of theologians presided by Bishop Tempier in 1277 in which participants condemned averroism. It should be noticed that this condemnation is directed to a doctrinal movement rather than to an individual.

Now, the question is:

What does this condemnation mean?

Averroes, who is the cause of Latin Averroism, is not a mere commentator of Aristotle; his comments are different from Aristotle's ideas, and in this sense we could claim that Averroes liberated the European spirit, in the Renaissance, from Aristotle as a frame of reference of religious thinking. Jean de Jandun, who politically opposed papacy, claimed that there is no principle except reason and experience. His political collaborator, Marsile of Padou, separated reason from faith, the temporal from the spiritual. As a consequence, the basis of politics should be secular and not religious, and this is the true meaning of the French Revolution.

Now, what happened in the Moslem world with respect to Averroes?

No Averroism. Even those who claim to be reformers such as Muhammad Abdou; he was against Averroes. The origin of the harsh dispute between Farah Antun and Abdou was due to a a long study of the life and philosophy of Averroes by Antun in his Journal "Al - Jamia", then published in a book entitled, "Ibn Rushd and his Philosophy". In his dedication Antun declares that the book is meant for "the new shoots of the east"1:

Those men of sense in every community and every religion of the east who have seen the danger of mingling the world with religion in an age like ours, and have come to demand that their religion be placed on one side in a sacred and honoured place so that they will be able really to unite, and to flow with the tide of the new European civilization, in order to be able to compete with those who belong to it, for otherwise it will sweep them all away and make them the subjects of others.(1)

A little further on he explains why he is writing about Ibn Rushd: it is to separate the temporal from the religious authorities. There are

five reasons why this is necessary. The most important is the third one in which he states that the religious authorities legislate with a view to the next world, and therefore their control would interfere with the purpose of government which is to legislate for this world. Abdou protested on pretence that the separation of religion and state was not only undesirable, it was also impossible, for the ruler must belong to a specific religion.

Twenty years after Abdou's death new problems arose. In 1922, after the revolution of Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish National Assembly had abolished the sultanate and set up a shadow-caliphate with spiritual powers only; in 1924 they abolished that as well. There was a lively discussion throughout the Moslem world about whether the Turkish action was legitimate and whether the caliphate could or should be revived.

In 1925 Sheikh Ali Abdul-Razik published a book on "Islam and the Bases of Political Authority". He raised the most fundamental question "Is the caliphate really necessary?" But behind this question there was another, more fundamental one: Is there such a thing as an Islamic system of government? He approaches this question by an inquiry into the political situation in the time of the Prophet, and finds no clear evidence that there was any kind of organized Islamic government during the Prophet's lifetime. Then he gives his own version and this forms the core of the book. He states that the prophetic mission is purely spiritual. This statement aroused a violent storm, and the consequences for him were serious. It was refuted, denounced and formally condemned by a council of the leading "ulama" of Al-Azhar, and they pronounced the author unfit to hold any public function2.

In May 1926 a "Congress of the Caliphate" was called together in

Cairo by a group of Egyptain "ulama" presided over by the Rector of Al-Azhar. The congress reaffirmed the traditional view of the caliphate: it must have both spiritual and temporal power.

Along with this fundamentalist movement came Moslem Brotherhood, headed by Hassan Al-Banna and influenced by Rashid Rida, the most important disciple of Muhammad Abdou. He took part in the great controversy aroused by Abdul-Razik's book, which he denounced vigorously on the pages of "Al-Manar". The danger of views such as Abdul-Razik's, he said, was that they could be made use of by the enemies of Islam.

The role played by the philosophy of Averroes in the development of human civilization determines the paradox of Averroes. Through unfolding of the paradox, it is clear that Averroism, as a philosophical trend, played an active role in shaping the European philosophical conscience in the transition from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment across the Renaissance. That is, Islamic civilization crystallized in Averroism has been instrumental in developing human civilization in the West, whereas Averroes has been totally alienated from Islamic culture. The absence of Renaissance and Enlightenment in the Moslem World is almost tantamount to the absence of Averroism in this area of the world.

The question now is:

What is the possible role that Averroism can play in the Moslem world?

In other words, to what extent can the present-day Islamic world benefit from Averroes' philosophy in the realization of historical changes as had been the case in the development of human civilization in the European Christian world? Can Averroism play a somewhat similar, probably more creative, role in enriching and enhancing human civilization in the East than it had done in the West?

Notes:

(*) Presented at the First Conference of Islamic Philosophy on "Islam and Civilization", November 1979, Cairo.

(1) F. Antun, Ibn Rushd and his Philosophy, Cairo, 1903, p. 23.

(2) Hukm Hay'at al-ulama, French trans. in Revue des Etudes Islamiques, Vol. 9 (1935), pp. 75-86.

THE CONCEPT of the GOOD in ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

In his book, "Sufi Essays", Nasr observes that:

"Islam presents a view of life which is completely sacred and a freedom which begins with submission to the Divine Will.. In the language of Islamic peoples there is no distinction between the sacred and the profane or temporal realm. Through the Divine Law which encompasses all human life, every human activity is given a transcendental dimension: it is made sacred and therefore meaningful. (Nasr, 1972, p.166).

Once the Divine Law is established, theology must be based upon it. Consequently, the arguments of the theologians involve nothing but quotations from the sacred texts. And these quotations provide the main evidence, sufficient and final, in terms of which any question is to be settled. The pivotal belief of most Islamic theologians is that God's Unity necessitates the dependence of all beings upon Him. If this were not the case, there would be the possiblity of transforming God into Gods. In ethics, for example, if man could judge what is good, he might overrule what God rightly prescribes for him, and this would be blasphemous. This view is theistic, then, in that the decider of all values is taken to be God.

In opposition to this generally held position stand the Mu'tazilites. Justice, according to them, is one of the attributes of God, but it is a negative attribute, in the sense that God does not commit acts that are evil and His acts cannot contradict human reason, which distinguishes between good and evil. Things, however, are either good or evil in themselves. Thus evil cannot be misidentified as the good, they contend, and the Divine Law cannot be against reason. It follows that reason is the basis of the idea of the good even prior to the Divine Law, and when the Divine Law appeared, it merely ensured what reason had said before. The Mu'tazilites also point out in this regard that, if reason were unable to distinguish between good and evil, then the prophets would not have asked people to use their reason in distinguishing between them. The Divine Law itself, moreover, does not speak about the fine details of good and evil. These issues are left to human beings to work out with the aid of their reason. Given that they believe that reason perceives the moral value of acts, the Mu'tazilites consider this value - that is, the goodness or badness of the acts themselves - to be absolute. Thus, God does not determine, arbitrarily, the moral value of an act. On the contrary, this value is intrinsic in the act. All that God does is to inform us of this value through the revelation of the Prophet, if He finds that this information is necessary.

The most expressive figure among the Mu'tazilites is "Abdal-Jabbar. In his book entitled "Summa on the Headings of God's Unity and Justice" he states that good and evil are objective. In one sense, good is to be defined as nothing more than the negation of evil. But the absence of evil is still only a necessary, and not yet a sufficient condition for good. This is evident from his classification of good acts. These are divided into three classes. The humblest class includes those acts for which the agent deserves neither blame nor praise for

either doing them or not doing them. Among the examples he offers are breathing air and eating food. The next class of good acts includes those for which the agent deserves praise when he performs them, but for whose omission he does not yet deserve blame. Two kinds of acts fall into this class: those which do good directly to other people, and those which induce a state of mind in which such acts will subsequently be done. To this, there corresponds yet another distinction - between acts known as good by reason and those known as good by revelation. The third and last class is that of the obligatory act. According to al-Jabbar, an obligatory act is one for which a person capable of doing it deserves blame if it is not done.

Al-Ash'ari and al-Ghazzali argue against this line. Al-Ash'ari emphasizes that we cannot be satisfied with reason if we are to discover how we are to act, for our moral principles can only stem from God's commands. Our knowledge of good and evil and of our duty is obtainable only through our acceptance of revelation. in which God details the precise nature of his commands and prohibitions in order that those who follow them may earn the enjoyment of rewards in the next life.

Al-Ghazzali, on the other hand, objects to the idea of God's being confronted with human notions of good and evil which have been given the status of an extrinsic and independent law. In agruing against the objectivity of ethics, then, al-Ghazzali presents an explanation of how religious references can be incorporated into the meaning of ethical terms. He does this by interpreting the ethical concepts of good and evil theologically. God, he contends, has no ends. Thus, it would be misleading to call any of His actions "good" in the normal sense. Consequently, His actions are not necessary but merely possible. He could have done otherwise. Al-Ghazzali sums up

his view as follows:

"We assert that it is admissible for God the exalted not to impose obligations on his servants, as well as to impose on them unachievable obligations to cause pain to his servants without compensation and without offense, that it is not necessary to Him to take notice of what is in their best interests, nor to reward obedience or punish disobedience and that it is not necessary for Him to send prophets, and if it is not necessary of God to send prophets and if He does not send them it is not evil or absurd, yet He is able to demonstrate their truthfulness by a miracle". (Sherif, 1975, p.160).

This text implies that there is no point in arguing that God's actions are good since the notion of good is logically inappropriate as an attribute of divine action. Al-Ghazzali denies, then, that independent reason is a sufficient guide to ethical knowledge, while the Mu'tazilites distinguish between two kinds of obligations those which are known by reason alone, and those which are known by revelation. By means of reason we can know the general direction in which moral activity must run, but by means of revelation we know the detailed rules that provide us with a practical guide to everyday actions. Against this claim, Al-Ghazzali argues as follows:

"In brief, whenever you wish to know the difference between those well-known judgments and the rational first principles, submit to your mind the statement "Killing a human being is bad and saving him from death is good" after imagining that you have come into existence all of a sudden mature and rational, having, however, received no instruction, been associated with to community, experienced no human hierarchy of polity, but having simply experienced sensible objects. You would then be able to doubt these premises or at least hesitate in assenting to them, whereas you would

be unable to experience such hesitation (in assenting to such claims as) "our statement's negation and affirmation are not true in one and the same state" and "two is greater than one".

Al-Ghazzali then applies this principle to the discussion of goodness and badness. Human beings can only be servants of God, he contends. Whether their service is good or bad depends upon the point of view adopted. From the viewpoint of God, all actions are necessary and therefore good. But from the human viewpoint, the good may be described as pleasant, useful, or beautiful. The pleasant is felt immediately; the useful is judged from the perspective of ultimate ends; and the beautiful is gratifying at all times and in all situations. Bad things, by contrast, are those that are harmful. Just as things are absolutely good when they involve the three qualities of goodness - that is, utility, pleasure and beauty - so things are absolutely bad when they involve all three qualities of evil - that is, harm, pain, and ugliness. In actuality, however, most things involve combinations of the above six qualities. Of the three qualities of the good, the most important is usefulness, and of those things that are useful, good deeds within faith are the most useful, for they serve the highest end of man- his happiness.

After usefulness comes pleasure in order of importance. Pleasures are either spiritual or bodily, but the first of these two categories is peculiar to man. Accordingly, we can represent the hierarchy of the goodness of pleasures in the form of a pyramid. The base of this pyramid encompasses what all animals share, and as we move towards its apex, we focus on what is peculiar to man - which is to say, wisdom. Wisdom, being the pleasure of the spirit, is, of all the pleasures, the highest in the quality of its goodness, and wisdom in this sense refers to fellowship with God.

The Islamic philosophers, however, were not all of one opinion concerning the nature of the good. According to Miskawa, the good is the realization of the perfection of human existence. But men differ in their disposition towards the realization of this end. Some are good by nature and, because their nature is unchangeable, they do not commit evil. but these are a minority. The majority are disposed towards evil. The third class is neither good nor evil and shifts from the evil to the good and vice versa through punishment or through accompanying the good men.

The good is either general or particular, and there is absolute good, which is the Supreme Being. Good men endeavor to grasp this Being. However, from the subjective viewpoint each individual has his own good and this is incarnated in his being conscious of happiness or pleasure. This particular good is nothing more than the emanation of acts from the individual in question, according to his essence. But as long as the individual is independent of others he is unable to realize these possible goods, and consequently individuals have to establish a community in which love for all men is the basis of all virtues and duties. Hence, the fruits of love flourish within and only within community, and asceticism and solitude are forbidden.

After Miskawa comes Al-Farabi. At the beginning of his "Book of Letters", Al-Farabi states that religion comes later in time than philosophy, since the aim of religion is to teach the multitude theoretical and practical things that are deduced from philosophy in ways that facilitate the multitude's understanding. Theology and jurisprudence come later in time than religion, and consequently are subordinate to it. Thus, according to this hierarchy, reason comes before revelation. In this sense Al-Farabi declares that reason is able to judge whether an act is good or evil. On this point he differs from

the Sunna which declare that the good is what is ordered by God and the evil is what God has forbidden.

Al-Farabi considers the good to be the perfection of Being who, at the same time, is the Necessary Being. Evil, in turn, is the privation of this perfection. Given Al-Farabi's relating of the good to the Divine Being, so far as Providence encompasses all beings. it follows that they are all good. Therefore, the good is the substance of beings, and what seems to be evil in fact exists by accident. Thus, it too can be considered good, even though it seems not to be. If you peer carefully into nature, you will find that many things which seem to be catastrophic and evil are, in reality, a means of destroying what is more evil and more dangerous. When human nature acts. however, good and evil definitely emerge. Thus, Al-Farabi denies the reality of evil on the ontological level and affirms its existence on the moral level. And on this level, the exercise of will and choice determines one's orientation either towards good or towards evil, provided that the choice involved in the moral act is based on rational reasons. What are these rational reasons? They are derived from Al-Farabi's understanding of reason as being essentially political in nature. Thus he identifies the good with the political good, or justice, rather than with the ethical good. The reasons underlying action within the moral realm, then, are political, and that is why Al-Farabi is known primarily through his political writings - "The Virtuous City", "The Political Regime", and "The Attainment of Happiness". From these books it is evident that political science does not depend on the results of the investigation of beings above and beyond nature, rather, it builds on the foundations provided by natural science. It investigates those things by means of which man reaches his perfection, and distinguishes them from the things that obstruct his progress. It is

concerned with the moral virtues and vices. Political science then considers the structure of the city and compares this to the strucure of the world (excluding from this comparison any consideration of metaphysical or divine beings).

Accordingly, although man is said to be a natural being and the science of man is said to belong to natural science rather than to metaphysics, political science is not reduced to natural science. Man is a natural being of a special kind, and the differences between man and all other kinds of natural beings result from the difference in the way that nature prepares man to achieve his perfection. It does not give man his perfection, but only the means for achieving it through will and choice. Unlike the other kinds of natural beings, man is able to know the end towards which he must work as well as the means with which he is to perform the actions that bring him to that end. This knowledge is prior to, and the indispensable condition for, good action.

Thus, Al-Farabi states that reason alone can define what is good and what is evil, and the absolute good is the attainment of happiness. But this cannot be attained unless man lives in political communities. It is impossible, in other words, for the isolated individual to attain the virtues conductive to the good human life. At the same time Al-Farabi emphasizes the fact that not all men are capable of being virtuous., So a hierarchy is needed, because some individuals have no virtues, others have some virtues, and still others possess all virtues. These last are the philosophers who must rule, while those without virtues or possessing only some virtues ought to be ruled and guided. For the rule of philosophy provides the only guarantee that those lacking in virtues may attain some semblance of well-being and happiness. In guiding them to happiness, the philosopher-ruler makes use of the

Divine Law in order to promote in them virtues necessary for their happiness. He does this by means of a political act which is lower than philosophy in rank and dignity, but superior to the Divine Law. This act is the establishment of the virtuous city, the existence of which is necessary for the well-being of the masses, but not for that of the philosophers, who may lead happy lives in an imperfect regime. The best city, according to Al-Farabi, is that which had been ruled by a series of virtuous kings. In view of the impossibility of establishing a perfect political city, however, the masses do well to live according to the rules of the Divine Law.

The question now is:

How does one make a community happy?

According to Ibn Sina, there is a relation between God and goodness. God is a necessary Being in essence as well as in all other aspects. That is, He could not be a Necessary Being in one sense and a possible Being in another, because that would involve a contradiction. And if He is necessary and everything that is possible has become possible by virtue of its necessity in Him, there remains nothing incomplete or lacking in Him to be explained - neither will, nor nature, nor knowledge, nor any of his attributes. Furthermore, He who is Necessary Being in his essence is pure good and pure perfection. Thus, the good is what every being keenly desires in order to perfect its existence. It is a condition of perfection and evil does not exist in essence. That is why Ibn Sina says, "Existence is goodness, and the perfection of existence is the goodness of existence," Thus a being that does not suffer any evil in the form of the absence of a substance, or of any undesirable state of it, is pure good. This could not apply to what is in essence a possible being. As for goodness in the sense of the useful and profitable. this, of course, is only a matter of attaining

perfection in things. God contemplates his essence as well as the order of the good pervading all things. By doing so, that order emanates from him to all existent things. We love and seek the good, but only for a purpose. God, on the other hand, entertains no such purpose, and he possesses this form of pure intellectual will with no specific aim in view.

Evil, according to Ibn Sina, takes various forms. It may be a defect stemming from ignorance or from the disfigurement of the body; it may be something that causes pain or sorrow as the result of some act; it may be just the lack of what brings happiness and provides for the good. In essence, it is the absence of something - a negative and not a positive element. It is not every form of negation, but the non-existence of what has been provided by nature for the perfection of things. Hence it is not something definite and determined in itself. If that were the case, there would exist what might be called "universal evil". As an accident, evil is the concomitant of matter and may come from outside and be an external factor, or from inside and be an internal factor.

To the question why God did not make the pure good always prevail unaffected by the presence of evil, the answer is that such a situation would not be suitable for our genre of being. If we were to suppose the absence of evil, the consequences would constitute a still greater evil. our judgment of evil is always relative and in terms of human action. It is with reference to something. Burning is for fire a perfection, and for those who may lose something as a result of it, an evil.

It should be observed that Ibn Sina offers no classification for an entity that destroys the essence of other entities, such as a positive theory of evil. Underlying his classification is his aim to establish the

sense in which the Necessary Being is the absolutely perfect. He specifies this feature of absolute perfection so as to stave off the objection that the emanation aspect of the Necessary Being may lead to deficiency on Its part - a deficiency or loss of substance caused by the emanation of other entities from Him. Accordingly, the Necessary Being is portrayed as generating or sustaining goodness by being essential to the realization of other entities without losing anything in this process.

Good and evil are distinguished in the following ways. With respect to the intention of the terms, differences are recognized between intrinsic goodness and instrumental goodness.(a) For example something having intrinsic goodness may be good in itself if it leads to the perfection of some entities which are imperfect, though these do not strive to accomplish such a good.(b) That which possesses instrumental goodness is a good by means of which other things become better. Good and evil are further distinguished with respect to the extension of the terms.(a) We call that entity "totally good" from which nothing but good can come.(b) We call that entity "predominantly good" from which good may come even though evil exists within it.(c) Finally, we call that entity "prodminantly evil" from which good may come even though evil is dominant within it. It is evident that in this context Ibn Sina wishes to identify the Necessary Being with that which is intrinsically and predominantly good. It is also apparent that he has no classification covering totally evil entities.

Ibn Rushd (Averroes) follows Al-Farabi in focusing upon morality, not from the perspective of how it is to be acquired, but in terms of how it is to be used to attain happiness. The question, once again, is about happiness and not about the good. As happiness is the

end of the political community, there is no good per se, but only the good of either justice or happiness within the human will, and not within the Divine Will. In this sense, Ibn Rushd opposes the theologians who declare that what God wills has no definite nature and merely turns on what the will of God lays down for it. According to this argument, there is nothing good except by fiat, And more specifically, there is no end of man other than by fiat. What brought them to this conclusion, of course, was a desire to defend the perfection of God's attributes, understood in terms of his capability of doing anything whatsoever. And by implication it follows that all things are in principle possible. Ibn Rushd observes that these opinions of the theologians reflect the opinions of the multitude concerning the nature of ethics and in particular of the good. In these opinions, however, they are very far from a true understanding of the nature of man and of the rational faculty which distinguishes him from other beings. Through this specific nature man is what he is, and from this result the actions that are specific to him. This having been laid down, the good and the bad of a man's action are necessarily to be found only in the actions specific to him, And this being the case, a man's end is attained only if those of his actions that are specific to him are realized by him in the utmost goodness. The good, instead of being theologized, has been secularized by Ibn Rushd, and this secularization of the good conforms to his observation in the "Decisive Treatise" that the sacred texts can be interpreted by human reason in such a way as to grasp the true meaning symbolized, whereas the theologians, and with them the masses, are content with the apparent meaning for fear of employing their reason.

In this context, that is, in relation to their approach to scripture, Ibn Rushd classifies people into three classes. The first class is

comprised of those who are not people of interpretation at all. These are the rhetorical class, and they constitute the overwhelming mass. The second class is comprised of the dialecticians. The third, or demonstrative class, is comprised of the people of certain interpretation. This interpretation, Ibn Rushd contends, is not to be expressed to the dialectical class, let alone to the masses. Accordingly, the concept of the good should be approached as it is understood by the third class, if we want to grasp its human character.

One can say, then, that the concept of the good in Islamic philosophy has been secularized through Ibn Rushd's distinction of the three classes and his insistence that the masses are deprived of the ability to interpret which is the basis of secularization. This is evident from Ibn Rushd's definition of interpretation in "The Decisive Treatise". He writes. "If the apparent meaning of Scripture conflicts with demonstrative conclusions, it must be interpreted allegorically, that is, metaphorically". He then expounds his famous definition of allegorical interpretation as "the extension of the significance of an expression from real to metaphorical significance. Thus, Ibn Rushd claims that the Scriptural texts have two meanings - an apparent meaning and a hidden one. The hidden meaning is disclosed by using human reason. Within this context the concept of the good can be conceived as a secular concept.

Having considered some of the ancient Islamic theologians and philosophers, we will now turn to the late nineteenth century and examine the thought of the most historical thinker, that is, Muhammad Abdou, who was interested in determining the relation between revelation and reason in order to define the true ethical norms. In his Treatise, Abdou writes"

The obligation to perform actions that are commanded or simply recommended, and to avoid or disapprove actions that are forbidden,

in the manner prescribed by the Divine law-which determines the appropriate rewards and penalties - all this reason cannot attain by itself. The only way to know, then, is by revelation. This is not to deny that what is commanded is already good in the sense that it leads to worldly or other-worldly benefit.

Thus revelation does not endow actions with the quality of goodness or evil, but only defines the obligation. What is commanded is "already good" for reasons that man can understand. This means that reason can tell men what they should or should not do and revelation gives them the most compelling reason why they should or should not do it. But since reason is often distorted in its operation by other human qualities, it seldom proves adequate even for its own primary role, and therefore most men need the confirmation of revelation to help them decide what they should or should not do. Furthermore, although reason can provide causes why one should behave in a certain way, these reasons lack compelling force, and therefore the religious imperative becomes necessary. This is evident from the following text:

"When have we ever heard that a class of people have made the good triumph in their actions solely on the gounds of the utility that this good offered for the masses or the elite, or that it prevented evil simply because it should have led to corruption and ruin? This has never occurred in human history and it is not in accord with human nature, The foundation of good habits rests only on dogmas and tradition, and these things themselves have no other basis than religion. Therefore, religion's power over men's minds is greater than the power of reason that is peculiar to them".

From this text we can conclude that the concept of the good has its roots in the Sacred Law and not in the secular law. In this sense, one

could say that Abdou is the forerunner of the Muslim brotherhood that was formed in Egypt by Hasan Al-Banna in 1928. Its conception of goodness and evil was derived from Abdou's basic principle that the Quran is the only source to which one can go for an identification of the good.

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RATIONALISM
in the
CONTEMPORARY ARAB WORLD

Thirty years ago an International Symposium was held in Bordeaux on "Classicism and Cultural Decadence in the History of Islam". It is well known that this decadence began by the end of the twelvth century, with the death of Ibn Rushd who played an active role in shaping the European philosophical conscience in the twelvth from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment across the Renaissance, whereas he had been ever since totally alienated from Islamic culture.

Averroes' (Ibn Rushd) philosophy attracted Emperor Frederick the Second who was trying to wrench from the Holy See its power and influence in the affairs of the Empire. This was due to the fact the Frederick grew up in a society where a new culture was in the making, that is, a secular culture distinct from that of the church. Here Muslim influences, incarnated in Averroes' philosophy, combined to produce a modern civilization which gave the Italian Renaissance its first impulse. There followed a period of reform during which the Kingdom of Sicily was given a modern administration, a new legal code and a new world-view. Averroes' theory of the twofold truth, that is, the distinction between the theological truth and the philosophical one had been adopted by the

Italian Averroism of the Renaissance which had a great influence on the rise of Enlightenment. The Renaissance emancipated man from the dogmatism of the church, and owing to this movement modern science began to grow. But the Renaissance did not save man from all kinds of superstition, that is why Enlightenment was an inevitable outcome. It was essentially an independent intellectual activity, that is, the sovereignty of reason. It is considered the age of reason. The conclusions of the mid-eighteenth-century writers challenged views of the history and nature of man and of the universe which were endorsed by the Church of Rome. Kant is considered to be the philosopher who summed up the achievement of the Enlightenment. In his "Critique of Practical Reason" moral duty was withdrawn from possible determination by the material world of perceived phenomena. This means a refusal to subordinate the material of social facts to religious and moral principles. In this sense the concept of social contract was adopted as a doctrinal counter balance to the theory of divine rights of kings.

But it was not an easy task for the European Averroists. They faced a severe struggle, especially in the universities. Albert the Great published a book entitled "Unity of Intellect Against Averroists", and Thomas Aquinas wrote "Contra Averroistas" and thus Averroism was condemned in 1265 as a heresy.

In December 1270 the Bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, condemned fifteen theories, thirteen of them were of Averroist inspiration. Here I mention some:

- Mortality of the soul,

- Unity of active intellect,

- Negation of the Divine Providence, whether it concerns individ-

uals or human actions.

It should be noted that this condemnation is directed to a doctrinal movement rather than to an individual.

Now, the question is:

What does this condemnation mean?

Averroes, who is the cause of Latin Averroism, is not a mere commentator on Aristotle; his comments are different from Aristotle's ideas, and in this sense we could claim that Averroes liberated the European spirit, in the Renaissance, from Aristotle as a frame of reference of religious thinking. Jean de Jandun, who politically opposed papacy, claimed that there is no principle except reason and experience. His political collaborator, Marsile de Padou, separated reason from faith, the temporal from the spiritual, the church from the state, in the domain of politics. As a consequence, the basis of politics became be secular and not religious, and this is the true meaning of the French Revolution.

Now, what happened in the Arab world with respect to Averroes?

No Averroism. Even those who claim to be reformers, such as Mohamed Abdou, were against Averroes, for they protested against secularization which is one of the important features of rationalism. And this protest was a mere echo of a collective protest in the Arab world that could be classified into two types: traditionalism and abortive modernism.

Traditionalism is to be viewed as a negative attitude towards Western civilization, and towards any futuristic outlook on the grounds that the locus of the Golden Age was in the past and not in the future.

Abortive modernism is to be understood as a positive attitude towards the West but at the same time tradition-bound. It is not much

more than enlightened traditionalism, and that is why the abortive modernism, in its fundamental premises and ultimate conclusions, opposes secular elements of social modernization more effectively than traditionalism ever does precisely because it is more rational.

The two most influential figures in the traditionalist movement were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Mohamed Abdou. It must be stressed from the start that this movement, spearheaded by these two Muslim thinkers, did not question the dogma. The primary impluse had its source in the challenge which the West posed to the Arab world. Its aim was to reinstitute and strengthen Islamic dogma, but not to expose it to rational criticism.

Afghani put the issue of the decadence of Islam in clear shortcut words, "Every Muslim is sick, and his only remedy is in the Quran" (Afghani, quoted in Muhammad al-Makhzumi [=M. Abdou], Beirut, 1931, p. 99). Thus, the task of the Muslim countries is not to be strong, but how to understand religion and live in accordance with its teachings. Emphasizing this theme, Afghani published a book entitled "The Refutation of the Materialists" (1955) which became the model for traditionalists' thought in dealing with materialist philosophy. Those whom he attacked under the name of materialists included all, from Democritus to Darwin with their equivalents in Islam, who gave an explanation of the world not involving the existence of a transcendent God. Afghani's preoccupation with Western materialism reflected a general Islam bias against science, which was regarded as responsible for the disintegration of traditional Christianity, and which was now threatening Islam. It is, therefore, not surprising if this stand blocked logical discourse and contributed to deflecting interest in rational criticism.

Thus, Afghani formulated the general direction traditionalism was

to take, but it was Abdou who, using Afghani's teachings as a springboard, gave this direction its precise formulation. The task he set himself involved two things: first, a restatement of what Islam really was, secondly, a consideration of its implications for modern society. As for the first point, Abdou is of the opinion that reason must accept everything that is in the Quran without hesitation, once it acknowledged that Muhamed was a prophet, it must accept the entire content of his prophetic message. The second point proceeds from the first, for as long as reason is controlled by the Quran, so the ideal society is that which submits to God's commandments, for these commandments are also the principles of human society. The behaviour which the Quran teaches - to be pleasing to God - is also that which modern social thought teaches to be the key to progress. Islam is the true sociology, the science of happiness in this world as well as in the next. So when Islamic law is fully obeyed society flourishes, when it is rejected society decays.

This is the ideal society, but for Abdou it is also a society which once existed. His imagination is fixed on the golden age of Islam (Abdou, Risalat al-Tawhid, p. 214). And that is why Abdou was against secular society. One proof of this fact is the dispute between Abdou and Farah Antun on the occasion of a book published by the latter entitled "Ibn Rushd and his Philosophy"(1903), In his dedication Antun declares that the book is meant for "the new shoots of the east". He says:

"Those men of sense in every community and every religion of the east who have seen the danger of mingling the world with religion in an age like ours, and have come to demand that their religion be placed on one side, in a sacred and honoured place, so that they will be able really to unite, and to flow with the tide of the European

civilization.. for otherwise it will sweep them all away and make them the subject of others".

A little further on he explains why he writes about Ibn Rushd: it is to separate the temporal from the religious authority. There are five reasons why this is necessary. The most important is the third one in which he states that the religious authorities legislate with view to the next world, and therefore their control would contradict with the purpose of government which is to legislate for this world.

Now, we come to the second movement, that is, the abortive modernism. The most influential figures are: Youssef Karam, Osman Amin, Zaki Naguib Mahmoud, Abdel Rahman Badawi, Malek Ben Nabi, Lahbabi, and Laroui.

We begin with Youssef Karam, the advocator of "moderate rationalism". He wrote the history of Greek, medieval and modern philosophy, commenting on every philosophic system, whether supporting or rejecting, according to his own system of moderate rationalism which is propagated in his two books "Reason and Being" and "Physics and Metaphysics".

Karam's moderate rationalism is representative of "Neo-Thomism" which was advocated by Jacques Maritain, under whom Karam studied philosophy at the Catholic Institute in France at the beginning of world war one. According to Karam's system, the mind can strive towards truth and, thus, attain certainty, for the mind grasps the essence of objects due to its capacity of abstraction which is a mediator between the mind and exisence and, thus, guarantees scientific objectivity. Karam, therefore, is against the sensualists because they exclude reason and believe only in the senses. But he is also against the rationalists who deny abstraction because they fail to locate the real cause that identifies the mind with the objects.

Abstraction is a justificaion of metaphysics. Due to abstraction, the mind transcends sensible nature to its unsensible origins and conditions and, thus, extends to being per se and consequently to metaphysics. is concerned with proving the immortality of the soul and the existence of God.

The immortailty of the soul rests on three proofs:

- a metaphysical proof which holds that the human soul is independent and, therefore, is immortal and is not annihilated with the extinction of the body.

- a psychological proof derived from a basic natural inclination towards eternal survival.

- a moral proof resulting from the necessity of the total sanction of our free actions. The total sanction necessitates another life since it cannot be realized neither in nature because it is immoral no can it be realized in society because society deals only with apparent actions, nor with the conscience because it cannot judge itself.

The existence of God, according to Karam, rests on three proofs:

- a proof from motion to the unmovable mover, a reasoning from order to the regulative, and a proof from the contingent to the Necessary Being. The third proof, like the first, depends upon the principle of causality and is formulated in the following statement: "There is a cause for everything that exists". The second proof relies upon the principle of teleology and is formulated in the following statement: "Every action must have a purpose". Karam states that the principles of causality and teleology are principles of the mind and are universal. The mind, therefore, is capable of judgment, but is unable to act because action pertains to the will.

As to the question of the relation between the mind and the will, Karam's answer is that each is a cause which is the principle of

judgment. However, they differ in that the will is the efficent cause of the mind's judgment and the mind is the final cause of the will because it offers to the will a specific cause. The direction of the will by the mind delimits the clash between the mind and religion, since it is the will, rather than the mind, that fosters faith. Karam writes: "If a person's behaviour is straight and firm, his will is ready for faith, and it will direct the mind towards finding a support fot this belief". The significance of this statement is that the mind per se neither accepts nor refuses belief, that is, it is not initiated towards a specific belief. The mind is directed towards a specific belief by accepting the external reasons under the influence of the will. The inevitable consequence of moderate rationalism is that faith is beyond reason.

Osman Amin is the advocator of the "Philosophy of Inwardness" (al-Gouwania). It is a philosophy which tries to see people and things from a spiritual angle. In other words, it tries to see the invisible world by not being limited to the visible. It seeks the inward being, not stopping at the outward. Many traditions, attributed to the Prophet, emphasize this opposition between the invisible and the visible. For example: "God does not look at your faces and wealth, but He looks at your hearts and your actions" (Amin, 1973). In this religious sense, al-Gouwania is a synonym for freedom. which must not be sought in the possession of objects, like wealth, but in our soul, that is, in something of absolute autonomous, namely, faith in God and attachment to the dignity of man. In this context Amin thinks that he combines Western philosophy with the framework of Islamic tradition. He says: "I now go back to the philosophical explanation of al-Gouwania. In this respect Maine de Briran is of great help. He says that there is much difference between knowing a truth through our reason and having it always present in our soul" (Amin. 1973).

Further on he states that the philosophy of al-Gouwania adopts the distinction made by Bergson between two very different ways of knowledge: "... the one being th way of inward vision, penetration by the spirit, by intellectual sympathy; the other being the way of exterior vision, affected by using the testimony of the sense or by applying logical analysis alone".

Concerning his concept of freedom, Amin assumes that it is found in the Cartesian ethics which aims at establishing the mastery of the soul over the passions, and in Kant's idea of the moral law which is inward and a priori, that is to say, conditioning all experience,and is not derived from the exterior world.

Due to this interiorized idealist tendency Amin is against logical positivism and historical materialism. He is against logical positivism because it stops at the limits of senses and experiment and denies authenticity of reason. He is also against historical materialism because it uses science to abolish man and, consequently, religion, since man according to Amin's definition, is a religious animal.

The inevitable consequence of this is the handling of social issues in a religious manner. Amin adopts the issue of socialism as an example of this handling and states that socialism is Islamic and its pioneers are Gamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abdou, al-Kwakbi and Muhammad lqbal.

The puropse of such philosophic system, according to its advocator, is the attempt to restore to our atomic age, the age of historical materialism and logical positivism, faith in God and allegiance to man. However, in all his lectures which he delivered at Fouad university, Amin harshly criticized logical psoitivism rather than historical materialism. This can be explained by the fact the Zaki

Naguib Mahmoud, who was a professor of philosophy at the same department, adopts logical positivism. and reaches two important conclusions:

- The first conclusion is that the logical analysis of a mathematical sentence indicates its tautology, and that its certainty is due to the fact that it says nothing. He writes: "This strange discovery about the nature of the mathematical sentence justifies the fact that there is only one source of knowledge for man, namely, his senses and that nothing can justify any element beyond the senses and independent from them.

The second conclusion is that value "is purely a subjective expression which has nothing to do with the external world". The significance of that is, if two people disagree about a value judgment the only alternative would be to resort to an external criterion to decide who is wrong and who is right.

The question now is:

What is Zaki Naguib Mahmoud's motive behind adopting this interpretation of science?

The motive is a social one. In one of his later books entitled "Revival of Arab Thought" (1971), he says that his aim is to reconcile Arab tradition with modernism.

What is meant by Arab tradition?

According to Zaki N. Mahmoud, Arab tradition is the technique used by our ancestors for living. Our task is to choose the technique that can help us in promoting our living. Hence, Arab tradition is not a matter of ideology but technology.

What is meant by modernism?

According to Zaki N. Mahmoud, "Logical Positivism represents

the spirit of modernism and that is why it is an essential part of Mahmoud's philosophy to affirm a legitimate distinction between judgment of facts and value judgment. One is scientific, the other is not. As a consequence, one cannot advocate a scientific approach to the study of social change. Hence, ideology also is non-scientific, and what we call ideological struggle is nonsense.

That is why, according to Mahoud, the terms "capitalist" and "socialist" societies have been replaced by "technological" or "postindustrial" society.

This trend has become the main theme of modern bourgeois ideology, and it has received the name of "de-ideologization" which is an attempt to implant an apolitical state of mind that does not care either for social change or for society. That is why Mahmoud is consistent with his philosophy when the writes in his book “Days in America” (1955): "Owing to my philosophical trend I approve of anything that could strengthen the individuality of the individual and that could destroy society in case solidarity is to grow up at my own expense. There is no real fact except my own being and everything else is but an instrument for strengthening this being".

This statement confirms our point of view which claims that de-ideologization is an ideological weapon used against social change.

Adbel-Rahman Badawi comes to the same conclusion but through atheistic existentialism. According to him, existence and time are synonymous. In his book “Existential Time” he writes: "We clearly and frankly declare that any existence that is not temporalized is an absolute falsehood". Since time, for Badawi, is divided into physical and subjective, there is, likewise, physical and subjective existence. The physical existence is the existence of objects in the

world in which man exists while subjective existence is the existence of the self in an independent and quite isolated existence. Consequently, communication between selves is totally absent. However, this schism may be overcome by means of a leap, which cannot be explained rationally, according to Badawi, because nothingness is an essential factor in the structure of existence, and the irrational is the intellectual expression of existential nothingness, and modern physics corraborates the notion of the irrational. Non-Causality stated in modern physics in the Quantum theory and wave mechanics, is quite irrational in the sense that it cannot be reduced to pure rational elements.

In this respect, Badawi relies upon Louis de Broglie's assumption that physics should reject the idea of continuity and limit itself to deducing laws which are necessarily of a statistical nature.

Consequently, self-knowledge cannot be attained by reason but by another faculty, namely, intuition. The logic of intuition is tension and tension means the inability to supersede the contradiction. This is the meaning of the dialectic which is placed only within the self and not outside the self.

Badawi considers his system an appropriate ideology for Arab society. He justifies this appropriateness by the Islamic legacy as represented in sufism. He finds a close connection between Sufism and existentialism. Both start from subjectivism and place subjective existence above physical existence. The purpose of abstraction in sufism is to release the self from the other so that the self may be kept alone. The notion of perfect man for the Sufis means a polarization of existence in man alone. In this way, humanity becomes a substitute for God. But such humanity, however, is subjective rather than objective.

The main theme of the Algerian philosopher Malek Ben Nabi is to reconstruct an Islamic society free from exploitation, imperialism and coping with modern civilization. But this is impossible unless the Islamic idea becomes efficient. Ben Nabi means by the term efficient the ability to change the world radically, to create history. He says that this kind of efficiency was realized during the Prophet's time, that is, creating the Islamic empire and deepening the Islamic truth. One could object saying that truth was not identified with one point of view but with many. This objection could be acceptable, but no one can deny efficiency at that time.

What does this mean, according to Ben Nabi?

It means that truth is subjective, while efficiency is objective. Hence, objective factors are required for the realization of efficiency. Unfortunately, these conditions are absent nowadays and their absence is due to two reasons:

1. Presence of imperialism;

2. absence of ideas.

The first reason is obvious, but the second one is obscure and has to be explained in detail. According to Ben Nabi's ideology, there are three worlds which are necessary for any civilization.

1. The world of ideas.

2. The world of persons.

3. The world of things.

The leading world is the world of ideas because man is distinguished from animal by reason, and this means that our idea of a thing precedes its realization in reality. Therefore, ideas have this ability of changing the world of persons and the world of things.

Here, a question is to be raised"

What is the matter with the world of ideas in the Islamic world at the present time?

Ben Nabi's answer is that the world of ideas is absent, and its absence is due to two factors:

1. The objective factor;

2. The subjective factor.

According to Ben Nabi, imperialism represents the objective factor. It negates man from his creative powers by involving him in the world of things instead of the world of ideas. In this way, man retreats to the infantile period which is characterized by handling things without knowing what they are. That is why imperialism is always keen to sell us things and not ideas, and even if it accepts to sell us ideas, it sells them after distorting and falsifying them.

But, imperialism as an objective factor is valueless without the subjective factor which designates the "ability towards imperialism", that is the refusal of utilizing one's potentialities to raise up the standard of living.

Ben Nabi, in his book "Vocation of Islam" (1970), says that liberation from imperialism implies liberation from the ability towards capitalism. Hence, any revolution neglecting this subjective factor condemns itself to failure.

How could a revolution avoid such failure?

Through cultural revolution, but such revolution is not sufficient, though it is necessary. It is in need of "explosive economic policy" to liberate productive forces, and in this way the Islamic idea retains its efficiency.

But what is the definition of this technical term "explosive ecnomic policy"?

Ben Nabi's definition is that it is neither the capitalist pattern nor the marxist pattern.

What is it, then?

We get no answer from Ben Nabi, and that is his dilemma, because one cannot control and orientate social change if he lacks a clear idea about what is required for such a change.

As for Lahbabi, he resorts to the radical questioning of the decadence of the Muslim world in the light of the original fountains of Islam, that is, the Quran and the Sunna as a call for a sweeping transformation of the status quo, which is extremely backward, a call to go back to original Islam and shed the idea of the fixity of "taqlid" (blind belief in holy texts) and attempt to perform "ijtihad", that is, to rethink for oneself the meaning of the original message. In the light of these characteristics which are attributed to the Salafiya (traditionalism) Lahbabi enlists the radical difference between the Salafiya and the Western Renaissance.

Western Renaissance is a rupture in the continuity of civilization. One was freed from the medieval style of thinking which enslaves oneself into Antiquity. On the contrary, the Salafiya goes back to the sources of Islam without rejecting the cultural acquisitions whether Islamic or not and going back to Quran and Sunna to liberate the dogma and the laws from superstition, suffism and taqlid. The Salafiya is a search for the original force of Islam, whereas the Renaissance was a movement against the Middle Ages, and Protestantism was a movement against the Chruch. A paradox phenomenon, progress, in Europe, is realized through imitation of what the Greeks and Romans

had thought of. On the contrary, the Middle Ages, for Muslims, were ages of creativity, of free interpretation in all fields. In this sense, a marriage was held between the sacred and the secular. The classics of Greek antiquity, especially philosophy and science, were taken, not as perfect models, as they were during the Renaissance, but as something that could be adopted. (Lahbabi, 1965).

But in my opinion, Lahbabi's theme suffers two weaknesses: The first weakness is that he does not fully elaborate a specific method; the second weakness is that he does not tackle the social implications of his theme. Thus, we can see that Lahbabi has not been able to transcend positively the ever-haunting ghost of the West. It is certain that the medieval religious output of Muslims cannot give any comprehensible guidance neither for today nor for the future; even though there is much that is highly valuable in this medieval thought and that is why Lahbabi is right when he assumes that the weakness of the Arab intellecutals lies in abolishing the historical dimension. and consequently the failure to see reality. The only way to do away with this failure consists in strict submission to the discipline of historical thought and acceptance of all its assumptions: the existence of laws of historical development, the unity of the meaning of history and the efficiency of the political role of the philosopher.

But, in my opinion, it is not easy to adopt the historical thinking, which requires a certain stage of civilizational development, that is the Enlightenment, or the liberation of human reason from any authority save reason itself. Thus, without passing through Enlightenment, being looked at not as an outcome of Occidental civilization but of human civilization, historical thinking is impossible.

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THREE P'S SCIENCE (*)

From the unity of the world stems the unity of sciences if we take the unity of the world to mean the unity of nature and society. Thus the natural and social sciences are determined by this unity. From the beginning of civilization this unity was felt unconsciously, and it is high time to be felt consciously..

At the outset of civilization in the well-watered river valleys, the practice of building in brick, particularly of large religious buildings of pyramid form, gave rise to geomerty. The ability to count and calculate, derived from practical needs of the temple administration, led to the making of calenders to fix the complicated set of religious holy days. Astronomy, from the start, was linked with religion. It dealt with the sky - world in which the spirits particularly those of the sacred kings, lived after death. Thus, primitive man's knowledge originated from labour as a means of mastering the world. This means that what constitutes the content of man's knowledge, acquired by labour, is not the world per se, but the subjectivized world. But this subjectivization of the workd was based, at the start, on myth. And it was the Greeks who produced the first analytical and logical presentation of sciences as one unit. But this rational unity did not last. It has been converted into a mythical unity in the middle ages as a result of the absolutization of Aristotle's philosophy.

The terrestrial social universe corresponded point by point to the great celestial universe. Angels of appropriate rank took their situation beside individual men and ruled the stellar spheres. But this mythical unity of human knowledge was, once more, destroyed during the Renaissance and the Reformation and reconstructed on rational basis. In the seventeenth century Descartes aimed at satisfying the idea of philosophy of being the universal unity of knowledge by means of unitary and absolutely rational foundation. But Descartes' defect was that he limited this universal unity to the ego cogito and that is why when he raised the problem of the reality of the world he solved it in a mythical way, that is the divine veracitas. In this sense, Husserl's critique of Descartes is acceptable. He says: "I discover myself as a human being in the world, as one who at the same time, experiences that world, and as one who knows it scientifically and this scientific knowledge includes me. I now say to myself: all that which exists for me exists by virtue of congnitive cosciousness.. that everything which is and has reality for me, that is, for man, exists only in my own consciousness."[1] This kind of consciousness is described by Husserl as transcendental subjectivity. But Husserl expands this transcendental subjectivity to become intersubjectivity on the grounds that the transcendental ego establishes in itself a transcendental alter ego.

In this manner Husserl excludes the problem of objectivity to avoid raising, according to his terminology, a contradictory and meaningless idea, that is, the idea of something outside the realm of consciousness.[2] The real problem with Husserl is that he thinks that the theory of knowledge is the theory of reason. But this equivalence between knowledge and reason is not sufficient because the theory of reason is the theory of being-in-the-world. So the unity between reason and the world is from the beginning. But this unity implies

opposition as long as reason is considered as a part of a whole which is the world. But this unity of opposition means that the relation between reason and the world is dialectical, in the sense that reason transcends the world and this transcendence means humanizing the world by transforming it. This meaning of reason excludes mechanistic objectivism which claims that science is merely a description of objective reality, and excludes also solipsism which reduces the world to the creation of reason. The first exclusion is due to the inabiliy of reason to transcend reality and the second one is due to the presupposition that reason is 'a priori' to reality. In either exclusion man is not engaged in transforming reality. That would be impossible in mechanistic objectivism because for this kind of objectivism, reason is the object of reality, and reality would then be transformed by itself. The solipsistic view is equally incompatible with the concept of transforming reality, since the transformation of an imaginary reality is an absurdity. Thus in both concepts of reason there can be no true transformation of reality. Transformation is only possible where the objective-subjective is maintained. In this sense, we have to claim that science, as a means of transforming reality, implies the dialectical relation of the objective and the subjective.

As a result of successive revolutions in physics scientific theories are considered to be an outcome of the interference of the subject (and his measuring agencies) with the physical object under investigation. Accordingly Heisenberg suggests that it is now profitable to review the fundamental discussion, so important for epistemology, of the difficulty of separating the subjective and the objective aspects of the world.(3) Thus a scientific theory is not a picture of reality but an interpretation of reality for the sake of transforming it. This means that the scientific theory is not an outcome of observation and experiments as the

inductive logic claims, but an outcome of a human impulse to transform reality to cope with our new needs. Consequently, human needs are the starting point then come observation and experiments as limelights guided by, and not guiding, the scientist. The emergence of science in agricultural civilization, considered as the beginning of civilization, was due to the food crisis that faced man in hunting economy. Consequently, it could be claimed that man created a hypothesis to solve this crisis, and entailed from it a certian conclusion which could be verified in reality. and this process could refer to the priority of deductive method over the inductive one. But this priority is not true because it is based on a dichotomy between reason and reality and exclusion of man from being-in-the-world. To eliminate such dichotomy one has to assume a dialectical relation between both methods, the inductive and the deductive. This assumption means unity of opposites which negates the reduction of the one to the other but, at the same time, leads to a new concept or to a new method which may be called the humanist method as long as the goal of science is to transform reality or precisely to humanize reality. In this manner it is evident that the dichotomy between natural sciences and human sciences disappears and instead we create one human science. And if it is necessary to name it let it be "Three P's Science", that is: Philosophy, Physics, and Politics.

What does this mean?

It means that philosophy, defined as the universal unity of knowledge, has to be based on physics and politics.

As for physics, it is now acknowledged that natural sciences and mathematics can be reduced to the principles of physics. Such a reduction would be an exercise in unification but it is insufficient for formulating a Weltanschauung. It is the task of philosophy being considered as cosmology and the philosopher as cosmologist.

As for politics, man, by definition, is a rational animal but his rationality is due to being social and being social means, at the same time, being political. In World War II principally physics was joined to power in a radically new way. In every country every major scientist was involved in the development of weapons, especially the creation of the atomic bomb. The men who created new weapons stepped into positions of power not only as scientific advisors to governments but also as shapers and makers of policy. Thus emerged what could be called the political scientist or, strictly speaking, the political physicist.

In this context, unity of knowledge is a must through "Three P's Science".

Notes:

(*)Paper presented at the Third International Philosophy Conference on "Unity of Knowledge", December 1980, Cairo.

(1) Husserl, The Paris Lectures, 2nd ed., the Hague, 1970, pp. 30-31.

(2) Ibid., p. 32.

(3) Heisenberg, The Physical Principle of the Quantum Theory, 1930, p. 65. See aslo J. Von Neuman, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, 1949, pp. 418-421.

LE RENOUVELLEMENT ACTUEL de la PHILOSOPHIE (*)

Le meilleur moyen pour prendre connaissance des orientations nouvelles qui se font valoir, à un moment donné, dans telle ou telle branche scientifique est celui d'assister à un congrès international. Moi meme, j'ai non seulement attendu et participé aux congrés, mais j'ai aussi organisé cinq conferences internationales de philosophie au Caire. J'ai choisi de ces congrés internationaux celui qui eut lieu à Varna en Septembre 1973 et le congrés extraordinaire qui eut lieu à Cordoba à l'Argentine en Septembre 1987. De celles que j'ai organisé j'ai cohisi la première et la troisième.

Nous nous arretêront seulement sur les communications les plus importantes et les plus adaptées à mettre en evidence le renouvellement actuel de la philosophie. Parmi ces communications les plus intéressantes à Varna est celle d'ANDREW RECK (USA) sur "Philosophie Americaine du Demain".[1] Il dit qui cette philosophie est aujourd' hui pluraliste. Le resultat de ce pluralisme est l'ouverture à l'analyse linguistique en Angleterre ou à la phénoménologie et l'existentialisme. Mais RECK croit que le future sera terminé par le neopositivisme qu'il renouvellera le style philosophique malgré l'expectation d'une assimilation du marxisme non seulement à cause de la philosophie de MARX mais aussi aux investigations philosophiques

du RICHARD DE GEORGE au niveau pratique. Et c'est pourquoi JOHN DEWEY le plus remarquable comme philosophe pragmatique, dans la période entre les deux guerres mondiales, sera le philosophe par excellence à la fin de la vingtième siècle. Et c'est à cause du role que DEWEY a joué comme critique de la civilisation. II a découvert les problèmes sociaux et les defauts de la société américaine, et il a élaboré une méthode pour les resoudre. Mais RECK ajoute que malgré cette découverte DEWEY n'a pas réussi de signaler les buts specifiques et les valeurs pour son pays. Le future neopositiviste devra jouer ce role. II fera projeter l'idéologie américaine mais d'une manière ouverte et non pas d'une manière close et dogmatique.

Comme DEWEY les futures pragmatistes exposeront les problèmes sociaux d'une manière experimentale en traitant les buts comme hypotheses pour organiser et diriger les forces productives. Plus, ils auront voir ces buts comme fonctionnels et non pas comme des valeurs absolues.

D'une autre côté, une autre communication presentée par deux philosophes, ATHEL MAS et LARRAN (Argentiniens)[2]. Partant d'une definition de la philosophie ils seront efforcer de demontrer sa presence en Amerique Latine. A leur avis la philosophie fournit les fondements de toute pensée à partir d'une réflexion totalisatrice de la réalite qui opère la rencontre de l'homme avec son univers. Le mythe se presente comme une forme différente de rationalité. II y a en lui une pacte entre l'homme et son monde. Le mythe vise ainsi à l'integrité pensée et veçue dans le monde. Sa fonction est de rendre possible la vie en l'installant dans l'éternité. Et c'est pourquoi parce que la philosophie puisse constituer une pensée première, il faut qu'elle approche la réalité d'une manière différnent eavec des catégories totalisatrices qu'ils croient précisement trouver dans le

mythe. Leur mission consiste à suiver la voie ouverte par la litterature à travers la profonde découverte des formes mythiques de leur litteratures. Ils croient que leur tache consiste à suivre le destin de cette pensée pour forger une authentique vision du monde d'après l'Amerique Latine.

Concernant le renouvellement, de la philosophie marxiste le grand philosophe Bulgarien SAVA GANOVSKI a presenté une communication à la première conference Afro Asiatique de philosophie que j'ai organisé au Caire en 1978(3). Il a exposé le courant philosophique qui veut de-ideologiser la philosophie pour écarter la constitution d'un Weltanschauung. GANOVSKI critique ce courant au point de vue gnoseologique en disant que le role de la négation de l'idéologie est basée sur le principe de la separation entre la science et la philosophie d'une côté, et la contraste entre le Weltanschauung scientifique et l'idéologie d'une autre côté. Cette opposition entre les sciences concrètes et la philosophie, le progrès technologique et la culture spirituelle, est vu clairement dans deux courants extrêmes: le neopositivisme et le scientisme. En tout cas, les avocats de la négation de l'idéologie n'ont pas cach leur intention qui se base sur le fait que la refuse de l'idéologie ne doit pas être comprise comme une refuse totale de l'idéologie, mais comme une mesure du combat contre le Weltanschauung scientifique qui caractérise l'idéologie marxiste leniniste. Mais à la fin de la communication GANOVSKI dit que ce courant n'est pas le plus important dans norte temps. Le plus important n'est pas idéologique, il est humaniste. Et c'est pourquoi, ajoute GANOVSKI, que malgré les différences philosophiques, politiques et religieux la réalisation de l'unité de l'humanité est une obligation pour éviter une guerre néculaire mondiale, pour defendre la paix et la securité des nations. C'est une obligation sacrée pour les philosophes d'aujourd'hui.

Je crois qu'à la suite de cette mission philosophique proclamée par GANOVSKI que la "société des philosophes du monde pour éviter l'homonicide néculaire" a été formée à la fin du congrés XVII mondial de la philosophie à Montreal en 1983. Le terme "homonicide" a été crée par le president de cette société, JOHN SOMMERVILLE, qui signifie le suicide de l'humanité par les humains. La motivation de créer ce terme "homonicide" est pour clarifier la différence substantielle entre la guerre qua guerre et la guerre néculaire. La première signifie le conflit physique entre deux groupes humains et le resultat c'est la victoire de l'une de ces deux groupes. La seconde signifie la destruction totale de l'humanité.

En tout cas,la première conference de cette société a été organisée à St. Louis en 1987.(4) Des philosophes de l'Union Soviétique, de l'Amérique et du Tiers Monde ont été invité. Moi meme, jai presenté une communication pour éclairer les moyens d'éviter la guerre néculaire. A mon avis, la guerre qua guerre est le resultat d'une relation alienée entre les hommes, mais cette relation alinée est une relation secondaire. L'essentielle c'est la relation entre l'homme et le cosmos, ca veut dire qu éviter une guerre néculaire ou cosmique n'est possible que si la conscience humaine devient cosmique. Mais cette conscience cosmique requiert avant tout, trois étapes importantes: la mairtise du logos, ce qui revient à la revolution scientifique et technologique, l'abolition des classes sociales, cause d'un principe dichotomique presidant aux sociétés divisées en classes depuis la civilisation agriculturelle et l'unité de la connaissance peut être atteinte á travers de ce qu'on peut appeler "la science des trois P", à savoir de la Physique néculaire, de la Politique et de la Philosophie.

Notes:

(*) Communication presentée au Colloque Philosophique à Tunis sur "Defie de la Philosophie", Tunis 1989.

(1) The XVth World Congress of Philosophy, 1973, Varna, Bulgaria.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ganovski, The Problem of the Future of Philosophy, quoted in Philosophy & Civilization, (ed.) Mourad Wahba, Cairo, 1978, pp. 241-248.

(4) Mourad Wahba, Ideology and Peace, presented at the First International Conference for the Prevention of Nuclear Omnicide, St. Louis, May 1986.

IDEALS of the ENLIGHTENMENT for TODAY

The subject matter of this paper is to see whether the ideals of Enlightenment can any longer serve as our guide today. To find out the answer one has to identify these ideals. In a nutshell, one could say that they rotate around one principle, that is, the sovereignty of human reason. And this sovereignty has been tackled and clarified by Kant in his essay entitled "An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?" which was published in a Berlin monthly in 1784. In this essay Kant defines Enlightenment as "man's quitting the nonage accompanied by himself. Nonage is the inability of making use of one's own reason without the guidance of another. This nonage is occasioned by one's self, when the cause of it is not from want of understanding but of resolution and courage to use one's own reason without the guidance of another. Have courage to make use of thy own reason is therefore the dictum of Enlightenement.:

In this sense human reason is autonomous. Being autonomous means being critical. And that is why the Enlightenement's definition of philosophy is that it is the organized habit of criticism, and this definition does not correspond to the traditional definition.[1]

By identifying philosophy with criticism the Enlightenemt raised serious doubts about the validity of metaphysics, or strictly speaking,

about the validity of the absolute. And that is why it was by chance that Kant was the first to introduce the concept of the absolute into the field of philosophy at the beginning of his preface to the first edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason". He says that reason has this peculiar destiny, within a part of its knowledge, of being forced to face questions which it cannot avoid. These questions are imposed on reason by its very nature, but it is unable to give answers. These unanswerable questions are about the concept of the absolute, whether you call it God or State. And the history of philosophy, according to Kant, is nothing but the story of this inability. However, Kant differentiates between two cases: to seek to grapple the absolute and to grapple the absolute. There has always existed in the world and there will always continue to exist as a possibility for grappling the absolute, but to conceive that you grasped the absolute in an absolute way, is an illusion. For in so far as one grasps the absolute he relativizes it, and then it is no longer the all-comprehending reality. And that is why Protagoras' dictum is still acceptable: Man is the measure of the absolute. And this statement could be considered as the dictum of Enlightenment. One of the sequels of this dictum is the relativity of knowledge, but not relativism. For relativism denies the dialectical movement of the relativization of the absolute, whereas the relative points beyond itself to the unconditional. And this dialectical movement, in its turn, prevents us from falling into absolutism or dogmatism which seeks to impose one's view of truth by the use of arbitrary power. Thus, if each social system adopts one view of truth conceived as absolute, then we will have more than one absolute and this contradicts the nature of the absolute that cannot be but one. And that is why the absolutes cannot live in a peaceful coexistence, otherwise they lack being absolute. Using the Darwinian terminology, the absolutes, in this case, struggle for existence and the survival is for

the fittest. But this struggle is performed by the relative in the name of the absolute. Thus, man adopting an absolute, struggles for it to the extent that he raises war against those who believe in another absolute. And this is what I call "theological murder".[2] For this reason Enlightenment could be considered as one of the greatest revolutions of human history educating people how to uproot this theological murder. But this education is not an easy task.

Enlightenment was severely criticized philosophically and religiously. Philosophically, it was criticized by the Frankfurt School especially by Adorno and Horkheimer in their book "Dialectic of Enlightenment" and by Horkheimer in his book "End of Reason". In the first book, the co-authors try to explain how, at the same height of the development of democratic European culture, fascism could become dominant. Their explanation is that the spirit of Enlightenment which is responsible for th social, intellectual and material progress has always within it the seeds of regression to primitive unenlightened forms. There is a dialectic of Enlightenment by which Enlightenment reverses itself and turns into a new barbarism, that is, fascism, Consequently, reason becoms unreason.[3]

In the second book Horkheimer remarks that the bourgeois philosophy as it is the incarnation of Enlightenment is, by its very essence, rationalist. But rationalism has turned against itself and fallen into either skepticism or dogmatism. Nothing remained from the concept of reason. Moreover, reason is the means by which the individual is rooted in society or is adapted in a way that pushes reason to master the instincts and sentiments.[4] And that is why Kant says that "apathy is a necessary presupposition of virtue."[5] In this sense Horkheimer says that reason becomes a calculater delivering analytic judgments and discarding value judgments. But if we

consider the invention of calculators and computers as the outcome of the scientific and technological revolution which is an outcome of Enlightenment, then Frakfurt School has to oppose this revolution.

Religiously, Enlightenment was criticized indirectly by fundamentalists through the concept of modernism which is an outcome of the concept of Enlightenment. Historically speaking, fundamentalism dates back to the turn of this century. The name comes from a series of booklets called the "Fundamentals" issued from 1910 to 1915 criticizing the attempt of christian adjustment to modernism, that is, science, evolution, liberalism and adhering to modernism, that is, sceience evolution, liberalism and adhering to the literal inerrance of scripture.

Thus, Fundamentalism could be defined as an anti-modern ideology opposing enlightened capitalism that disrupted the religious Weltanschuung. In this sense, Fundamentalism differs from conservatism. Conservatism accepts the modern reduction of the role of religion and accepts the modern world as the arena in which theological task is to be done, whereas Fundamentalism refuses the modern logos. And that is why its pivotal idea is not to translate religion into the mental categories of modernism but to change the modern mental categories so that religion can be grasped. Anyhow, the fundamentalist movement became an international phenomenon. But I'll limit my paper to two fundamentalist movements, that is, the Christian and the Islamic.

As for Christian Fundamentalism, it was incarnated in 1979 in the "Moral Mojority" founded by Jerry Falwell with the purpose of liberating USA from armament control and establishing a military defense network and the expansion of anti-communist propaganda. To reinforce those objectives Falwell founded a coalition of his followers,

the Catholics, the Jews and the Mormons with the aim of "launching the theological guns at liberalism, humanism and secularism, in Falwell's own words.[6]

Christian Fundamentalism is paralleled by Islamic Fundamentalism represented by the Islamic groups headed by Al Mawdoudi (Pakistan), Sayed Qutb (Egypt) and Khomeini (Iran). All three consider the capitalist West and the communist East as the two camps of ignorance that should be discarded by Islamic fundamentalism for God's honour and strengthens the Arabs with Islam, but if they look for honour and strength in other places they become contemptible.[7] But what is meant by the word "ignorance"? In Qutb's words, it is the renaissance, religious reformation and enlightenment, and it is the duty of militant Muslims to eliminate these phenomena, but on one condition that they should be eliminated by religious wars and not by peaceful means. This condition was elaborated by the theoretician of the Iranian revolution Ali Shariati in his book entitled "Sociology of Islam" tries to interpret history in religious terms. He says that the story of Abel and Cain is the beginning of a war that is still and not concluded. The weapon of Abel has been religion and the weapon of Abel has also been religion. It is for this reason that the war of religion against religion has also been constant of human history. On the one hand is the religion of "Shirk", that is, of assigning partners to God, a religion that furnishes the justification of Shirk in society and class discrimination. On the other hand, is the religion of "Tawheed", of the oneness of God, which furnishes the justification of the unity of all classes and races.[8] Owing to this inevitable war between the Shirk and the Tawheed, Shariati states that the most important fundamental Islamic principle is the ability to offer oneself as a testimony. It is the principle that pushes the Molsem into war without hesitation. In this respect, it is not death that

chooses the martyr, but it is the martyr who chooses death consciously and according to his own will. It is not a martyr of tragedy but of an ideal because testimony by blood is the supreme degree of perfection. This means that the real Moslem is the militant martyr.

And now the most crucial issue is the following: assuming there is an organic relation between religion and economics all over human history, the crucial issue is to find out the kind of social class that can fit into the religious fundamentalism. To tackle this issue in a scientific way one has to find out the kind of relation between fundamentalism and human civilization as long as the fundamentalists pretend that their mission is to save human civilization. It is well noticed that fundamentalism is against liberalism and Marxism. But these two trends are the outcome of Enlightenment. Engles says, "Modern socialism, originally, oppears ostensibly, as a more logical extension of the principles laid down by the great French philosophers of the eighteenth century". He goes on to say that the great men who, in France, prepared men's minds for the coming revolutionaries, recognized no external authority of any kind; everything was subjected to the most unsparing criticism, everything must justify its existence before the judgment-seat of reason or give up existence. Reason became the sole measure of everything.(9)

But what does Engels mean by "logical extension"? The answer could be given by Engels' theory of the dialectics between the absolute and relative truth. He says that the contradiction between the character of human thought necessarily conceived as absolute and its reality in individual human beings, all of whom think only limitedly, is a condition which can be resolved only in the course of infinite progress. In this sense, human thought is just as much sovereign as not sovereign, and its capacity for knowledge just as much unlimited as

limited. It is sovereign and unlimited in its disposition, its vocation, its possibilities and its historical ultimate goal. It is not sovereign and it is limited in its individual realization.[10]

Further on, Lenin elaborated this dialectics in "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism" under the title "Absolute and relative Truth" in which he claims that the distinction beetween relative and absolute truth is sufficiently indefinite to prevent science from becoming a dogma in the bad sense of the word, from becoming something dead, frozen and ossified, but it is, at the same time, sufficiently definite to enable us to dissociate ourselves from fideism and agnosticism.[11]

In this respect, fundamentalism is against both liberalism and Marxism because it rejects the Enlightenment and modernity as its outcome. And since modernity is equivalent to the scientific and technological revolution which is the spirit of the twentieth century then fundamentalism could be considered as an entropy to the process of human civilization. In this respect, one has to find out a social class that could cope with this civilizational entropy. It could not be the enlightened capitalism, but an unenlightened capitalism, that is, what I call "parasitic capitalism" that gows rich without development neither in agriculture nor in industry. Consequently, this new kind of capitalism negates producation in all fields of human activity and instead adopts parasitic activities such as, drug traffic, creating black market and trading in illegal activities. In this respect, parasitic capitalism shares fundamentalism in standing against the real process of human civilization which is production in the broadest sense, that is, civilizational production and not only economic production.

To conclude, I think it is clear that the ideals of the Enlightenment should be assimilated, not in a passive way, but in a way that could pave the way for the real process of human civilization.

Notes:

(1) Peter Gray, The Enlightenment, New York, Norton & Company 1977, p. 130.

(2) Mourad Wahba (edit), Roots of Dogmatism, Cairo, Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, p.234.

(3) Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, London, Verso, 1979, p. 90.

(4) Horkheimer, End of Reason, quoted from Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 95.

(5) Ibid.

(6) J. Falwell, Listen America, New York, Doubleday, 1980, pp. 16-81.

(7) Abd alslam Yasin, Call to God in al Jamaa, 1975.

(8) Engels, Anti-Duhring, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, pp. 27-28.

(9) Ibid.

(10) Ibid., p. 122.

(11) Lenin, Marxism and Empirio-Criticism, p. 134.

THE ILLUSION of The GOOD (*)

To what object does the question of ethics relate?

To the good and its contrary, evil.

And what does ethics do with the object?

Ethics seeks to understand it, that is, not to produce neither the concept of the good, nor the actions that fall under this concept.

Thus, the question that seems to follow is:

What is good? or strictly speaking, what is the definition of good?

But the definition asked for, as any other definition, is related, necessarily, to the science of language as G.E. Moore had pointed out in his book "Principia Ethica" But language, itself, is a social phenomenon. Consequently, the definition of any concept implies the quest of the social roots. In this sense, the quest of the social roots is prior to the quest of what is.

Read the "Republic" and you will find out that the main issue is not about the definition of the good, but about the root of the good. The good is represented as the highest absolute end of all reality, as the One to which all the rest are subordinate in the sense of means to end. Thus, the good illumines the whole circuit of humanity as species and not as individuals, and the form in which this species appears is the organic unity, that is, the state and the state is divided, in accordance

with the three parts of the soul, into the ruling class, the warrior class and the working class. The state belongs to the first class, and especially, to the philosopher king whose function is to realize his heavenly vision of the ideal city. And this city, once established, will continue to be stable. In this sense, the philosopher becomes godlike himself in the sphere of politics. Thus, Montesquieu was right when he stated that the ancient Greeks had raised the knowledge of politics almost to the level of a cult. Following from this, the ethical, according to Plato, is reduced to the political as its root and not vice versa, for the vice versa conceals an illusion that the good is the prime mover which goes against Plato's intention.

The same case with Freud. In his book "Civilization and its Discontents"(1) Freud was clearer than Plato. He sought directly for the root of the good and the bad, and he found it in the sense of guilt, that is, in the tension between the harsh super-ego and the ego that is subjected to it. And this sense of guilt experiences itself as a need for punishment. Then he went deeper to reveal the origin of the sense of guilt.

The super-ego rejects the existence of an original capacity to distinguish good from bad on the pretense that what is bad is not at all what is dangerous to the ego; on the contrary, it may be something which is desirable to the ego. This means that there is an external influence and it is this that decides what is to be called good or bad. Such influence is discovered in the dependence of the individual on the other people and it can be designated as the fear of the loss of love. For fear of that loss one must avoid it. Then Freud proceeds in deepening that loss and discovers that the authority replaces that loss due to being internalized through the establishment of a super-ago.

A third and last example Schlick's book "Problems of Ethics". In

the fourth chapter entitled "What is the meaning of moral?" Schlick enumerates the various definitions of the good according to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.

Then he gives his own definition, that is, "the meaning of the word "good" is determined by the opinion of society... which is the lawgiver formulating moral demands. Consequently, moral valuations of modes of behavior change when the structure of human society changes.(2) But in fact, this is not a definition of the moral, for it is reduced to the social. In this case, the real issue is to ask about the structure of the society and the social norms that emerge from such a structure, and not the pseudo moral norms. Accordingly, the proof of Schlick's theory involves two steps: to show that in fact the moral predicate "good" is bestowed only upon such behavior as promises the social growing an inverse in pleasure and to refute the reasons which lead many philosophers to think that the predicate "good" means something different from promising an increase of happiness or a decrease of sorrow for society.(3)

Anyhow, these three examples reveal that the root of the so called good is either in the state or the super-ego or the society. This means that the origin of the good lies outside the good itself. Hence, we can't speak of the good per se, of the good as an anonymous entity. And if we do speak as such we are apt to fall into an optical illusion.

Now, the question is:

How did this optical illusion come about?

Behind and beneath the human experience of the good we find the myth. It is by discovering the motives of the invention of the myth that we can reveal the illusory path to the good. But the invention of the myth is implied in the invention of civilization. Whatever we may

define the concept of civilization, it is a certain fact that this concept describes the whole sum of the achievements which distinguishes our lives from those of our animal ancestors and which serves one purpose, namely to master nature, or strictly speaking, to accommodate nature to human needs. As regards this purpose there can be scarcely any doubt. It we go back far enough we find that the first act of civilization was the invention of the technique of agriculture accompanied by the invention of the myth to fill in the gaps left by the limitations of the technique.

Thus, it was believed that by the worship of the sun and the stars the earth will be fertilized. Consequenlty the priests emerged adopting the myth as the central organizing principle, and accordingly it gained absolute authority in all fields of human activity. Through the myth the priests created taboos which became rules of conduct. Hence, the dichotomy good/evil emerged and from this dichotomy followed the so called moral law "Thou shalt", and "Thou shalt not", which is expresed in Kant's categorical imperative, and which demands that one the moral action should be independent of one's inclinations and needs.

Hence, in accordance with the dichotomy the technique of mastering natures is restricted, and consequently man's activity develops in a new direction, that is, seeking a pseudo satisfaction in internal psychological processes, and considering nature as the sole enemy and as the source of evil. Not only nature is evil, but also man as long as the dichotomy goo/evil has been interiorized, and homo homini lupus is the inevitable outome.

Nevertheless, the real development ran against this illusory dichotomy. The industrial revolution in Europe was preceded by religious critical thinking and the liberation of human reason from

any other authority save that of reason itself. Hence, this revolution reveals that the real development is realized with the help of technology guided by science mastering nature for the sake of satisfying man's needs.


References:

(*) Paper presented at the Twentieth World Congress, Angust, 1998, Boston.

(1) S. Freud, Civilisation and its Discontents, (trans.) J. Strachey, W.W. Norton Company, Inc. 1961, pp. 71-72.

(2) Schlick, Problems of Ethics, (trans) D. Rynin, Dover Publications, 1961, pp. 90-91.

(3) Ibid., p. 86.



Politics



AUTHENTICITY & MODERNIZATION
in
THE TRIRD WORLD(*)

In the third world traditional societies are disrupted, we can neither cry over that, nor ignore that this is a "fait accompli". There is no going back, and the only way is to go forward for better or for worse.

In this case the only question to be raised is the following:

How could it be for better?

The answer of this question should be based up on the nature of the development of human civilization which could be confined to two specific steps:

First step: Sovereignty of reason.

Second step: Commitment of reason.

These two steps indicate the spirit of "modernisation" owing to the historical development of Western civilization. It is well known that the French revolution is a symbol of sovereignty of reason over what was called the ecclesiastical power of the church.

Descartes was the forerunner of the ideological basis of this revolution. His main theme was that wisdom is not a particular kind of

knowledge, distinct from all others and accessible only to a few "The whole sum of knowledge and science is but human wisdom, which remains always one and the same, no matter how various the subjects to which it is applied...".[1] In addition, the "Encyclopédie des Sciences", published in twenty-eight volumes from 1751 to 1772 thanks largely to the labours of Diderot (1713-84) and D'Alembert (1717-83).

But the French revolution failed to incarnate reason in society, owing to its notion of liberty which refuses any social commitment. It was Karl Marx (1881-83) who later in the nineteenth century brought out the inevitable consequence of the French revolution when he stated his famous proposition, "Philosophers had only interpreted the world in various ways but the task was to change it".

The Russian revolution was the inevitable consequence of the French revolution. In other words, sovereignty of reason entails commitment of reason towards the change of society and commitment of reason implies necessarily secularization.

Why?

Because secularization is that human process in our civilization by which human existence comes to be determined by the dimension of time and history.[3] Therefore, secularization is the spirit of modernisation.

What about "authenticity"?

This term is often used in the developing countries of the third world, especially in Africa and Asia, because these countries, due to imperialism, were isolated from western civilization for at least three hundred years. So, when the national liberation movement began during the second world war with a policy of "decolonisation", it was

accompanied by a policy of "de-westernisation". As Nkrumah put it in his book "Neocolonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism", "The methods of neocolonialists are subtle and varied. They operate not only in the economic field, but also in the political, religious, ideological and cultural spheres". (p. 239).

But at the same time the national intelligentsia, to a great extent, had been shaped outside their countries. During their stay in foreign educational establishments it acquired in addition to special knowledge various social ideas which subsequently formed their political credo.

Therefore, a critical position arises, concerning the nature of the social outlook of such intelligentsia. It is obviously noticed that they are divided into two antagonistic groups. The first group realizes that modernisation has alienated it from the traditional cultural roots without giving it a satisfactory substitute. This realization has produced an increasing search for national culture to bring it into the picture of modern world.

This attempt to rediscover the cultural past shows itself in various ways such as "Négritude". This term was first coined by the poet Aimé Césaire from the West Indies. It has been elevated and given its philosphical content by another great poet, Leopold Sédar Senghor. "Négritude is not the defense of a skin or a colour. Négritude is the awareness, defense and development of African cultural values. Négirtude is a myth. It is the awareness by a particular social group of people of its own situation in the world". He sees it in relation to political life: "It is democracy quickened by the sense of communion and brotherhood between men"; and in the cultural context, Négritude is more deeply rooted in works of art which are people's most authentic expression of itself, it is sense of image and rythm, sense of symbol and beauty". With a rather emotional outburst, Senghor tells

ι.. that "we ought not to be neutral towards Négritude. We must be for Négritude with lucis passion.[4]

Certainly, these declarations by the chief apostle of Négritude are void of scientific outlook, and consequently they are not based upon reason, but upon a mythical vision. From this point of view, one feels alienated from modernisation as defined before and that is the dilemma of Négritude as an ideology, and of every ideology which does not acclimatize itself to the modern spirit. And that is the dilemma of authenticity when it is separated from modernisation.

The second group is fascinated by Western civilization and, at the same time, it is aware that rapid changes are taking place in their countries so that the traditional culture is being modified or coloured by the changing situation. And this changing situation is not separated from what is happening in the outside world, that means, it is not separated from the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism. Consequently, this forces this group of intelligentsia to state that secularization which is the spirit of modernisation, has a social content. In this case, one has to choose either capitalism or socialism. A citizen of a developing country involved in national liberation movemnt is inclined to choose socialism as a method of solving economic, political and social problems. But the dilemma, here, is that socialism, and especially scientific socialism is not satisfied with secularization but with secularism which can be defined as a way of living in which all appeals to anything beyond the horizon of human history are completely rejected.

The Algerian Moslem thinker, Malek Ben Nabi, in his book. "Conditions of Renaissance" mentions two conditions; one negative, the other affirmative. He means by negative condition, destruction of the factor of deterioration and this is done by Mohamed Abdou

(p.122). But it was neglected by religious leaders. So the affirmative condition, which is the foundation of Islamic society, is still confused.

As confirmation of such statement the following and interesting event is mentioned. A letter was sent by Mohamed Abdou (April, 8, 1904) to Tolstoi, through one of Tolstoi's friends named S.C. Cockerell, sympathising Tolstoi's ideas. The Egyptian Mufti says, "The Light of your thoughts has shown upon us and in our skies the suns of your ideas have risen, making a cord of friendship between the minds of the intelligent here and your mind".

"You have grasped that man has been planted in this present existence that he may be watered by knowledge and that he may bear fruit by labour, which may be a weariness of body bringing repose to his mind, and a lasting effort through which his race may be elevated".

"You have cast a glance on religion which has shattered the illusions of distorted traditions and by this you have arrived at the fundamental truth of the Divine Unity".

Unfortunately, nobody in Egypt knows about Tolstoi's reply. It happened, being in Moscow (1968-1969), I visited Tolstoi's Museum where I found out Tolstoi's reply (1904-12 May). At the end of his letter he asked the Mulfi about Bahaism.

What could one expect?

A reply from the Mufti, but I didn't find it. Instead I found a letter from Cockerell to Tolstoi (June 29, 1906), telling him that "The good Mufti of Egypt, whose letter to you I forwarded two years ago, died on his way to Europe. He left no one with his all embracing charity of outlook to take his place, and continue his work-which was briefly, to do to his religion what you have done for the Christian religion-to clear it of the encumbrances of its misguided interpreters and of

foolish dogma".

Two important questions are to be raised:

1- Why did Tolstor's reply disappar in Egypt?

2- Why didn't the Mufi answer Tolstoi's question?

These two questions confirm what Malek Ben Nabi has said about the absence of the affirmative condition; that means the absence of true renaissance which is the first step towards the liberation of man. And that is the dilemma of the people of the third world.

Lack of renaissance implies absence of critical thinking, and absence of critical thinking implies presence of taboos.

Translation of Abou's letter

Ain Shams
near Cairo
Egypt
April 8, 1904

To the illustrious Philosopher Leo Tolstoi,

Although I have not the pleasure of being personally acquainted with you I am not without knowledge of your spirit; the light of your thoughts has shone upon us and in our skies the suns of your ideas have risen, making a bond of friendship between the minds of the intelligent here and your mind.

God has guided you to the knowledge of the mystery of that inborn essential nature according to which He formed Man, and He has shown you the end towards which He has directed the human race. And you have grasped this, that man has been planted in this present existence that he may be watered by knowledge and that he may bear fruit by labour, which may be a weariness of body bringing repose to his mind, and a lasting effort through which his race may be elevated.

You have perceived the misery which has befallen men when they have turned away from the law of their nature, and have employed those powers, given to them to obtain happiness, in a way which has disturbed their repose and destroyed their peace.

You have cast a glance on religion which has shattered the

illusions of distorted traditions, and by this you have arrived at the fundamental truth of the Divine Unity.

You have raised your voice calling men to that where to God has guided you, and have gone before them in practise. And as by your words you have guided their intellects so by your deeds you have stirred up in them firm resolves and great aims. As your ideas were a light to bring back those who had gone astray so was your example in action a model to be imitated by searchers for truth.

And as your existence has been a reprimand from God to the rich so has it been a succour held out by Him to the poor. Verily the highest glory you have reached, the most sublime reward you have received for your labours in advice and teaching, is what they have called excommunication and interdict.

It was nothing-what you incurred from the heads of religion-nothing but a confession declaring to the world that you were not among those who had gone astray. Give praise to God that they have cut themselves off from you by their words as you also had abandoned them in their creeds and in their deeds.

This, and verily our hearts are in expectant desire of what shall come anew from your pen in the future of your life-may God prolong its extent and preserve your strength and may He open the doors of man's hearts to understand what you say, and may he urge their souls to imitate what you do. And salutations.

(Signed)

The Mufti of Egypt

Mohammed Abdou

Should the Philosoper do me the honour to write he will be pleased to do so in French the only European language known to me.

Tolstoi's letter to the Mufti

Cher ami,

J'ai reçu votre bonne et trop louangeuse lettrer et je m'empresse d'y répondre en vous assurant du grand plaisir, qu'elle m'a procurée en me mettant en communication avec un homme éclaire quoique d'une autre croyance, que celle dans laquelle je suis né et fus élevé, mais de la même religion, car les croyances sont différentes et il y en a plusieures, mais il n'y a qu'une seule religion; la vraie. J'espère ne pas me tromper en supposant, d'après votre lettre, que la religion que je confesse est la même que la votre, celle qui consiste à reconnaitre Dieu et sa loi-celle d'aimer son prochain et de faire à autrui ce qu'on voudrait qu'on vous fit. Je crois que tous les vrais principes religieux découlent de celui là et sont les mêmes pour les juifs, comme pour les Brahmans, Bouddistes, Chrétiens et Mohamétans. Je crois que plus les religions se remplissent de dogmes, de prescriptions, de miracles, de superstitions, plus elles désunissent les hommes et même produisent l'inimitié, et plus au contraire elles se simplifient et s'épurent, plus elles atteignent le but idéal de l'humanité - l'union de tous; c'est pourquoi votre lettre m'a été très agréable et je voudrais rester en communication avec vous.

Que pensez-vous de la doctrine du Bab de Bah-Ullah, et de ses adhérents?

Recevez, cher Mufti Mohamed Abdou, l'assurance de la sympathie de votre ami.

Leon Tolostoi

1904, 12 Mai

Notes:

(*) Paper presented at the XVII Pakistan Philosophical Congress, Lahore, Pakistan, October, 1975.

(1) Oeuvres de Descartes, tomex, Paris, 1908, p. 360.

(2) The English word "secular" derives from the latin word "saeculum". Basically, saeculm is one of the two latin words denoting "world". (The other mundus). The relation of the two words is a complex one. Sæculm is a time-word used frequently to translate the greek word "æon", which also means age or epoch. Mundus, on the other hand, is a space-word used most frequently to translate the Greek word cosmos, meaning the universe as the created order.

(3) Kenneth Cauthen, Science, Secularization and God, New York, 1969, p. 32.

(4) L.S. Senghor, Prose and Poetry (selected and translated by J. Reed & C. Wakes, Oxford/London 1956), p. 96.

IDEOLOGIES and CIVILIZATION (*)

The attempt to study civilization from a scientific standpoint must necessairly encounter the problem of bias and objectivity. This problem is, in one sense, the root of what is known as the sociology of knowledge or, more specifically, the sociological study of ideology.

The origin of the sociological study of ideology can be traced back to many sources. Destutt de Tracy was the first person to use the term to refer to a "science of ideas". Bacon's theory of idols may be regarded as another precursor of the sociology of ideology. He argued that men could acquire knowledge of nature only if they rid their minds of imperfections. The Philosphers of the French Englightenment interpreted Bacon to imply that men cannot understand their society because their position in society forces them to select particular facts and to interpret them in a biased way.

The Marxist theory of ideology synthesized these insights, and placed the problem of ideology within a dynamic theory of class society.

Here a question has to be raised:

What caused the emergence of the class society?

It is the food crisis in the hunting society owing to the disappearance of large animals from wherever they could be easily

hunted, and to the changes of climate, which replaced the open happy hunting grounds by forests in some regions like western Europe or by deserts in others, as in Africa. These difficulties that men faced led to an intensive search for new kinds of food. This pursuit was to lead to the invention of the techique of agriculture, and this invention led to a new relation of man and nature. Man ceased to be parasitic on animals. In practising agriculture man controlled nature and thus achieved independence from external conditions. Individuals began to stress their claims to what they had produced and private property came into being with its inequalities of wealth, and thus the formation of social classes began to develop. Thus the transition from hunting to agriculture was transition to civilization. And that is why civilization had originated and took root in the well watered river valleys where cultivation by natural canals could be practised. Early civilizations were, accordingly, limited to a number of favoured areas, the main ones known to us being those of Mesoptamia, of Egypt, and of the Indus valleys.

As a result of the agricultural civilization, the city was founded where the surplus from the villages could be collected and stored. The city was centred round a temple in which one God usually came to dominate assisted by his priests. From the beginning these priests ran the cities and formed the first administrative class. They arranged for the distribution of water and seed, for the timing of sowing and harvest, for storing of grain. Thus the establishment of the city revealed the origin of the class-divided society with its mythology. Myth was the central organizing principle and accordingly it gained an absolute authority in matters of science as well as in those of morals. But the history of civlization shows us how the human mind has managed to emancipate itself from the mythology of the agricultural civilization into something more rational, transformed Mythos into

Logos. Thus they rejected the complicated elaboration of theology and superstition. From that time to the present day the thread of rationalism has been lost at times, but it has been possible to find it again. It has been lost in the feudal civilization where the demand for useful science was reducd to a minimum so as the religious institutions could be in power to back feudalism by showing it to be an integral part of an unchangeable universe. Thus philosophy, on which theology was based, was assimilable to another worldly religion. Universities were mainly institutions for training the clergy. In this way a religious society was born assuming a divine character and tending to become an absolute authority. But the economy of feudalism faced a crisis that differed from food crisis in the hunting age. It was not a crisis of man against nature but a crisis of man against man, man imprisoned in a closed system of ideas against man emancipating himself from this system and paving the way towards an open system of ideas. The economy of feudalism proved to be against the development of this open system incarnated into the structure of capitalist system based on the principle of laissez-faire that was giving momentum towards the end of the Middle Ages. By the fifteenth century the bourgeois had grown so strong that they were beginning to transform a religio-feudalistic civilization into a secular one based on a capitalist system. This transformation needed an ideological struggle as a prelude to the emergence of this new civilization, The ideologoical struggle could be divided into two major phases: Renaissance and Enlightenment.

The Renaissance occupies an important place in world history for two reasons:

1. Going back to the Greek civilization, to Logos.

2. The cult of the individual.

These two ideological trends fitted the emergence of the capitalist class. As for Enlightenment, it is considered as the age of reason. The conclusions of the mid eighteenth-century writers challenged views of the history and nature of man and of the universe which were endorsed by the church of Rome. Kant is considered to be the philospher who summed up the achievement of Enlightenment. In "Critique of Practical Reason", moral duty was withdrawn from possible determination by the material world of perceived phenomena. This means a refusal to subordinate the material of social facts to religious and moral principles. In this sense the concept of social contract was adopted as a doctrinal counter balance to the theory of the divine rights of kings. It was adopted to show the sovereignty of the people as the ultimate source of authority.

But gradually the capitalist system was transformed into a closed system due to the emergence of monopoly and imperialism. Thus the emergence of socialism was a must.

Now the question is:

Could the socialist system prevent man from being imprisoned into a closed system?

In my opinion this could be possible if man is considered as an end in himself. And in this case man will discover his own destiny:

The conquest of comos based not on Mythos but on Logos.

Notes:

(*) Paper presented at the First Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference, Cairo, March 1978.

CRISIS of SOCIAL REVOLUTION
in the
ARAB WORLD (*)

A crisis is problematic.

And what is problematic is contradictory.

As for social revolution, it is considered as a qualitative transformation which means the supersession (Aufhebung) of the contradiction to a higher level.

Though this proposition is a consequent, we adopt it here as a premise for the study of the Arab world, and this adoption is legitimate in logical thinking.

Here two questions arise:

Where is the crisis?

What is the desired qualitative transformation?

The crisis of the Arab world is not absolute but temporalized. The time span in this paper is limited within four centuries starting from the Ottoman empire in the sixteenth century to the twentieth century.

If the crisis is problematic and contradictory, the question that arises is:

Where does the contradiction in the four centuries lie?

The contradiction lies between a desired communication between the Arab and the Western world on the one hand, and an actual separation on the other. The witnesses of the desired communication are four:

First witness: the missions sent by Mohammed Ali to Europe, particularly to France, with the intention to transmit the Western culture through translation and Arabicization. Rifa'a al-Tahtawi is the pioneer of this trend.

Second witness: a group of distinguished Lebanese thinkers, pioneered by Butrus al-Bustani and Ahmed Faris al-Syidyaq, who in 1870 published a political newspaper and a scientific journal with the purpose to transmit Western ideas. Due to the civilizational backwardness of the Ottoman empire under the rule of Sultan Abdulhamid, the disciples of the two thinkers migrated to Cairo where they continued to publish a periodical which they had founded in Beirut in 1876 under the title "al-Muqtataf". The first issue published in Cairo came out in 1885. The articles published in this periodical revolved round the pivotal idea that science is the basis of civilization and society, and that the Arab reason should assimilate this fact. One of the leading editors of this periodical was Shibli Shumayyil who in 1867 directed a correspondence to Sultan Abdulhamid in which he stated that the Ottoman empire lacked three things; science, justice and freedom. Science, according to Shumayyil is derived from the writings of Huxley and Spencer in England, and Haeckel and Buchner in Germany.

Third witness: a book by Farah Autun entitled “Ibn Rushd and his Philosophy”, published in 1903, in which he adopts the philosophy of

Averroes as guideline in his advocacy of secular mind. This is clear from Antun's dedication of his book to "the new shoots of the east" in Islam, Christianity and other religions, by whom he means: "Those men of common sense in every community and every religion of the east who have seen the danger of mingling the world with religion in an age like ours, and have come to demand that their religion be placed on one side in a sacred and honoured place, so that they will be able really to unite, and to flow with the tide of the new European civilization, in order to be able to compete with those who belong to it, for otherwise it will sweep them all away and make them the subjects of others". (p.23).

The significance of this dedication is that secularization is an indication of European civility, and must be the sign of the east's civility too if it desires to become civilized.

Fourth witness: Sheikh Ali Abdul-Raziq in his book "Islam and the Foundation of Government" published in 1925, in which he refers to Hobbes and Locke, denying the Caliphate as an Islamic system of government: "The fact that is confirmed by reason and to which past and modern history testifies is that God's laws neither rest on the kind of government which the jurisprudence call Caliphate nor on those upon whom they bestow the title of Caliph. Furthermore, the goodnss of Muslims in this world does not depend on either of these. We are not in need of such Caliphate either for our religion or our worldly affairs. Indeed, we could say more; the Caliphate has been and is still catastrophic to Islam and Muslims and the source of all evil and corruption". He then denies the relation between religion and state: "The Sultants have circulated the error among people, namely, that the Caliphate is a religious office making religion, thus, a shield with which they protect their thrones and defend themselves against their

dissenters. Having popularized this view in many diverse ways, they could ultimately persuade the people that the obedience of Imams is equivalent to obedience of God and rebellion against them amounts to rebellion against God. They even went as far as announcing that the Sultan is God's successor on earth and His extended shadow on His subjects". (p. 102).

After having mentioned the four witnesses, there remains a question as to their destiny. They were all aborted by the advocates of seperation.

The abortion of the first witness, Rifa'a al-Tahtawi, was accomplished by the witness himself. He copied the Western culture that prevailed in the eighteenth century without assimilation, for he did not understand that that century is the age of Enlightenment, that is, the age of liberation of reason from any authority save that of reason. He warned against belief in secularization on the assumption that it sometimes contradicts with the "shari'a". In his criticism of the people of the city of Paris Rifa'a writes in his book "Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Paris" published in 1834; "If you mention Islam to the people of Paris in contrast to the natural sciences, they would not believe in anything contained in the holy books which is not in conformity with natural phenomena". Rifa'a, therefore, draws the reader's attention to the fact that "the philosophical sciences of the Philosophers of Paris are full of blasphemy and contradict with all religious books. Therefore, he who wishes to indulge in the French language that contains a sort of philosophy, has to be in full command of the Quran and the Sunna or else his faith will be lost". (pp. 152-53). He says this after having translated, during his stay in France, twelve booklets and read "Esprit des Lois" by Montesqueiu and "Social Contract" by Rousseau and "Dictionnaire Philosophique" by Voltaire. This means

that Tahtawi, while copying the European culture in the eighteenth century, was at the same time warning against the assimilation of this culture. The reason is that Rousseau, Voltaire and Montesquieu were advocating the establishement of a society not founded on religion but on civil bases because society is man-made and its laws have, therefore, to be made by man. Hence, we think that Albert Hourani in his book "Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age" (1798-1939), was mistaken in stating that the thought of the French Enlightenment had an impact on Tahtawi and on the Egyptian mind through Tahtawi.

The abortion of the second and third witnesses was realized due to the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood movement which called for the foundation of a religious society and for which Sheikh Mohammed Abduh paved the way. In the hot controversial argument between Abduh and Farah Antun over the latter's book "Ibn Rushd and his Philosophy", which ultimately led to their separation, Abduh stated that the separation of religion and state was not only undesirable, but impossible. Consequently, the Muslim Brotherhood movement emerged as a crystallization of this pivotal idea. Sayyed Qutb, the theoretician of the movement, says in his book "Landmarks on the Way": "Islam knows only two kinds of societies: the Islamic society and the pagan society. The Islamic society is that in which Islam is incarnated as dogma. The pagan society is that in which Islam in neither incarnated nor does it govern society's faith. The pagan society may take many forms; it may take the form of a society that denies the existence of God and interprets history in a materialist dialectical way and adopts what it calls scientific socialism as a system. It may also take the form of a society that does not deny God's existence, but reduces Him to the realm of heaven and isolates Him from the realm of earth. So it does not apply God's law on its life style

nor does it judge according to His morals which He fixed as eternal values in people's lives, Such society allows people to worship in religious establishments, churches and mosques, but prohibits them from demanding the rule of Shari'a, It, thus, denies or suspends God's divinity on earth; (pp. 105-106).

There remains the abortion of the fourth and last witness, Ali Abdul-Raziq, which was brought about by the verdict passed by the council of Ulama headed by Sheikh of al-Azhar, which condemned Adbul-Raziq and dismissed him from the circle of Ulama. As a result of this verdict, Abdul-Raziq's name was lifted from the records of al-Azhar and from those of other institutes. He was also dismissed from any kind of job and from receiving any payment from any institution, and was disqualified for undertaking any public post either religious or non-religious.

Despite these measures, The Muslim Brotherhood movement in the Arab world was opposed by two parties: the Baath Party and the Communist Party. The Baath Party was founded in Damascus in 1940, and spread later in Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon. At the beginning of its formation, the ideology of the party had an Islamic-Arabic content in the sense that Islam represents the Arab's national culture. The party also objected to the separation of religion from nationalism. However, when the Socialist Party, headed by Akram al-Horani, joined the Baath Party, the content of nationalism became the social revolution in the sense of redistribution of wealth and limiting land ownership and a guarantee of a minimum level of living. Yet, the party, after its development, relied upon the army to realize the social revolution, entered into an alliance with Gamal Abdel-Nasser and announced the unity between Egypt and Syria, which caused a conflict with the Egyptian and Syrian Communist parties, This caused the setback of

social revolution and the succession of the unity soon followed. The task of the thinker is, therefore, to analyse the significance of this correlation. The Arab Communist parties, due to their ideologies, are committed to the social revolution, yet are, at the same time, in conflict with the so-called revolutionary Arab regimes.

The question then is:

Why this conflict?

For two reasons:

The first reason is the fact that Marxist thought can never be assimilated without Enlightenment. Enlightenment, however, is rejected in the Arab world until now. The necessity of Enlightenment as a starting point for Marxist thought is stated by Engels in his book "Socialism; Utopian and Scientific": "Modern socialism... in its theoretical form... originally appears as a more developed and allegedly more consistent extension of the principles laid down by the great French Philosophers of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century". (p. 45) He goes on to say: "We saw how the French philosophers of the eighteenth century, the forerunners of the Revolution, appealed to reason as the sole judge of everything in existence. A rational state, a rational society, were to be founded..." (p. 49).

Consequently, the absence of Enlightenment in the Arab world led to the abortion of Marxist thought. However, someone might object by saying that there are Marxist parties in the Arab world. But this claim is inaccurate because these parties are engaged in practical rather than theoretical problems which turn Marxism into Pragmatism disguised under Marxist terminology.

The second reason consists in the fact that the revolution of the

Arab regimes is of a verbal rather than an ideological nature. Critical thinking is permitted for everybody, with the exception of two spheres: religion and politics. The panorama of the Arab wolrd is the best evidence of what we say. The supposedly revolutionary regimes are in conflict with each other yet are, at the same time, in harmony with the so-called reactionary regimes.

For instance, the establishment of the United Arab Republic and the Iraqi revolution in 1958 produced a certain kind of alliance, and Saudi Arabia led the opposition to this alliance. Yet after the 1967 setback the Egyptian revolution was allied to the conservative Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Furthermore, the relations between the Arab regimes and the two superpowers are not ideologically founded but are of a pragmatic nature, that is, they depend on the receipt of economic and military aids. Hence, the transition from one superpower to another becomes possible.

To sum up, social revolution in the Arab world is in a crisis, And if any crisis is problematic and contradictory, the contradiction in the Arab world lies between the rejection of the path of European civilization and the inability to find an alternative path. And if social revolution means a qualitative transformation, which means that the contradiction has to be superseded to a higher level, the qualitative transformation is impossible if the contradiction is not superseded.

What is the consequence?

The answer is Buridan's Ass who, finding himself at a distance from his food and drink, died of hunger and thirst for he was unable to make the choice.

Notes:

(*) Paper presented at the EASRG Conference on "Youth, Intellectuals & Social Change", March 1980, Cairo.

INFLUENCES of OCCIDENTAL IDEOLOGIES
on
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (*)

The reign of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) is often taken to mark the start of westernization. But the beginnings of the westernization tendency have been pushed back by some Turkish historians to the early eighteenth century.

As early as 1716 a French officer, de Rocherfort, submitted a project for the formation of a body of foreign engineer officers in the Ottoman army. In 1720 another Frenchman, the convert David, known as Gercerk, organized a fire brigade in Istanbul. In the admiralty and navy too the new mood was felt. The admiralty offices were reorganized and an important change was made in ship construction.

As for ideologies we find fewer traces of Western influence. Here we have to mention the report presented in 1788 by Reis-ul-Kuttab, Ahmed Atif Efendi. He begins with a general account of the French Revolution. The most significant is the following:

It is one of the things known to all well informed persons that the conflagration of sedition and wickedness that broke out a few years ago in France, scattering sparks and shooting flames of mischief and tumult in all directions, had been conceived many years previously in the minds of certain accursed heretics.. In this way the known and

famous atheists Voltaire and Rousseau, and other materialists like them, had printed and published various works consisting, God preserve us, of insults and vilification against the pure prophets, of the removal and abolition of all religions.

Furthermore, in 1789, in a proclamation distributed in Arabic in Syria, Egypt and Arabia, a detailed refutation of revolutionary doctrines was offered:

In the name of God, the Merciful and the Compassionate.

O you who believe in the unity of God, community of Muslims, know that the French nation (may God devaste their dwellings and abase their banners, for they are tyrannical infidels and dissident evil doers, do not believe in the Unity of the Lord of Heaven and Earth, nor in the mission of the intercessor on the Day of Judgment, but have abandoned all religions, and denied the afterworld and its penalities.

The general nature of the report and the proclamation is clear from its own words. It is against any assimilation of the Western new ideology of the eighteenth century, that is, enlightenment, which was the work of three overlapping and closely associated generations. The first of these, dominated by Montesquieu and Voltaire, set the tone for the other two. The second generation reached maturity in mid century: Buffon was born in 1707, Hume in 1711, Rousseau in 1712, Diderot in 1713, Condillac in 1714, Helvétius in 1715, and d'Alembert in 1717. It was these writers who fused the fashionable anticlericalism and scientific speculations of the generation into a coherent modern Weltanschauung. The third generation, the generation of Holbach, Lessing and Kant, was close enough to the second, and to the survivors of the first.

The Philosophers intended to secure rational control of the world to liberate reason from the pervasive domination of theological presuppositions, in a word, to secularize the Weltanschauung, that is, to separate, first between religious institutions and state, and then

between religion and secular culture. In this sense, we can say that secularization is the true process, in the eighteenth century, "by which human existence comes to be determined by the dimension of time and history"(1).

Now a question arises:

if the Turkish generation of the eighteenth century had refused the spirit of secularization, what about the nineteenth century generation?

Bernard Lewis, in his book "The Emergence of Modern Turkey says that "from about the middle of the century (19th) the spread of Western ideas and the acclimatization of Western social and political attitudes among the Turks was greatly accelerated by the rise of a new Turkish literature, differing both in form and in content from classical Ottoman writings. In it the literature of France had begun to replace the classics of Iran as the source of inspiration and the model for imitation"(2). Then the author mentions three men credited with being the pioneers of this new literature; Ibrahim Sinasi (1826-71),Ziya Pasa (1825-80), and Namik Kemal (1840-88). But when one goes on reading the details it is obvious that the three were conservatives. Sina's political ideas contained no radical criticism of the existing order - Ziya Pasa attacked the fashions of his time, that is, forgetting the religious loyalty in all affairs, and instead following Frankish ideas. As for Namik Kemal, he tried to make the ideas of Montesquieu compatible with the *Seriat*. But this trial did not cope with the true spirit of Montesquieu which refuses to subordinate the material of political facts to religious principles, and in this sense, opens the royal road of political science. That is what distinguishes Montesquieu's great theoretical revolutions. The most famous of these is contained in two lines defining laws: "Laws are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things" (SL, 1,1).

In a nutshell, one could say that the three did not touch the central problem which was that of the religious basis of the empire. The one

who touched this central problem was Mustafa Kemal. In 1922, after his revolution, the Turkish National Assembly had abolished the sultanate and set up a shadow-caliphate with spiritual powers only. In 1924 the Assembly abolished them as well. This act was accompanied by a series of others, abolishing the ancient office of *Seyh-ul-Islam* and the Ministry of Seriat, closing the separate religious schools and colleges, and, a month later, abolishing the special *Seriat* courts in which theologian-judges had administered the Holy Law. The new order was confirmed in the republican constitution, adopted by the Grand National Assembly on 20 April 1924, which affirmed the legislative authority of the Assembly and reserved the judicial function to independent courts acting "in the name of the nation".

Speaking at the inauguration of the new law Faculty in Ankara in the fall of 1925, Kemal had criticized the old law and its practitioners as obstacles to progress:

This nation had accepted, as an immutable truth, the principle that the knowledge and means to create vitality and strength in the area of the general international struggle can be found only in contemporary civilization. In short, the nation.. esteems as a condition of its very existence the principle that its general administration and all its laws be inspired solely by temporal necessities... and a secular administrative mentality.

The new civil code put this view into practice in the most intimate sphere of life, that of family relationships. Under this code marriage became a civil contract (although a religious ceremony might be added if so desired). The husband's advantage, under Islamic law in securing divorce, was swept away. This was a major step in ensuring the legal equality not only of the sexes, but also of the sects. It sounded the death-knell for the *millet* system.

By 1926 the major measures of secularization had been carried out. Others followed, from time to time, at a slower pace. In 1928, the

clause that proclaimed Islam the religion of the Turkish state was stricken from the constitution.

The most significant phenomenon is that these radical changes aroused active and widespread resentment. The leader of this resentment was Seyh Said of Palu, the hereditary chief of Naksbendi dervishes who had urged his followers to overthrow the godless Republic and restore the caliph. The resentment had spread to much of the south-east, and seemed to offer a serious threat to the republican regime. In May 1926, a "Congress of the Caliphate" was called together at Cairo presided over by the Rector of Al-Azhar, in view of the priviledged position which this country enjoys among the Muslim peoples.(3) The congress reaffirmed the traditional view of the caliphate: it was legitimate, indeed it was necessary, since many legal obligations depended on it. But to be real it must have both spiritual and temporal powers.

By 1927 all opposition to the regime - military, religious, or political - had been silenced, and when elections were held in August and September 1927 for a third Assembly of the Turkish Republic, only one party, the Republican people's Party of Mustafa Kemal won . Thus the Kemalist regime came in possession of dictatorial powers. At the same time it did not look kindly on foreign capital, nor for that matter did foreign investors show any great desire to put money into Turkey. Local capitalist enterpries was lacking. As a result, it was inevitable that the regime should turn to the Soviet model to solve its problems and its economic crisis, and this in turn led to the signature of a Russo-Turkish treaty of friendship on 17 December 1925. But this diplomatic friendship brought no ideological influence. Kemal had made it clear from the start that, whatever might be the arguments for communism in Russia, he had no use for it in Turkey. On more than one occasion he disavowed any affinity between Kemalist and Communist ideologies, and as early as January 1921 he took steps to attack communist activities in Turky.

After the death of Ataturk, there was a religious restoration. The first open sign of religious opposition to the policy of secularization of the state appeared in 1940. The first issue that was publicly debated was that of religious education. At the beginning of 1949 religious education was reintroduced in Turkish schools. Religious activities increased and Mosque attendance rose considerably. Religious books were published on an ever increasing scale. By 1950 there were many periodicals devoted wholly or mainly to religious matters and to the propagation of religious ideas.

Now the question is:

What elements weakened the spirit of secularization?

This is the most crucial problem, not only of Turkey but also of the states of the Middle East. The answer is still not easy. As a tentative answer I think that the difficulties facing the propagation of the spirit of secularization are due to the absence of two factors, one concerns the superstructure, the other concerns the infra-structure. The superstructure lacks two movements; the reformation or what may be called critique of religious thinking, and the enlightenment or what may be called the liberation of reason from any authority except that of its own. The infra-structure is in need of a bourgeois class backed by science and reason.

Notes

(*) Communication presentée au Colloque international sur "Economie et Sociétés dans l'Empire Ottoman, Strasbourg, Juillet, 1980.

(1) Quoted by Arend van Leeuwen. Christianity in World History, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914, p. 331.

(2) Bernard Lewis, the Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd edition. Oxford 1968, p. 136.

(3) Sékaly, "Les Deux Congrés Musulmins de 1926", Revue du monde musulman, lxiv, 1926, 3-219.

IDENTITY STRUGGLE
in
RECENT MIDDLE EAST (*)

It is usually stated that national liberation movement, in recent Middle East, is nothing more than a quest for identity.

But what is identity?

Is it personal or societal?

There is a move from identity as an essential element in the continuity of personality to identity as political.

In 1739 Hume defined identity as an essential element in the continuity of personality. He says: "There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity".[1]

In 1950 Erik Erkson published his book “Chidhood and society” in which he uses the term identity to designate "the continuing I". He prefers identity to self or ego. because it conveys the idea of a two-way process. Identity includes the relationship of oneself to social institutions. Identity, thus, implies a social element. Later on, Erikson slides, in his article on “Psychosocial identity” in the new

Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (1968), towards specification of the identity of a collectivity: a new identity of womanhood, a German identity, the passive Indian identity. But the identity is still the identity which an individual can find through a collectivity.

In 1973 the concept of identity was used in its political sense in the concluding paragraph of a white paper called the "European Identity" approved by the foreign ministers of the Nine and published on the occasion of the European Summit meeting in Copenhagen on the 14th December 1973. It runs as follows:

"The European identity will evolve in a dynamic way as the construction of a united Europe proceeds. In their external relations, the nine propose progressively to undertake the definition of their identity in relation to other countries. They believe that in doing so they will strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy.

The same phenomenon is taking place in recent middle East, but with a different flavour, that is, what I name "Identity Struggle", and this term implies conflicting identities.

Now, the question is:

What is the essence of these identities?

Identity, as a mirror of culture or of ideology, is either secular or religious.

In Europe, with the emergence of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, accompanied by the industrial revolution and the breakdown of the religious institutions, secular identity replaced the religious identity of the Middle Ages.

What about recent Middle East?

If you glance at the map of recent Middle East you will see two antagonistic absolutes. though of the same kind, that is, semitic. one is based on the concept of the chosen people and the other on the exclusive goodness.. The reconciliation between them has been, up to the present moment, doomed to be abortive.

How?

The Jewish identity has been absolutized since antiquity. It has been incarnated in a certain religion where it is declared that it is a people that shall dwell alone, and shall not be reckoned among the nations. Thus, mankind was divided into Jews and Gentiles.

Now the question is:

To what extent has this dichotomy been preserved?

Or in other words:

What is the Jewish reaction to the influence of the Gentiles?

The most significant reaction was in the eighteenth century when Ashkenaz Jewery was enabled for the first time to come face to face with a new intellectual movement, that is, elightenment, or strictly speaking, the age of the sovereignty of reason. Among the enlighteners were men whose dislike of the Jews proved stronger than their idea that all men must be equal before the law. The idea that the Jews were innately evil was so widespread among the leaders of the French Enlightenment. The most influential of the enlightened anti-semites was Voltaire who put the following words into the mouth of Memmius, an imaginary correspondent of Cicro:

"They (the Jews) are all of them, born with a raging fanaticism in their hearts... I would not be in the least bit surprised if these people would someday become dangerous to the human race".[2]

In my own opinion, this antisemitic trend is due to the organic unity between Jewish religiosity and identity, whereas the enlighteners separted religion from identity. As a justification of this statement I refer to Patai's book "The Jewish Mind", and to his statement "Prior to it (Enlightenment) the question of Jewish religiosity and identity did not arise aside from a few exceptional cases. Internally, Jewish religion and the Jewish community had such a hold on the individual Jew that his Jewish observance and identification were his natural conditions"[3]

Moreover, the Jews in the Arab world did not experience the secular ideas because the European movement had not reached the Middle East. Consequently. there was nothing in the environment that could have enticed away studious young Middle Eastern Jews from the traditional intellectual field, that of the Talmud. Moreover, the general cultural stagnation which characterized the Muslim world until our own days extended into the life of the Jewish communities as well. Thus the traditional hold of Jewish religiosity and the Jewish community remained unbroken until the great upheaval of the establishment of Israel.

Turning our attention to the Arab identity we find that it is also not separated from religion. Take Saudi Arabia being the vanguard of the Aab regimes whether the so called progressive regimes or the conservative ones. King Faisal aspired to avoid an incurable collision of Wahhabism with Western materialism. He protected his people from the mischief of socialism, the godlessness of communism and the liberal democracies. He resolved to immunize the peninsula from every microbe of Marxian politics and to prevent, at any price, the radicalization of the Arab mind. Coping with the Saudi trend the Islamic militant groups emerged seeking for a new social order based on Islam, or strictly speaking, on the application of the Sharia (The Quran and Hadith) to life.

According to the Repentance & Holy Flight, Muslim brotherhood and Mujahedeen, Arab society had degenerated because it turned away from Islam. The remedy of the Arabs' malaise lies in Islam, which alone can give them the strength to struggle against Israel and guarantee their ultimate victory. The term used to describe this state of degeneration is Jahiliyya, that is, a combination of infedility, decadence and ignorance, similar to what was prevailing in pre-Islamic Arabia. The cultural atmosphere is always in favor of Islamic groups over the leftist counterparts. The reason for this is due to the accusation of the leftists, either of being atheists or agents of foreign power (usually the Soviet Union). Economic crises are proclaimed as being the result of a weakening of the adherence to Islam. Even the so called progressive regimes are unable to incarnate the spirit of secularization, According to these factors, Islamic militancy grows and becomes the inevitable alternative. Moreover, the Iranian Islamic revolution enhances and dazzles the imagination of the previous Islamic movements.

To conclude, both the Israelis and the Arabs continue to realize their dreams of a golden past. In order to achieve their goals each party tries to stick to its stagnated religious identity which goes in contradition with another stagnated religious identity.

Notes:

(*) Paper presented at the Fifth EASRG Conference, April, 1983.

(1) Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, (Book 1, IV, Sect. IV).

(2) Voltaire, Lettres de Memmius à Ciceron, in Oeuvres Complètes, 52 vols, Paris.

(3) Patai, The Jewish Mind, New York, 1977, p. 397.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY MAN - ISM (*)

Human mind, by its very nature, strives to find a unifying concept not only in the various sciences, but also in the whole field of human knowledge. The human mind draws up a comprehensive view of separate facts, establishes relations among them and synthecises these relations into a simple entity, into an absolute.

A question here arises.

How does the human mind come to this simple entity, to this absolute?

It does so through its principal operation which is abstraction. This implies the encounter of the enquiring mind with objective reality and so it embodies something of the real nature of the conceptual creativity of the mind which knows it. Therefore, scientific theories are the product of an abstractive process and are stated in symbolic language which refers indirectly to perceived data. And that is why for half a century a process of de-objectification has taken place in the scientific domain. The scientist no longer claims that his symbols describe reality as it is in-itself. It is fairly widely accepted that the observer is a part of that which he observes so that the scientist's picture of the universe resides, in part at least, in the mind of the scientist himself.

A similar process of de-objectification has gone in the domain of religious thinking. A poing has now been reached when theology is being forced to realize that it must make a large-scale leap similar to that which quantum physicists were forced to make. In this sense, it is claimed that the Ultimate, which we call God, cannot be an "object".

Thus the absolute objet of the classical thinking in science and theology has disappeared. In making this statement we are not denying the existence of an objective world. There is nothing in any scientific theory which compels us to deny the reality of an objective world, neither in quantum physics nor in Einstein's theory of relativity. Each claims the impossibility of absolute objectivity and, more important, it claims the active role of the human mind.

This activity means that man can transcend(1) reality, and consequently can change it and shape it to suit human purposes. From this angle I understand Marx's famous phrase in his "Theses on Feuerbach", "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it". Consequently, philosophy is linked with ideology, because any ideology, to quote Engels, influences history. Such an ideology is a key instrument to promote the social order, otherwise it will lack transcendence, and as a result, lose its essence.

On the other hand, transcendence pushes ideology to total knowledge. This totality transforms ideology into an absolute, an "ism". The "ism", by its very nature, abolishes contradictions because it presupposes simplification. In this way, ideology is dogmatised and stands not only against revolution but also against evolution. In this case, the "ism" has to be negated by a "de-ism". "De" does not mean mere negation of ideology. it means negation of an ideology transformed into an "ism". If we are not aware of this meaning, an

optical illusion leads us to negate ideology as a whole on pretence that ideology is an absolute. So "re-ism" is implied into any "de-ism".

What does this means?

It means that the "ism" perpetually changes and never disappears. Therefore. "de-ism" means opposition to ideology as long as exclusivity of the claims to absolute truth presses towards totality, and thereby towards dictatorship, that is, towards abolition of freedom. Therefore, ideology is not, and should not be, an end in itself but a means of liberation of man from alienation which means separation of the products of oneself from oneself.

That is why, in the last thirty years, a new method called ecumenical dialogue has been introduced. One of its main characteristics is that it concerns itself not with "ism" but with "de-ism". The following terms are being used: de-sacralisation, de-mythologisation, de-dogmatisation. But these terms are an outcome of the movement of secularization vs secularism. Secularization implies a historical process, almost certainly irreversible, in which society and culture are delivered from tutelage of religious control and closed metaphysical world. Secularism, on the other hand, is the name for an ideology; a new closed world-view which functions very much like a new religion. Like any other "ism", it menaces the openness and freedom secularization has produced.

And if it happens that an ideology becomes an "ism", an absolute, a deviation is involved. Man sinks down into unconsciousness or, at least, loss of consciousness and this leads to the absence of faith in man.

To avoid such deviation one has to be close to the human pattern of truth which is relative and not absolute. Absolute truth is never

attained, but it is on the way; we are living in time of change, not in eternity.

On the other hand, there is a recent tendency towards the abandonment of ideology through absolutization of technology which is known as "de - ideologisation".

The trend of de-ideologisation in the advanced industrial society has its champions in the U.S.A. and Western Europe. These include A. Schlesinger. W. Rostow and R. Aron, who deny the existence of any difference in principle between the modern capitalist and the modern socialist society on pretence that these societies come to mutual agreements in the economically vital spheres where business and science are in partnership. This trend is summed up in the key phrase of Marcuse's social critique: the trend towards technological rationality.

"As a technological universe, advanced industrial society is a political universe, the latest stage in the realization of a specific historical project, namely, the transformation and organization of nature as the mere stuff of domination, As the project unfolds, it shapes the entire universe of discourse and action, intellectual and material culture. In the medium of technology, culture, politics, and economy merge into an omnipresent system. Technological rationality has become political rationality".[2]

Th .. is why the trend of de-ideologisation is based on technology on pretence that it is capable of coping with any contradictions in the realm of production, distribution and consumption. The old conflict between substructure and superstructure is overcome. In this sense technology is transformed into technicism.

One of the most significant defects of technicism is that it fails to

see the genuine dialectics of the relations of production and productive forces because it admits only the determinative role of technology in isolation from the human component of the productive forces.

In other words, if de-ideologisation means technicism, then it implies an "ism" which is "pseudo-ism" because it stands for a fetichism of empiricism and a denial of moral and human ideals. Consequently, de-ideologisation leads to de-humanisation of man.

Anyhow this theory of de-ideologisation is a decisive proof that man can never live without a certain "ism".

Hence a serious and overwhelming question arises:

What kind of "ism" should the twentieth century man adopt?

An open "ism" and not a closed one.

Is it possible?

Yes, if man is considered as an end in himself and not as a means, that is to say, humanisation of man in which man can be himself. Certain contemporary philosophical and theological trends are a good sign of the realization of this possibility. The Soviet philosopher M.B. Mitin states that there is not a single problem of the inner spiritual world of man which might not be the subject - or has not astually been - of a marxist analysis, psychological, logical, social and moral.(3)

Theology of secularity has been developed lately through Harvey Cox's book "The Secular City" (1965) and Robinson's book "Honest to God" (1968) Thus, theology, in this case, is reduced to anthropology.

In the end, these contemporary trends bring us close to Dietrich Bonhoeffer's thesis that man has come of age.(4)

Notes:

(*) Paper presented at the XV World Congress of Philosophy, Varna, Sofia, September, 1973.

(1) I use the word "transcendence" in the sense of transnatural and not in the sense of supernatural.

(2) H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, Boston, 1966, p. XVI.

(3) Ervin Holland, Philosophy in the Soviet Union, 1967, p. 10.

(4) D. Bonhoeffer, Prisoner for God, New York, 1957, pp. 121, 126.

PEACE & PROGRESS (*)

The title of this paper necessitates a clarification of two concepts: peace and progress. Concerning peace we have to distinguish between two meanings. We say that a certain country is currently at peace with its adjacent neighbours. When we speak thus, we are using the word "peace" negatively to mean the absence of actual fighting. In contrast to this negative meaning of the word peace, there is the positive meaning when we use it to say that peace exists among people living in civil society under civil government and that is called civil peace based not on the absolute but on the relative, not on dogmas but on civil laws.

But peace today is of global nature as long as interdependence of states prevails. Thus peace cannot be confined to one community but to a global community that includes all people on earth.

Concerning the concept of progress, there was nothing in the heritage of antiquity to support this concept. Man's pilgrimage was seen as a rise from a sinful fall to ultimate grace. Thus, the terrestrial history is an interlude between two unchanging eternities.

It was with the beginning of the seventeenth century that the notion of progress was known and elaborated. It meant that things will get better in the future and implied also the assumption that a pattern of change exists in the history of mankind. This means that the notion

of progress involves a synthesis of the past and a vistion of the future.

Within this context, Condorcet, in the eighteenth centure, the age of Enlightenment, expressed his notion of progress in his book entitled "Sketch for a historical picture of the human mind" (1975) and has often been regarded as the authentic testament of the Enlightenment, written by the last of the Philosophers. He divided the historical progress of mankind into nine stages adding a tenth epoch in which he sketched his hopes for the future on the pretence that the experience of the past, the observation of the progress that the sciences and civilisation have already made in the analysis of the progress of the human mind and of development of its faculties, are the strongest reasons for believing that nature has no limit to the realization of man's hopes.(1)

But this concept of the future is of secular nature whereas it was of a religious nature in the fifth century according to St. Augustine's concept in his famous book "The City of God", where he looked forward to the movement of history from life in earthly city to life in heavenly city. Such extra logical preoccupation continued to affect thought and action throughout the subsequent centuries.

Throughout the nineteenth century, side by side with the spirit of progress that animated the minds of the Philosophers there was to be seen slowly but developing a kind of malaise affecting the very premises on which the spirit of progress rested. It was a reaction against modernity which is figured in the major phenomena such as industrialism, technology, science, secularization and liberation from traditional values. We get intimations of it from Burke, and Durkheim.

Burke's writings and speeches rotate round the following items: "reverence for the divine disposition, reliance upon tradition, conviction that men are equal in the sight of God. In his book "Reflections on the

Revolution in France" (1790), these items generally find their most earnest expression. Society is indeed a contract and the state ought not to be considered nothing better than a partnership. "As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living but also those who are dead, and those who are born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primaeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher nature, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place.

Now two questions have to be put:

1. What is the primaeval contract of eternal society?

2. What is the inviolable oath which holds all physical natures in their appropriate places?

I suggest that the contract and the oath were meant to be divinely appointed. Therefore, the French Revolution runs counter to the divine order, and this is the meaning of what Burke called "General Earthquake" in the western world.

Concerning Durkheim, though conserved to describe the evolutionary progress of society from "mechanical" to "organic" solidarity, took notice of the tendency for the level of advancement of society to be inversely related to human happiness. Durkheim tells us that modernity brought with it progress but at the same time a hightening of insecurity, and increasingly, of loss of purpose in living. All this analysis was brought to a focus in Durkheim's study of suicide. In the increase of suicide in the West Durkheim thought that the malaise of an entire society can be seen.

By the beginning of the twentieth century Einstein's theory of relativity surpassed Newton's system and paved the way for nuclear physics which played a great role in the emergence of nuclear weapons and consequently a threat to the survival of man on earth. A new term was coined by the American philosopher, John Sommerville, that is, "omnicide" which means the end of all humans by some humans.(2)

But we have to ask:

This omnicide is an outcome of what?

It is either an outcome of science or of man. In my opinion, it is an outcome of both. Science is a creative outcome of man defined as a creative animal.

But what is creativity?

Creativity is the ability of human reason to establish new relations for the purpose of changing reality. This defintion implies two essential concepts: new relations and changing reality. What matters here is that changing reality may be for the best or for the worst. And the criterion of distinguishing between the best and the worst is due to whether we humanize or dehumanize reality. And I mean by humanizing reality adapting reality in order in to cope with the essential needs of the human beings, that is, to be conscious of being in unity and peace in this world.

Now let us investigate the history of science to clarify our definition of creativity and its forementioned consequences. I pick up Einstein's case. In their joint book "The Evolution of physics" Einstein and Infeld state the following: "a new concept appears in physics, the most important invention since Newton's time: the field. It needed great scientific imagination to realize that it is not the charges nor the

particles but the field in the space between charges and the particles.... The theory arises from the field problems. The contradictions and inconsistencies of the old theories force us to ascribe new properties in the space-time continuum, to the scene of all events in our physical world. The relativity theory develops in two steps. The first leads to what is known as the special theory of relativity, applied only to inertial co-ordinate systems, that is, to systems in which the law of inertia, as formulated by Newton, is valid. The special theory of relativity is based on two fundamental assumptions: Physicl laws are the same in all co-ordinate systems, moving uniformly, relative to each other, and the velocity of light always has the same value. From these two assumptions, fully confirmd by experiment, the properties of moving rods and clocks, their changes in length and rythm depending on velocity, are deduced. The theory of relativity changes the laws of mechanics. The old laws are invalid if the velocity of the moving particle approaches that of light. The new laws for a moving body as formulated by the relativity theory are splendidly confirmed by experiment. A further consequence of special theory of relativity is the connection between mass and energy. Mass is energy and energy has mass. The two conservation laws of mass and energy are combined by the relativity theory into one, the conservation law of mass-energy".(3)

After this creative theory emerged the atomic technology that was put to change reality. But in which direction, for peace or for war? If we go fast from 1905 to Reagan's speech in which he has labelled his "Star wars" or SDI strategic defence initiative, we have to ask: Who was backing this project? the Christian fundamentalism headed by J. Falwell. And this means that dogmatism is behind the misuse of science.

Who was guilty on the afternoon of August 6, 1945, when an atom bomb had been dropped over Hiroshima: the scientist or the dogmatist?

Heisenberg's answer is as follows: the word "guilt" does not really apply, even though all of us were links in the causal chain that led to this tragedy. Otto Han and all of us have merely played our part in the development of modern science. We know from experience that it can lead to good or to evil. But all of us were convinced, and especially our nineteenth century rationalist predecessors with their faith in progress, that with growing knowledge good would prevail and evil could be kept under control. The possibility of constructing atom bombs never seriously occurred to anyone before Hahn's discovery; nothing in physics at the time pointed in that direction. To have played a part in so vital a scientific endevour cannot possibly be considered guilt".(4)

But if the scientist is not guilty who else is guilty? In my opinion the guilty is the dogmatist who thinks that he grappled the absolute truth and wishes to impose it by force. That dogmatist was the homo faschistus. "Believe, obey, fight" was the injunction Mussolini gave to the Italian masses.

To conclude one may say that the main obstacle against global peace is dogmatism. Creativity, according to my definition, is its antidote.

Notes:

(*) Paper submitted to the Conference of the "Academy of Humanism" on "Challenges to the Enlightenment" in Utrecht, the Netherlands, 1992.

(1) Keith Michael Baker (ed.), Condorcet, "Selected Writings', The Bobbs-Merril Company, Indianapolis, 1976, p. 259.

(2) J. Sommerville, Nuclear War in Omnicide, quoted in Michael Allen Fox and Leo Groazke, Nuclear War, Peter Lang, 1985.

(3) Eintein & Infeld, "The Evolution of Physics", Cambridge University Press, 1971, p. 244.

(4) Heisenberg, "Physics and Beyond" Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1971, p.194.

THE FUTURE QUARTET
CONDITION for a UNIFIED WORLD

The title of this paper refers to the future and not to the past, and this leads us to assume that the priority should be for the future. But this priority is not a choice of our own but it is a must because, in my own opinion, human history moves from the future to the past and not vice versa. In this sense, one has to formulate a futuristic vision which could be scientific due to the scientific technological revolution and in particular the space conquest. This vision could be called: the quartet, that is, universalism, globalism, interdependence and creativity.

Universalism means studying the cosmos from within the cosmos and not from our globe. Globalism means studying our globe, the earth, from without, from the cosmos and not from within. In this case, the earth will be seen as one unit without divisions or dichotomies. Consequently, regional problems cannot be solved except within the global level. And at the same time global problems will have their impact on the regional level. Thus, globalism leads to interdependence.

Now, as these three phenomena are new ones, therefore, the problematics hidden into them need a new way of thinking and that is creative thinking. In this sense, we could speak about the "Future Quartet" that is "UGIC".

Now, a question has to be raised:

How could we realize this future Quartet?

Or in other words, this question could be put in a negative way, that is, what are the obstacles against the realization of the future Quartet.

First, religious fundamentalisms. They are the truthlords of the absolute truth, and consequently, they are the agents of violence, terrorism and assault on the pretence that they are fighting against the would be annihilation of the absolute truth. In this sense, fundamentalism could be put under a wider perspective, that is, dogmatism. Thus, if we aim at eliminating religious fundamentalisms we have to de-dogmatize the dogmas to pave the way for a new method of thinking, that is, creative thinking which could be developed in the field of education to reshape the world society in order to act in uncertainty and not in certainty.

Second, the emergence of what could be called parasitic capitalism which is the most dangerous symptom and a trademark of our age. It lives on the drug traffic which has nothing to do with production which is the basis of human civilization. In addition, the drug traffic exceeds the petrol trade according to a report published by "Club of Rome" in 1991 under the title "The First Global Revolutio[1]. It is stated that due to the great influence of drug traffic, the market forces have been gripped by the madness of profit by any means. But what is worse than this drastic phenomenon is the organic unity between religious fundamentalisms and parasitic capitalism, in the sense that the fundamentalists are funded by this new economic class according to a report revealed by the C.I.A. and published in (L'Express, 2 Decembre, 1933) in which it is stated that the Pakistani

Generals who were training the Islamic fundamentalists to fight against the Soviets were in charge of the trade of Heroine in the U.S.A. Consequently, there was no charge against those who were trading in the drugs in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Third, the nation state. From the moment the first atomic bomb exploded, the central question of our time has turned on whether this "absolute" weapon can be compatible with the continued existence of masses organized in nation-states? If nations are unwilling to relinquish their sovereign rights, might not some future quarrel spark a global conflagration that would leave the world in ruins? Given the conflict inherent in the state system, nuclear war is a matter of time. But one can logically draw other prescriptions that would avoid the ultimate catastrophe. One of these prescriptions is complete disarmament. However, theoretically feasible this solution to the problm of conflict in the state system may be, it is unlikely to be the answer to the dilemma of nuclear weapons in a world of political conflict.

The belief that disarmament is the solution in the state system is based on the assumption that the arms race causes wars. To attribute wars to arms is to confuse cause and effect. Although an arms race reflects political tensions between nations, it does not cause these tensions. Nations do not fight because they possess arms. Rather, they possess arms because they believe it might someday be necessary to fight. Since arms are a symptom of interstate political conflict, it is an optical illusion to expect nations to disarm as long as conflict persists. Thus the question is:

How can interstate conflict be eliminated?

In order to give a scientific answer one has to analyze the origin of the state to see the root of interstate conflict. In recent theories of

political development which attempt to explain the origin of the modern state, securing identity, procuring legitimation and social integration are listed as general system problems. However, the most important system problem is the problem of legitimation, that is, the claim of a certain political order to be recognized. But this problem is not a speciality of modern times. The formulas of legitimum imperium or legitimum dominium were widespread in Europe since Aristotle if not since Solon.

In ealry civilizations the ruling families justified themselves with the help of myths of origin. Thus, the pharaohs represented themselves as gods or as sons of gods. With the imperial development not only the ruler had to be justified, but also the political order. Let us recall Hobbes; postulate that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war... of every man against every man. And to escape the evils of war the members of a community enter into a "covenant" by which they all bind themselves to subordinate themselves to the will of an autocrat agreed upon. And that is why Hobbes argued in the interests of "absolute" monarchy, and accordingly in the interests of what was previously rejected, that is, the divine right of kings. And the same with the general will of Rousseau as an outcome of the social contract. This means that the problem is not with the abolition of the Divine right of the King, but with the abolition of the absolutization, or, srtictly speaking, the dogmatization of the state. When the state is dogmatised it creates a deception about the timelessness of authority. The Nazis used the image of a state enduring a thousand years to justify absolute power. Stalin used the image of his boundless strength and a pseudo-love for the people to extract from them absolute submission. And if the states are based on the absolute, whether

religious or secular, we will have struggle of absolutes because absolutism demands an equally absolute negation and this involves the image of an absolute enemy. And this means that the state, in this case, is erected on the fear of a neighboring state which is supposed to be possessed by a malevolent devil and thus it becomes a sacred duty to have the most destructive weapons.

In order to abolish this enemy image the state is in need of being in a condition of relativisation and not absolutisation because relativization permits tolerance. But there are difficulties connected with the concept of tolerance which are to be related to the concept of equality. Kant says "it is difficult for every individual to free himself from the incapacity for responsibility which has almost become second nature to him. It is, however, more likely, that the public can enlighten itself. Indeed it is almost inevitable provided only that the public is allowed to enjoy freedom"(2). This means that tolerance is related to the public and not to the individual. But, in this case, there is a possibility that the public could control the state and function as an absolute disguised in the public opinion. This dilemma could be solved if we make use of the achievements of the scientific technological revolution. The most important achievement is the emergence of what could be called (mass-) such as mass-media, mass-communication, mass-production, mass-culture, mass-man.

What concerns me is the phenomenon of the mass-man. This phenomenon involves the masses and the individual at a time provided that both should be enlightened in the real meaning of enlightenment, and that is, the liberation of reason from any sovereign authority except that of reason which rejects the process of absolutisation or dogmatisation. And this leads to a radical change in the essence of the state in the sense that we will not have independent states but interdependent states and this, in turn, helps the foundation of the New World Order which is based on universalism and globalism.

Notes:

(*) Paper submitted to Laval colloquum on Towards a Responsible and Solidary World, June, 1996.

(1) Kant, Critique de la Raison Pure, trad. Barni, Flammarion, Paris, 1928, I, II, 30-36.

(2) A. King & B. Schneider, The First Global Revolution, U.K. 1991.

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